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COLLOQUIA & CONFERENCES
CONVENTION, CONVERSATION AND PRESUPPOSITION
Mandy Simons
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University
April 21, 2005
Thursday, 4:00pm-6:00pm
BA (Close/Hipp), Room 008
In this talk, I will offer a novel account of the nature of presupposition.
I will propose that presuppositions are properties, not of sentences, nor
of speakers, but of utterances. Specifically, the presuppositions of an
utterance are propositions which are required -- in a sense to be specified
-- in order for the utterance to make sense to the addressee. I will spell
out the notion of making sense in Gricean terms: an utterance makes sense
to an interpreter just in case she can assign to it some interpretation
which allows her to attribute full cooperativity to the speaker. The next
step will be to articulate what it is for a proposition to be required in
order to allow an interpreter to make sense of an utterance. I will argue
that the relevant requirement concerns a somewhat complex relation which
must hold between the proposition in question and the interpreter.
Having laid out the view of presupposition, I will show that many of the
standard properties of presupposition are natural explicable in terms of
the account, including the fact that presuppositions must generally be
noncontroversial for the conversational participants.
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