



*Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice*

**2010 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW  
ENFORCEMENT CENSUS:  
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT USE AND  
EVALUATION OF THE SOUTH  
CAROLINA INTELLIGENCE AND  
INFORMATION CENTER**

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The South Carolina Law Enforcement Census is an annual survey conducted by the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of South Carolina. The survey alternates on a year-to-year basis between a general census of South Carolina law enforcement agency characteristics and surveys on special issues confronting agencies in the state. Previous special-issue surveys have explored various topics including patterns of gang activity in South Carolina and standards of law enforcement training. The 2010 South Carolina Law Enforcement Census focused on local law enforcement's use and evaluation of the South Carolina Intelligence and Information Center (SCIIC), also known as the South Carolina Fusion Center.

The events of 9/11 led law enforcement in the United States to become more involved in intelligence efforts to support homeland security. As part of this paradigm shift, most states and a few large law enforcement agencies created intelligence fusion centers, which have the intended goal of being the primary conduit for connecting state and local law enforcement agencies to the increasing homeland security efforts of federal agencies. Many of these centers have moved beyond their initial anti-terrorism-only focus to an "all crimes" approach, essentially taking an intelligence approach to day-to-day criminal activity in addition to terrorism activity. This "all crimes" orientation is consistent with the broader intelligence-led policing movement that has emerged in law enforcement over the past decade. Despite this expanded role, however, little is known about the actual operations of fusion centers. While there have been a number of publications produced by federal agencies and law enforcement associations proscribing steps for the development and functioning of these centers, empirical research on their operations is non-existent. This year's study attempts to partially fill this knowledge gap by examining the connection between the state fusion center in South Carolina (the SCIIC) and local law enforcement agencies within the state.

The present study employed three data collection strategies to capture information on the use and evaluation of SCIIC products and services: (1) a survey of law enforcement executives, (2) a survey of law enforcement personnel, and (3) an analysis of a database maintained by SCIIC of all requests for services made by agencies in the state. The analyses of the survey data and the database were guided by three research questions. Are the personnel of state and local agencies aware of the products and services provided by the SCIIC? How often do they review the products and use the services of the center? How do they rate the products and services and the center overall?

## FINDINGS

### *Executive Survey Results*

The executive survey asked a variety of questions that covered knowledge and review of SCIIC intelligence products, overall assessment of the SCIIC's utility to the executive's agency, the intelligence resources and practices of the executive's agency, and whether the executive had attended any training on intelligence of the SCIIC.

#### Key findings:

- The large majority of the executives reported that they received the various SCIIC intelligence products and usually reviewed them upon receipt. Moreover, they evaluated these reports positively, with more than 80% of the executives indicating that each of the products was quite a bit or very useful to them.
- South Carolina law enforcement executives also provided positive ratings for the overall usefulness of the center to their agency, with 43% reporting the SCIIC was very useful to their agency and 33% reporting it is moderately useful (scale: very useful, moderately useful, somewhat useful and not at all useful).
- Ratings for the overall usefulness of the SCIIC varied by the degree of support executives had for intelligence-led policing (ILP). Specifically, over 60% of executives stating that ILP is a high priority in their agency gave the SCIIC a very useful rating, compared to 44.1% for those giving ILP moderate priority, and 28.6% giving ILP low priority. Moreover, the percentages of executives that rated SCIIC services as only somewhat useful and not at all useful was highest in agencies with a low priority on ILP followed by those rating ILP as moderate priority.

### *Personnel Survey Results*

The personnel survey was distributed to a sample of South Carolina law enforcement personnel that excluded agency chief executives. The survey was intended to capture insight from those individuals who are more likely to use the SCIIC on a daily basis in the course of their work. The sample was composed of individuals on a distribution list for receiving intelligence products from the SCIIC. Similar to the executive survey, the agency personnel were questioned about their knowledge and review of SCIIC intelligence products, overall assessment of the SCIIC's utility to their agency, and whether they had attended any training on intelligence of the SCIIC. In addition, they were also asked about their use of intelligence services provided the SCIIC, such as database queries, investigative support services, and data analysis efforts.

#### Key findings:

- Survey results regarding the intelligence products were similar to the executive results. The large majority of personnel reported they read the intelligence products most of the

time or always. Most personnel also reported that the products are quite a bit or very useful, with 75% or more the respondents providing these responses for each product.

- 56.9% personnel reported using one or more SCIIC services during 2009, with rates of use highest among personnel assigned to investigations (70.1%) and crime/intelligence analysis (75.0%).
- Personnel who reported having received any type of intelligence training were more likely than those who did not to have utilized SCIIC services in 2009 (69% versus 47%, respectively).
- A sizable number of personnel reported they were unaware of certain services provided by the SCIIC. Just over 50% indicated that they were unaware of the Consolidated Lead Evaluation and Reporting (CLEAR) database, partial vehicle tag analysis, and facial recognition services. Similarly between 40% and 46% reported that they were unaware of the SCIIC's services for checking probation and parole status, locating fugitives, and the production of flow charts and maps.
- Similar to the executives, the surveyed personnel provided positive ratings for the overall usefulness of the center to their agency, with 61% reporting the SCIIC was very useful to their agency and 27% reporting it is moderately useful (scale: very useful, moderately useful, somewhat useful and not at all useful).
- Personnel who received intelligence training specifically provided by SLED or the SCIIC were more likely to rate the SCIIC as being very useful to their agency (67%) than were personnel who did not receive such training (52%).

### *Request Database Analysis Results*

While the surveys provided evaluations of the SCIIC from different perspectives, they did not give an overall measure of the frequency at which agencies in the state use the center's services. As a result, additional analysis was conducted on all requests for SCIIC services made by the 294 state, county, municipal, campus, , and special service law enforcement agencies in South Carolina in 2009. The purpose of the analysis was to examine the prevalence of use and types of services provided by the SCIIC.

Key findings:

- Approximately half (49%) or 143 of the 294 agencies made one or more requests for SCIIC services during 2009.
- Requests for services increased with agency size, e.g., 92% of agencies with 100 or more sworn officers requested services, whereas 20% of agencies with 1 - 9 sworn requested services in 2009.
- Of the 4,320 SCIIC requests made, the vast majority consisted of photo lineups (3,785 or 88%). The next most frequent requests were for "other" database queries (166 or 4%) and DMV queries (142 or 3%). Only 18 (0.4%) of the requests were for threat assessments.
- The results suggest that other than photo lineups, the services of the SCIIC are being underutilized. This is not necessarily surprising given that the findings from the personnel

survey indicated that many of the respondents were unaware of the services provided by the center.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings indicate that the SCIIC and its intelligence products generally were rated positively by the executives and personnel surveyed. The findings do, however, suggest that the SCIIC can improve its outreach to law enforcement agencies and personnel in South Carolina. This recommendation is based on the idea that improving knowledge about the SCIIC and the usefulness of its services will improve and help maintain communication between the SCIIC and local agencies as well as improve service utilization on a broader scale. This would increase the SCIIC's ability to support agencies in addressing crime problems within and across their jurisdictions, as well as assist the SCIIC's mission to link these agencies to the national homeland security intelligence network. We make the following three specific recommendations:

**1. *Market the SCIIC services to all law enforcement personnel in the state.***

The SCIIC offers a variety of investigative support and analytical services that no single agency in the state possesses. Yet, the findings from the survey and request database suggest these services are currently underutilized by the South Carolina law enforcement community. A substantial proportion of the personnel survey respondents acknowledged that they were unaware of many services offered by the SCIIC, and this lack of knowledge is likely higher among the general law enforcement population who have little or no contact with the fusion center by way of receiving the intelligence products. Increasing the knowledge of services to the law enforcement community should increase the use of center services and subsequently increase the ability of all agencies to address crime and disorder problems in their communities. The current implementation of the Field Liaison Officer program should assist this dissemination of knowledge, particularly if it contains a strong orientation of marketing the SCIIC services. However, one issue that should be considered if such efforts to increase SCIIC use are to be successful is the potential need for the center to increase its personnel and resources to have the capacity to meet increased requests for support.

**2. *Increase the provision of intelligence training to law enforcement personnel in the state.***

The findings from the personnel survey indicate that individuals are more likely to use the fusion center's services and rate the fusion center more positively overall if they have received training on intelligence, particularly training from SLED/SCIIC personnel. Thus, the center might consider increasing knowledge of the SCIIC and its services through greater outreach and training, particularly if the training is provided by personnel from the center. An additional benefit is that this may promote the use of the intelligence-led policing model among agency personnel, as called for in the Fusion Center Guidelines (USDOJ, 2005b).

### ***3. Promote Intelligence-Led Policing to law enforcement executives in the state.***

The findings from the executive survey showed that executives who said their agency places a high priority on ILP are more likely to view the center as being very useful to their agency. Executives set the expectations and orientation of the personnel in their agency. Thus, implementing strategies that increase executive support of the center should also improve the support and use of the SCIIC from their personnel. If executives place a high priority on ILP in their agency, it can then be assumed that they understand the value of crime and intelligence analysis and, subsequently, will create an environment for their personnel that is supportive of using the center's services. This, in turn, should increase not only requests for investigative case support from the center's services but also increase the number of requests for the center to provide analytical products. As noted above, although agency executives may buy into the philosophy of ILP, they may not have all the resources in-house to support such efforts. The SCIIC could be a major resource to help these agencies incorporate ILP practices. In sum, the promotion of ILP among law enforcement executives could increase the support for and use of the SCIIC's mission and services as well as increasing the adoption of ILP.

Beyond these recommendations, consideration should also be given to the need for additional research that can assist fusion centers in accomplishing their mission. Little is known about the operations and effective practices of fusion centers, particularly as it relates to the interest of the present study on the connection between centers and their constituent agencies. More in-depth interviews with law enforcement personnel in constituent agencies can provide insight on additional services fusion centers can provide to assist these agencies in their day-to-day operations, particularly as it relates to assisting agencies in adopting an ILP strategy. Analysis of fusion center practices conducted across multiple centers can be useful in identifying lessons learned and effective practices that form the basis for a best practices model. Evaluation of the Field Liaison Officer program implementation across multiple sites can similarly serve as a basis for identifying best practices for connecting with constituent agencies. These research efforts and others will provide empirical and practical knowledge on the operations of fusion centers that build on existing guidelines.

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## INTRODUCTION

The South Carolina Law Enforcement Census is an annual survey conducted by the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of South Carolina. The survey alternates on a year-to-year basis between a general census of South Carolina law enforcement agency characteristics and surveys on special issues confronting agencies in the state. Previous special-issue surveys have explored various topics including patterns of gang activity in South Carolina and standards of law enforcement training. This year's survey focuses on local law enforcement's use of the South Carolina Intelligence and Information Center (SCIIC), also known as the South Carolina Fusion Center.

A primary finding from the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks on the United States (9/11 Commission, 2004) was the existence of opportunities prior to September 11<sup>th</sup> to identify the presence of the terrorists in the United States. These missed opportunities were viewed by the commission and others as symptomatic of a much larger problem of an inadequate intelligence apparatus for countering terrorist threats, characterized by a mix of lacking involvement, analysis, and communication among the various law enforcement and national security agencies. These observations prompted significant changes in federal law enforcement and national security agencies to address these deficits in order to prevent future attacks. These changes also impacted state and local law enforcement, where efforts have been made to increase the involvement of these agencies with the broader national intelligence nexus to further strengthen national security efforts to counter terrorism.

The centerpiece for facilitating the integration of state and local law enforcement agencies has been the establishment of state and regional intelligence fusion centers. These centers are designed to act as communication hubs for the distribution of relevant law enforcement and national security information and intelligence. Although the centers were initially developed with a national security focus, most have adopted an "all crimes" orientation and now work with local law enforcement using an intelligence-based approach to address everyday crime in addition to counterterrorism. This expanded approach is consistent with the broader movement of intelligence-led policing that has developed over the past ten years.

While there have been a number of publications produced by federal agencies and law enforcement associations proscribing steps for the development and functioning of these centers, empirical research on their operations is non-existent. The present study partially addresses this gap via an examination of the efficacy of the South Carolina Information and Intelligence Center (SCIIC) and its utilization by local law enforcement agencies in the state of South Carolina. It is based on surveys of local law enforcement personnel in the state of South Carolina and analyzing their requests for SCIIC services. Although the study was conducted in cooperation with the SCIIC, it is important to point out that the data collection and analysis was conducted independently by members of the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the

University of South Carolina in order to help ensure confidentiality and promote candid responses among survey respondents.

The remainder of the report is organized into four sections. The first section provides a review of the relevant literature, with particular attention given to intelligence-led policing and fusion centers. The second section describes the study methodology. The third section presents the study findings, which is subdivided into three areas: Law Enforcement Executive Survey, Law Enforcement Employee Survey, and Requests for SCIIC Services. The fourth section provides a review and discussion of the findings, along with recommendations.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 served as a catalyst for some of the most significant changes in how law enforcement agencies in the United States conduct their day-to-day operations. In particular, the post-attack evaluation of law enforcement efforts in the years and days leading up to this event led to the emergence of homeland security and criminal intelligence as a core law enforcement function. The 9/11 Commission (2004) and other observers concluded that terrorism-related intelligence efforts prior to the attacks was under-prioritized by law enforcement and other national security organizations and was plagued both by communication barriers and inadequate analyses among and within these organizations. These gaps were illustrated by the 9/11 Commission's review of the travel of hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had identified them as al Qaeda members and had been monitoring their activity in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia through January 2000, at which point they left for the United States. Although the CIA had known about their entry in the U.S., they did not make an effort to place these individuals on a travel watch list or to inform the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) - who has responsibility for domestic counter-terror responsibility - of their presence until three weeks before the attacks. One conclusion was that improved communication and proactive intelligence efforts may have led to the detainment of 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, thus potentially preventing the attacks.

The Commission's review of the Almihdhar and Alhazmi case and others revealed that such intelligence failures among the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) were the product of conflicting organizational rules, structures, and cultures. In the wake of this and other post-attack reviews, the CIA, FBI, and other federal agencies were reorganized to improve their counter-terror intelligence efforts. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security was created to improve intelligence efforts, preparedness, and responses to terrorist threats and attacks. However, the case of Almihdhar and Alhazmi highlighted that change also needed to occur at the state and local law enforcement levels. In April 2001, Alhazmi was pulled over by an Oklahoma state trooper for speeding (The hijackers we let escape, 2002). Given that Alhazmi's al Qaeda membership and presence in the United States was not passed on to domestic law enforcement, he was not identified as a wanted individual and, as a result, was not identified as a person of interest to the trooper when he ran a records check in the field. The incident highlighted that state and local law enforcement represent another body of organizations whose personnel could potentially have contact with members of terrorist organizations and thereby aid in intelligence and prevention efforts. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, however, state and local law enforcement were largely not integrated into national security and counter-terrorism intelligence efforts.

State and local law enforcement were quick to recognize this issue shortly after 9/11. In March 2002, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) organized a summit of law enforcement executives and intelligence experts to discuss directions for creating or

improving intelligence production and sharing by state and local law enforcement (IACP, 2002). One result of this conference was the formation of the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG), composed of representatives from state and local agencies that had the goal of developing a national intelligence plan (GIWG, 2003; Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005). The efforts of the GIWG in conjunction with the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) resulted in the creation of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) in 2003. The NCISP is comprised of 28 recommendations for integrating federal, state and local law enforcements agencies into a nationwide criminal and homeland security intelligence network. As was similarly argued in the 2002 IACP summit report, a central tenant of the NCISP was that all state and local law enforcement agencies should adopt an intelligence-led policing strategy to help facilitate this new nationwide intelligence network.

## INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

It is important to note that the concept of intelligence-led policing (ILP) did not emerge from the efforts of the IACP Summit and NCISP in the aftermath of 9/11. Instead, the initial model of ILP was developed by British law enforcement in the early 1990s. An emerging policy movement within the British government in the 1980s was an orientation toward improving the effectiveness and efficiency of services (Ratcliffe, 2008; Carter and Carter, 2009a). In essence, they were seeking more effective police work without an increase in funding or resources. Subsequent government reports argued the key strategy for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement rested with intelligence analysis becoming a central component in the operations of these organizations (Audit Commission, 1993; Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1997). This push for ILP culminated in the establishment of the National Intelligence Model (NIM). The NIM is a comprehensive framework that articulates the structure, processes, resources, and analytical efforts needed to implement an intelligence-led policing strategy in every British police department (National Centre for Policing Excellence, 2005). This intelligence-led strategy called for the institutionalization of data collection and analysis into everyday policing practices in order to produce intelligence on criminal activity that aids agency leaders in strategic decision making and guides operational personnel on tactical actions.

Although rudimentary forms of intelligence efforts have existed in large American law enforcement agencies for more than five decades, the precursors to the current intelligence-led movement in the United States can be found in the efforts of Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) and Compstat (McGarrell, Freilich, and Chermak, 2007; Carter and Carter, 2009a). POP introduced one of the first models for integrating an analytical process for addressing crime and disorder problems (Goldstein, 1979; 1990; Eck an Spelman, 1987). Officers are expected to examine various sources of information to identify the underlying conditions that give rise to interconnected crime and disorder problems in communities. This analysis then serves as the basis for creating new solutions to more effectively address these problems.

Compstat is a managerial strategy that aims to hold a department's district and unit leaders accountable for reducing crime and disorder problems in the areas, usually a geographic district, under their command.(Weisburd, Mastrofski, Greenspan, and Willis, 2004). The key mechanism for implementing this strategy is the use of crime analysis and crime mapping to identify patterns of criminal activity and subsequently measure the effectiveness of a given district or unit leader's anticrime strategies and tactics. While neither POP nor Compstat represent a robust intelligence function as found in the NIM, they nonetheless are popular models of policing that have made the analysis of crime and disorder problems an accepted part of law enforcement in the United States.

However, it took the events of 9/11 for American policing to build on these precursors and draw on the intelligence ideas developed by British law enforcement to initiate the ILP movement in the United States. This push for ILP was founded on the argument that state and local law enforcement had a unique and important role to play in intelligence efforts related to homeland security. It is state and local law enforcement personnel, as opposed to federal personnel, who have the most day-to-day contact the public (Henry, 2002; IACP, 2002; Masse, O'Neil, and Rollins, 2007;USDOJ, 2008; Randol, 2009). Research on terrorist events reveals that the members of these organizations engage in preparation efforts for attacks (surveillance of targets, acquiring weapons, and recruiting members) that potentially exposes them to detection (Smith, Cothren, Roberts, and Damphouse, 2008). Thus, officers may interact with citizens who observe suspicious behavior or have information about possible terrorist-related activities that, upon further investigation, are revealed to be terror-related.

State and local law enforcement officers may also have direct contact with individuals actively engaged in terrorist plots during routine policing efforts, as illustrated by the Almihdhar and Alhazmi traffic stop by an Oklahoma state trooper in 1991 (The hijackers we let escape, 2002). In fact, three other individuals responsible for the 9/11 attacks - Mohammed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, and Hani Hanjour - were stopped by either state or local law enforcement officers in Florida, Maryland, and Virginia in the days and months leading up the hijackings (Randol, 2009). Oklahoma City Bomber Timothy McVeigh was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently apprehended by an Oklahoma state trooper minutes after the bombing (McCormack, 2009).Likewise, Olympic Park Bomber Eric Rudolph was apprehended in Murphy, North Carolina by a police officer investigating a burglary.<sup>1</sup> This constitutes a cyclical pattern of state and local law enforcement coming into contact with terrorists prior to a broader and serious criminal event.

The two issues that emerged post 9/11 was how could intelligence produced by federal agencies be safely shared with state and local departments so that officers in the field might know they are dealing with a person or situation of interest, and how could state and local agencies link valuable pieces of information gained through routine policing activities to the broader homeland security intelligence network? The solution put forward by the participants of

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<sup>1</sup> See McCormack (2009) for additional examples of state and local law enforcement contacts with individuals engaged in terrorist activities.

the 2002 IACP Intelligence Summit was for law enforcement agencies to adopt an intelligence-led model of policing (IACP 2002). Subsequently, this suggestion for an ILP model was formally incorporated into national intelligence efforts as exhibited in the NCISP. The plan's first recommendation states (GIWG, 2003:10): "In order to attain the goals outlined in this plan, law enforcement agencies, regardless of size, shall adopt the minimum standards for intelligence-led policing and the utilization and/or management of an intelligence function as contained in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan."

One of the difficulties that initially confronted state and local law enforcement agencies attempting to follow this recommendation was a lack of direction regarding what ILP entailed. The NCISP (GIWG, 2003:28) broadly defined ILP as "[t]he collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end product designed to inform police decision making at both the tactical and strategic."<sup>2</sup> The Bureau of Justice Assistance, along with law enforcement organizations and the academic community have since produced additional publications intended to inform agencies on what they should be pursuing to be considered intelligence-led agencies (e.g. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005; 2009; International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2008). These publications stringently emphasize that intelligence is not equivalent to agencies engaging in information collection efforts. Instead, intelligence is a process whereby information (data) is collected and then analyzed to produce a product (report, presentation, recommendations, etc.). Therefore, an ILP agency implements a process that involves the comprehensive collection of data that their analysts then use to produce intelligence products that aid in decision making. The ideal ILP agency implements this process to aid in decision making across the organization, as advocated in the British NIM. An agency's analysts may produce a strategic product that examines crime trends over time to identify potential future criminal threats, which department leaders may then use to make decisions regarding the allocation of department resources or the development of new initiatives. Alternatively, analysts may produce a tactical product that draws on more detailed data to identify specific offenders or criminal organizations to be targeted by operational personnel (e.g., patrol officers, investigators, special enforcement units).<sup>3</sup>

As the above description reveals, ILP is not a terrorism-related intelligence strategy per se. Rather, it is a data collection and analysis process intended to improve the ability of state and local law enforcement agencies to address the crime and disorder issues they confront on a daily basis. It is argued that these efforts will produce a robust source of information that may be passed along to others to inform counter-terrorism efforts. While the idea of ILP being the key strategy for linking state and local agencies to the broader homeland security network has been widely accepted, there are challenges to fulfilling this goal. Like other law enforcement reforms, ILP calls for organizational change, which has long been recognized as a difficult endeavor (Guyot, 1979, Cope, 2004; Skogan, 2008). More specific to the present study, there are also two

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<sup>2</sup> The NCISP based this definition on a 1997 publication produced by the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (Smith, 1997)

<sup>3</sup> See Ratcliffe (2008) or the NIM for a more detailed discussion on levels of intelligence analysis and products.

important structural barriers to linking the information and intelligence from state and local agencies adopting ILP to a nationwide intelligence network.

First, although the IACP (2002) and NCISP (GIWG, 2003) call on all state and local law enforcement agencies to adopt ILP, many face personnel and resource limitations that make this endeavor difficult. The ideal ILP agencies will have personnel dedicated to intelligence analysis and supporting computer hardware and software (Carter, 2004; GIWG, 2006). Yet, the large majority (74%) of agencies in the United States have less than twenty-five sworn personnel (Reaves, 2007), and many of these agencies face difficulties pulling personnel from mission critical functions to do ILP analyses. Moreover, they may neither have the financial resources to hire a non-sworn analyst nor the ability to purchase the needed hardware or software. The ILP guidelines produced by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (2005, p. 13) recognizes these limitations and classifies agencies into four levels of intelligence capabilities:

- Level 1 - Agencies with the resources and abilities to produce strategic and tactical intelligence products for their own department and other agencies. Argues these agencies employ several hundred to several thousands of personnel, with multiple individuals assigned as intelligence analysts. Estimates that less than 300 agencies in the United States fit in this category.
- Level 2 - Agencies with the resources and abilities to produce strategic and tactical intelligence products for their own department. Similarly argues that these agencies employ several hundred to several thousands of personnel, with multiple individuals assigned as intelligence analysts. Estimates that less than 500 agencies in the United States fit in this category.
- Level 3 - Agencies that may have the ability intelligence products for internal use but are more likely to rely on the products produced by other agencies. Includes agencies ranging from several dozen personnel to several hundred, and generally do not have individuals assigned as full-time intelligence analysts. Estimates that several thousand agencies nationwide fit in this category.
- Level 4 - Agencies that have limited, if any, intelligence capabilities and minimally participate in information-sharing networks. Agencies generally have a few dozen employees or less and do not employ intelligence personnel. This represents the large majority of law enforcement agencies in the United States.

Level 1 and 2 agencies possess the capability to fully implement ILP within their organizations. Comparatively, many agencies in levels 3 and 4 do not have the ability to implement a robust ILP effort. The NCISP (GIWG, 2003) suggests that implementation of minimal ILP efforts are needed in all of these agencies to create a nationwide criminal and homeland security intelligence network. As a result, there is a demand for other structures and strategies that will provide data collection and analysis capabilities to under-resourced agencies.

Second, even if all state and local law enforcement agencies had the capacity to implement ILP, there is still the problem of coordinating agencies within a national network. There are an estimated 17,900 state and local law enforcement agencies in the United States (Reaves, 2007). Without any other structure in place, agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and FBI have to individually interact with all of these agencies on an ongoing basis to coordinate data collection and share information to maintain a nationwide intelligence network. This represents a cumbersome process that would place a tremendous demand on the resources of these federal agencies to the point of being impractical. What has emerged as an alternative for accomplishing this coordination, as well as a mechanism for improving the ILP capabilities of agencies, are state and regional intelligence fusion centers.

## FUSION CENTERS

Multi-agency intelligence centers existed long before the post-9/11 intelligence movement. The El Paso Intelligence Center was established in the 1970s by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency to create information and intelligence sharing in relation to drug enforcement and border security. The federally funded High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program established regional intelligence centers in the 1980s and had a strong orientation toward federal, state and local partnerships for the purpose of developing and sharing drug-related intelligence (Carter and Carter, 2009b). Nonetheless, it was following the response to 9/11 that the term "fusion centers" entered the lexicon of law enforcement and homeland security. Fusion is broadly defined as a process that "involves the exchange of information from different sources - including law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector - and, with analysis, can result in meaningful and actionable intelligence and information" (USDOJ, 2005a: 3). The concept is essentially a broader ILP process that integrates data from different law enforcement agencies and other organizations as opposed to a single agency ILP effort that draws solely on the data collected by that agency's activities. Fusion centers subsequently represent the entities that arguably accomplished this integrative process in relation to homeland security issues.

Fusion centers have rapidly developed nationwide since 2001. The United States Government Accountability Office (2007) reported that 28 operational centers were established by 2005. By 2009, this number had risen to 72 (IACP, 2010). The majority of these centers operate at the state level and is typically managed by the lead state law enforcement agency. There are also centers operated by federal agencies, regional centers, and centers specific to a limited number of large cities such as New York and Los Angeles. The formation of the centers at the state and local levels initially resulted from the efforts of political and law enforcement officials who wanted to take their own steps toward improving the intelligence coordination and information sharing issues discussed above (Masse, O'Neil, and Rollins, 2007).

The fusion center concept quickly found acceptance from political officials and government agencies at the federal level (Masse, O'Neil, and Rollins, 2007; Bush, 2007; United

States Congress, 2007a; DHS, 2008) which translated into substantial support for their establishment. For example, the DHS (2009) has provided over \$300 million in funding for fusion center development.<sup>4</sup> The 9/11 Commission Act<sup>5</sup> provided further support through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security State, Local and Regional Fusion Center Initiative, which provided approval and funding for DHS to contribute additional training, funding and guidance to the centers. The U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security (USDOJ, 2005b; 2008) also created detailed guidelines to aid the development and operation of fusion centers. Among the reasons for creating these guidelines was the belief that, given their independent development, there were issues in the interoperability and communication between existing fusion centers. The guidelines and supplemental documents were designed to create a degree of commonality in the structure and function between the centers to improve the sharing of intelligence and information across federal, state and local agencies. The centers are envisioned as conduits for the federal intelligence community to pass intelligence and information to state and local agencies and for state and local agencies to similarly pass intelligence and information to federal entities and other fusion centers.<sup>6</sup> Thus, fusion centers are presented as the linchpin for maintaining a national intelligence network advocated by the NCISP (Masse, O'Neil, and Rollins, 2007).

Given that 9/11 was the impetus for the concept of fusion centers, early centers primarily had a counterterrorism focus (Masse, O'Neil, and Rollins, 2007). They were grassroots efforts by state and local agencies to improve the ability to respond to potential and actual acts of terrorism within their jurisdictions. However, over time, the majority of these centers have migrated to an "all crimes" orientation, meaning that the centers focused on addressing terrorism and criminal activity.<sup>7</sup> The focus varies across centers, with some addressing all criminal activity and others only serious crimes (e.g. violence, gangs, drugs, organized crime). Three general reasons for the adoption of an all crimes focus can be found in the various reports on fusion centers (USDOJ, 2005b; Foster and Cordner, 2005; United States Congress, 2007b; Masse, O'Neil and Rollins, 2007; United States Congress, 2007a; Carter and Carter, 2009b).

First, the formation of fusion centers is largely framed in an ILP logic that valuable information on terrorist activity may be found through everyday law enforcement efforts. Thus, centers should focus on efforts that uncover and connect these links to everyday officer behavior. Second, the majority of fusion centers have been developed by state and local law enforcement agencies that face significant challenges with criminal activity in their respective jurisdiction.

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<sup>4</sup> Masse, O'Neil and Rollins (2007) reported the level of federal funding supporting these centers varies considerably, with the average and median levels of federal support at 31% and 21%, respectively. Thus, the total funding across federal, state and local levels of government to support these centers is much higher than the \$300 million provided by DHS.

<sup>5</sup> Pub. L. No 110-53.

<sup>6</sup> This function for fusion centers is also outlined in the National Strategy for Information Sharing (Bush, 2007).

<sup>7</sup> Many centers have also adopted an "all hazards" approach, which represents an effort to address other threats in addition to terrorism and criminal activity such as natural disasters or significant public health threats (Masse, O'Neil, and Rollins, 2007). However, because the present study is oriented toward examining law enforcement issues, its focus is limited to the terrorism and all crimes models.

They recognize that the fusion/ILP processes can be as valuable in addressing general criminal activity as it is for addressing terrorism. Third, adopting an "all crimes" approach is an important mechanism for gaining the support from center stakeholders, particularly other state and local law enforcement agencies. For example, state-run fusion centers want to exchange information with state and local agencies in their jurisdiction but many local agencies may not see terrorism as a major concern for their communities. This potentially leads these state and local agencies to be less engaged with centers having a terrorism-only focus. Thus, centers with an "all crimes" focus may facilitate information exchange between fusion centers and local agencies less concerned about terrorist activities.

Since fusion centers largely developed independently of one another, it is difficult to claim that there is a uniform set of practices or activities performed across all centers. However, the current practice is toward creating at least some minimal standards that all centers should meet in order to be useful nodes in a nationwide intelligence network, or what has recently been termed the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) (Bush, 2007; USDOJ, 2010). Specifically, the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Area Fusion Center publication produced by the U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security (USDOJ, 2008a) provides a detailed outline for the services, analytical functions, resources, and management strategies that fusion centers should adopt. With regard to homeland security-related activity, the guidance provided in the Baseline Capabilities manual calls for two general functions for the centers: (1) the establishment of a system for information and intelligence sharing between federal, state and local agencies on homeland security-related issues and (2) establishment of an analytical (fusion) process for evaluating threats and issues related to the jurisdictions under the fusion center's responsibility.

The Baseline Capabilities (USDOJ, 2008a) report recommends that the sharing of information and intelligence from federal agencies and the fusion centers to local agencies and others should be accomplished through the development a system to disseminate warnings, bulletins, and notifications to these entities. The intent of this recommendation is to create a process where important information is placed in the hands of those officers and officials who are working in communities so they can be on the lookout for certain suspicious activities or individuals. The Baseline Capabilities report also directs fusion centers to develop and implement a Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) process for the geographic area under its responsibility. The SAR guidance is part of an extensive effort to create a standardized mechanism for state and local agencies to pass information on suspicious activity related to homeland security matters to intelligence entities that want it such as the FBI, the local Joint Terrorism Taskforce, and the Department of Homeland Security (USDOJ 2008b; USDOJ 2010). The recommended SAR process makes the fusion center the primary collection, evaluation and distribution point for moving this information from local and state agencies to federal agencies. In sum, the Baseline Capabilities outlines processes for making the fusion centers the communication hub that links local and state agencies to the broader ISE managed by federal intelligence agencies.

The Baseline Capabilities report also identifies required staffing and resources needed to implement a fusion process (analytical function) within the center. As such, the centers are not only passing along information from the SARs to aid the fusion process of federal intelligence agencies, but they should also be conducting their own analysis with these reports. It is recommended that the centers develop data sources and various analytical capabilities to carry out risk assessments in the areas under their responsibility to identify the threats, vulnerabilities and their potential consequences (USDOJ, 2008a: p. 12 & 18). These fusion efforts are intended to produce threat assessments and related products that are disseminated to federal agencies, other fusion centers, and state and local agencies under the center's responsibility.

This analytical capacity is not only intended for homeland security-related issues. As noted above, most fusion centers were developed by state and local initiatives and, as a result, they are also concerned about everyday crime and disorder issues beyond only those that have a potential link to terrorist activity. As also noted, providing services related to state and local crime issues is important for gaining participation by local agencies. This role is recognized in the Fusion Center Guidelines document (USDOJ, 2005b:69), which recommends that fusion centers "offer a variety of intelligence services and products to customers." These efforts could include the production of intelligence products by fusion centers for stakeholders within their geographic area, such as threat assessments regarding gangs and drug activity. It can also mean providing services that support ILP efforts of local law enforcement agencies. The Fusion Center Guidelines suggest that centers should be able to provide a wide variety of analytical services to its customers (e.g., crime mapping, flowcharts, telephone-toll analysis, visual investigative analysis, case correlation). These efforts represent the primary mechanism that fusion centers can use to support the ILP efforts of local agencies that do not have the resources or skill sets among personnel to implement this policing model, and thereby support the NCISP goal of having all law enforcement implement ILP.

In sum, fusion centers have emerged as the primary conduit for linking state and local law enforcement to the broader national intelligence network for homeland security. Although fusion centers have emerged largely from state and local initiatives to improve their intelligence capacity post- 9/11, they are now widely supported by federal intelligence agencies and political officials. This support has resulted in substantial funding, legislation, and the production of documents to guide the development and functioning of fusion centers. At the same time, the centers have become an important mechanism for implementing and supporting ILP efforts focused on state and local crime and disorder issues, whether through producing assessments of problems that confront their local stakeholder agencies or providing direct analytical services that support the ILP efforts of these agencies.

## PRESENT STUDY

An accumulation of reports and literature has begun to emerge on fusion centers. To date, the literature has been primarily proscriptive in nature and largely composed of government

reports on recommended managerial structures, desired capabilities, and the resources and personnel needed for successful implementation. The U.S. Government Accounting Office (2007, 2008) and Congressional Research Service (Masse, O'Neil and Rollins, 2007, Randol, 2009) provide little more in the way of critical analysis on fusion centers, discussion issues of general structure, funding, civil liberties issues, and consideration on proper level of federal involvement. Thus, independent empirical analyses that explore the actual operations of fusion centers are lacking. There are a number of empirical questions worthy of attention, including: Do the centers meet the proscribed standards found in the Fusion Center Guidelines (USDOJ, 2005b) or Baseline Capabilities reports (USDOJ, 2008a)? What is the frequency and quality of information flow from federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies to the centers? What is the frequency and quality of information exchange and services provided by state fusion centers to the local agencies within their respective area of geographical responsibility?

The present study focuses on this last question. As indicated above, state fusion centers are intended to be the conduit for information and intelligence sharing on homeland security between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In addition, they represent a potential resource for facilitating the adoption of ILP among local law enforcement agencies. To date, little is known regarding the links between state fusion centers and the local agencies under their geographically area of responsibility. The present study addresses this knowledge gap by examining the link between the South Carolina Intelligence and Information Center (SCIIC) and local and state agencies within South Carolina. The research focused on three questions. Are the personnel in state and local law enforcement agencies aware of the products and services provided by the SCIIC? How often do they review the products and use the services offered by the center? How do they rate these products and services, and the center overall?

## RESEARCH METHODS

### SOUTH CAROLINA INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE CENTER

The SCIIC is operated by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), which is the primary investigative agency in the state.<sup>8</sup> The SCIIC has been in existence since 2006 and started operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week within the past year. The center operates under an “all crimes” orientation and provides a variety of products and services to other agencies in the state. The center provides five specific products:

- Daily Intelligence Bulletins – created and disseminated Monday through Friday, covering articles on counterterrorism, officer safety, and recent violent crimes.
- Advisors – represents "be on the lookout" (BOLO) requests published for local, state, and federal investigators who are seeking general leads on active investigators.
- Threat Assessments – produced on an occasional basis, containing evaluations of criminal and terrorist threats facing communities, events, and critical infrastructure.
- Gang Intelligence Bulletin – occasional reports containing information on gangs and related activity in the state.
- Amber Alert Newsletter – contains information on cases meeting the national criteria for an Amber Alert notification.

In addition to incorporating and disseminating these products to convey information and intelligence to agencies in the state, the SCIIC has implemented a SAR (suspicious activity report) process for gathering desired information from these agencies. The SCIIC also disseminates its research products and collects information from law enforcement agencies in other states as well as from non-law enforcement entities, such as fire departments, emergency management agencies, private security companies, and businesses. Given that the present study is a product of the *South Carolina Law Enforcement Census*, the focus of this report is on dissemination and collections related to law enforcement agencies in South Carolina.

To accomplish its mission, the SCIIC built multiple criminal-related databases and developed analytical capabilities to produce the products identified above. In turn, the center also offers access to these databases and analytical capabilities to all law enforcement agencies in the state. The database and analytical services offered include

- Statewide criminal incident database query
- National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) query
- Statewide gang database query

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<sup>8</sup> The Center is primarily staffed by SLED personnel, but members of the FBI and DHS are also assigned to the Center.

- Probation and parole database query
- Department of Motor Vehicle database query
- Facial recognition
- Partial vehicle tag analysis
- Consolidated Lead Evaluation and Reporting (CLEAR) database query
- Photo lineups
- Fugitive location assistance
- Flow chart and map construction for investigations and court

In general, these databases and analytical services provide investigative support to agencies. The same assets are similarly used by fusion center personnel to produce specific analytical products for agencies at their request. Thus, the databases and services of the center also offer a framework for supporting the ILP efforts of agencies in the state.

## DATA COLLECTION

The present study employed three data collection strategies to capture information on the use and evaluation of SCIIC products and services to South Carolina law enforcement: (1) a survey of law enforcement executives, (2) a survey of law enforcement personnel, and (3) an analysis of a database maintained by SCIIC of all requests for services made by agencies in the state. The analyses of the survey data and the database were guided by three research questions. Are the personnel of state and local agencies aware of the products and services provided by the SCIIC? How often do they review the products and use the services of the center? How do they rate the products and services and the center overall? The discussion below provides a more detailed description of these data collection efforts.

### *Survey of law enforcement executives*

One goal of the executive survey was to capture the opinions of law enforcement leaders in the state regarding the utility of the SCIIC. The executive officer establishes the accepted practices of his or her agency, including the willingness to work and partner with other agencies. Thus, executives represent important stakeholders to the SCIIC since they will presumably encourage their personnel to use the center if it is valued. The survey captured executive's knowledge, use and evaluation of fusion center products and their overall evaluation of the center. Additional questions asked whether or not the executives received any intelligence training under the assumption that individuals with this training may be more supportive the SCIICs intelligence mission. They were also asked if personnel in their agency used online intelligence resources, such as the Regional Organized Crime Intelligence Center (ROCIC) or Law Enforcement Online (LEO). The use of these sources represents another indicator that an agency is geared toward incorporating intelligence into their agency's operations. Lastly, the executives were asked about the resources their agency had for conducting crime and

intelligence analysis, and whether or not they rated ILP as important to their agency’s operations. These questions were asked to examine if a relationship existed between an agency’s analysis capacity and support for ILP and their use and evaluation of the SCIIC. See Appendix A for a copy of the Executive Survey.

The executive survey was sent to the lead official of every municipal, county, campus, and airport/harbor agency in South Carolina, which represented 294 agencies according to the 2009 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators. The initial survey was mailed to the agency head on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2010, followed by a reminder card, a second mailing of the survey, and a phone call to encourage the response of executives who did not return the survey. This resulted in 184 executives returning the survey (63%). Table 1 provides a description of the responding agencies by type and size. The majority of responding agencies were municipal police departments (116, or 63%) and agencies that had 1-9 full-time sworn personnel (67, or 36%).

Table 1. Agency characteristics of executive respondents

<b>Agency Type</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Police Department	116	63.0%
Sheriff's Department	29	15.8%
Campus Department	32	17.4%
Other Department	7	3.8%
<b>Number of Sworn Personnel</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
No Full-Time Sworn Personnel	7	3.8%
1-9 Full-Time Sworn Personnel	67	36.4%
10-24 Full-Time Sworn Personnel	36	19.6%
25-49 Full-Time Sworn Personnel	33	17.9%
50-99 Full-Time Sworn Personnel	21	11.4%
100 or more Full-Time Sworn Personnel	20	10.9%

*Survey of law enforcement personnel*

Although the insights provided by the chief executives are important, they are not the individuals likely to use the services of the fusion center on a daily basis. It is the officers, detectives, and other supervisors of these agencies that will call on the center for analyses or to search a database. There are approximately 11,000 sworn law enforcement personnel in the State of South Carolina (FBI, 2009). This represented too large of a population to survey and we are not aware of a list that identifies individual personnel and their respective agencies from which we could draw a random sample. As an alternative, a list of law enforcement personnel in the state that received one or more of the products produced by the SCIIC was used as the survey population. In-state and out-of-state law enforcement personnel as well as some public and private sector non-law enforcement individuals can request to receive intelligence products. After SCIIC personnel verify the identity of the requester, they are then sent the intelligence

products by e-mail. The SCIIC provided us with a list of all service requesters in 2009 along with their contact information. Given the focus of this study, personnel not employed by a South Carolina law enforcement agency were eliminated. We also eliminated all SLED personnel from the list of service requestors, since they employees of the same organization as SCIIC personnel and we were targeting non-SLED agencies that interact with the SCIIC. This produced a list of 731 South Carolina law enforcement personnel to survey.

Similar to the executive survey, the personnel survey captured the knowledge, use and evaluation of fusion center products and their overall evaluation of the Center. They also received the same questions on intelligence training experiences and their use of other online intelligence sources. Questions unique to the personnel survey asked respondents about their knowledge, use, and evaluation of the analytical and database services identified above. They were also asked about their experience in submitting SAR reports to the center. Note that Appendix B contains a copy of the personnel survey.

The personnel survey was mailed on March 8<sup>th</sup>, 2010, followed by a reminder card, second mailing of the survey, and an e-mail to encourage the response of personnel who did not return the survey. This strategy resulted in 510 respondents returning the survey for a 70 percent response rate. Table 2 shows the responses by type of employing agency. The large majority of respondents were from municipal police or sheriff’s departments. Table 3 provides the assignment and rank of the respondents. Most respondents worked in investigations, followed by patrol. The most common respondents were Lieutenants or Captains, followed by Corporals and Sergeants. This suggests that supervisors are the most interested in obtaining intelligence products from the SCIIC, particularly given that they represent a much smaller number of sworn personnel.

Table 2. Agency characteristics of personnel respondents

<b>Agency Type</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Police Departments	228.0	44.7%
Sheriff’s Departments	218.0	42.7%
Campus Department	10.0	2.0%
Other Department	39.0	7.6%
Unknown	15.0	2.9%

Table 3. Assignment and rank of personnel survey respondents

<b>Assignment</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>% Yes</b>
Patrol	127	24.9%
Investigator	147	28.8%
Crime/Intelligence analysis	21	4.1%
Other	97	19.0%
Administrative leadership	88	17.3%
Specialized unit	30	5.9%
<b>Rank</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	86	16.9%
Detective/Investigator	76	14.9%
Frontline Supervisor (e.g. Corporal or Sergeant)	113	22.2%
Unit/Divisional Level Leadership (e.g. Lieutenant or Capitan)	162	31.8%
Senior Department Leadership (e.g. Chief/Sheriff, Major, Deputy Chief)	48	9.4%
Civilian	25	4.9%

*SCIIC request database*

While the surveys provide evaluations of the SCIIC from different perspectives, they do not give an overall measure of the frequency at which agencies in the state use the center’s services. To this end, the fusion center maintains an electronic log of all requests made for its services. Contained in the log is the name and agency of the individual requesting the service, the type of crime or circumstance related to the request, and the services provided. The center provided this log for all request made in 2009. There were a total of 8,069 requests made for the SCIICs services. This included requests from law enforcement in the state, SLED personnel, agencies outside the state, and other non-law enforcement organizations. Requests from all agencies and organizations, including the requests from SLED personnel, were excluded from the database except those from South Carolina law enforcement agencies. This left 4,320 requests remaining from South Carolina law enforcement agencies and it was these requests that were used for the analysis. The analysis of the database focused on three general questions: What was the rate of SCIIC use across agencies in the state? What was the nature of the criminal cases or circumstances connected to the requests? What types of services were provided?

## FINDINGS

The findings are divided by the three data collection mechanisms: executive survey, personnel survey, and analysis of request database. The findings largely report the distribution of surveys responses and SCIIC requests, with occasional breakouts by agency characteristics.

### EXECUTIVE SURVEY

The executive survey examined a number of issues on intelligence and policing beyond the opinion these leaders had of the SCIIC. The findings presented below first examine some of these responses on the intelligence training of executives, agency intelligence resources and agency adoption of ILP before moving to the evaluation of the SCIIC.

#### *Intelligence Training of Executives*

The executives were asked whether or not they had attended training on intelligence issues in general and, more specifically, if they had attended any course or presentation on intelligence or the fusion center taught by SLED or SCIIC personnel. Few executives, less than 20%, reported they had attended federally funded intelligence courses such as the Criminal Intelligence for Chief Executive course or a course presented by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the State and Local Anti-Terrorist Training (SLATT) program, or other United States Bureau of Justice Assistance initiatives. A higher percentage of executives (27.5%) did report attending other courses that were not listed, which were primarily produced by the military or the FBI. Yet, more than half of the executives reported they had attended an intelligence course presented at the South Carolina Law Enforcement Academy by members of SLED (51.7%) or a presentation on the fusion center at the South Carolina Chief's or Sheriff's Association meetings (68.0%). This suggests that a number of executives have been at least minimally exposed to the products and services offered by the SCIIC, though there is still a sizable number who apparently do not have this knowledge.

Table 4. Percent of executives reporting type of intelligence training

<b>Intelligence Training</b>	<b>% Yes</b>
Criminal Intelligence for Chief Executives	18.0%
Intelligence commanders course, provided by the Intergovernmental Research (IIR) & Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)	9.6%
SLATT – Investigator/Intelligence workshop	11.8%
SLED courses at the S.C. Law Enforcement Academy	51.7%
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) Intelligence Course	14.0%
Presentations on the Fusion Center at the S.C. Police Chiefs or Sheriff's Association	68.0%
Other intelligence training	27.5%

*Intelligence Resources*

The SCIIC offers a number of analytical and database resources that can provide case support for investigations or broader support for an agency's effort to adopt ILP. However, a number of agencies may have their own resources that allow them to accomplish this effort, and therefore may be less likely to call on the SCIIC for assistance. To gauge this possibility, the survey included questions on what could be deemed the infrastructure for conducting crime and intelligence analysis: personnel assigned this responsibility, software and hardware resources, use of different analysis strategies, and production of intelligence products.

The executives were first asked if their agency has any personnel dedicated on a full- or part-time basis to crime or intelligence analysis. Figures 1 and 2 reveal that the majority of agencies do not have this resource, with only 30.5% of agencies reporting they have one or more dedicated crime analysts and 21.5% reporting they have an intelligence analyst. Table 5 illustrates that having these assignments are largely the product of agency size, suggesting larger agencies have more resources and a stronger need for these services.

Figure 1. Percent of agencies with full or part-time crime analysts




Figure 2. Percent of agencies with full or part-time intelligence analysts




Table 5. Percent of agencies with crime and intelligence analysts by agency size and type

<b>Number of Sworn Officers</b>	<b>% with Crime Analyst</b>	<b>% with Intelligence Analyst</b>
No sworn	0.0%	0.0%
1-9 Officers	9.0%	6.0%
10-24 Officers	25.0%	25.0%
25-49 Officers	36.4%	21.2%
50-99 Officers	52.4%	38.1%
100 or more Officers	85.0%	55.0%
<b>Agency Type</b>		
Police Department	30.2%	19.8%
Sheriff's Department	51.7%	34.5%
Campus Department	12.9%	12.9%
Other Department	20.0%	40.0%

Subsequent questions explored the resources agencies have for crime and intelligence analysis. Table 6 presents the percentage of agencies that have resources listed in the survey. The most frequently reported software resource was mapping software (25.0%), with fewer executives reporting they have crime analysis (15.6%) or intelligence software (6.2%). Nearly half of the executives reported they maintain a criminal intelligence database (45.0%) and a similar percent reported having a policy that guides information collection, analysis, product development, and dissemination (44.4%). A large portion of executives (85.6%) reported they have an electronic records management system. While this last resource is not exclusive to crime and intelligence analysis, it does simplify the ability to extract data from criminal reports to conduct analyses.

Approximately 40% of executives reported that their agency conduct crime analysis, which suggests that some agencies conduct this analysis absent personnel dedicated to that role, since only 30.5% of the agencies reported having a full- or part-time crime analyst. The executive responses also revealed that 36.5% of agencies conduct investigative analysis. A similar percentage of executives (40.4%) reported that their agency conducted strategic analysis efforts, such as threat assessments, vulnerability assessment, or problem profiles.

Table 6. Percent of agencies with intelligences resource, conducting different types of analysis, and producing different types of intelligence products.

<b>Intelligence Analysis Resources</b>	<b>% with resource</b>
Crime mapping software	25.0%
Crime analysis software	15.6%
Intelligence software	6.2%
Criminal intelligence database	45.9%
Electronic records management system	85.6%
Crime/Intelligence policy guiding information collection, analysis, product development, or dissemination.	44.4%
<b>Types of Analysis</b>	<b>% Conducting Analysis</b>
Conducts crime analysis	41.2%
Conducts investigative analysis	36.5%
Conducts strategic analysis	40.4%
<b>Types Intelligence Products Produced</b>	<b>% Producing Products</b>
Produces routine intelligence bulletins	41.2%
Produces warning/advisories	73.8%
Produces threat/intelligence analysis reports	30.9%

Lastly, the executives were asked if their agency produces intelligence products. The large majority of executives (73.8%) reported that they produce warnings or advisories, such as "be on the lookout" reports or requests for information on wanted individuals. It is important to note that such products more or less represent the sharing of information rather than a product of some analytical process. A much smaller percentage (41.2%) reported that their agency produces routine intelligence bulletins on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. Even fewer (30.9%) reported producing threat/intelligence analysis reports, which were defined as the product of detailed analysis on specific crime problems.

In sum, the executive responses suggest there are agencies in the state that have some or most of the infrastructure resources for engaging in intelligence-led policing. Although they may not have all the services, particularly unique databases possessed by the SCIIC, they have a sufficient basis for analysis efforts and thereby by may be less likely to rely on SCIIC for basic analytic needs. At the same time, these agencies may have more desire to utilize the SCIICs unique resources given their orientation toward analysis. These results also reveal that more than half of the agencies in the state have very limited resources for supporting the analytical end of intelligence-led policing, which suggests the SCIIC would be a useful resource for supporting crime and intelligence analysis efforts for these agencies.


### *Intelligence-Led Policing*

The executives were also asked about the priority given to ILP in their agencies. ILP was defined in the survey as:

a process for systematically collecting, organizing, analyzing, and utilizing intelligence to guide law enforcement strategic, operational and tactical decisions. ILP aids law enforcement in identifying, examining, and formulating preventative, protective, and responsive operations to specific targets, threats, and problems. ILP provides the ability to collect, examine, vet, and compare vast quantities of information and enables law enforcement agencies to understand crime patterns and identify individuals, enterprises, and locations that represent the highest threat to the community and concentration of criminal and/or terrorist-related activity.<sup>9</sup>

The underlying reason for this question was to determine what level of support existed for ILP among the executives with the assumption that those who support the concept of ILP are more likely to value the SCIIC given its core function is an ILP effort. Figure 3 presents the percentage of executives who reported that ILP has a high, moderate or low priority in their agencies. The largest percentage of executives (41.5%) reported that ILP has a moderate priority in their agencies with 20.2% reporting it has a high priority and 38.3% reporting it has low priority. Table 7 presents additional analysis by agency size. Presumably, larger agencies have more resources and more demand for their services due to criminal activity that may make them more likely to adopt and place a higher priority on ILP. Table 7 supports this assumption to some degree. Large agencies with 100 or more sworn personnel are most likely to have executives reporting that ILP is a high priority (60.0%) and executives of small agencies with 1 to 9 officers or no sworn officers being most likely to report that ILP is a low priority.

Figure 3. Percentage of executives reporting that ILP has a low, medium or high priority in their agency.




<sup>9</sup> The definition was adopted from BJA 2009, p 1.

Table 7. Percentage of executives reporting that ILP has a low, medium, or high priority in their agency by agency size.

Number of Sworn Officers	Low	Medium	High
No sworn	57.1%	42.9%	0.0%
1-9 Officers	59.1%	30.4%	10.6%
10-24 Officers	36.1%	38.9%	25.0%
25-49 Officers	27.3%	60.6%	12.1%
50-99 Officers	19.0%	57.1%	23.8%
100 or more Officers	5.0%	35.0%	60.0%

A follow up question asked the executives who reported that ILP was a low priority whether or not their low ranking was the result of a lack resources and/or the belief that there was no need for it in their jurisdiction. Figures 4 illustrates that the large majority of executives giving ILP low priority reported that this was a result of not having enough resources to engage in this practice (81.4%), 5.7% reported that there was no real need for ILP in their jurisdiction, and 12.9% reported both a lack of resources and no real need. These findings have potential implications for the SCIIC given that such a large percentage of agencies giving low priority to ILP indicated that it is due to a lack of resources, and the SCIIC could potentially provide assistance in this area.

Figure 4. Reasons why executives report ILP has a low priority in their agency



### *Knowledge, Use and Evaluation of SCIIC Intelligence Products*

The development and dissemination of intelligence products is a primary activity of the SCIIC, representing the mechanism for delivering information and intelligence to other agencies

in South Carolina. The survey asked questions on whether the executives receive the five intelligence products disseminated by the SCIIC, how often they review these products when they receive them, and how useful they rank these products. Insight into these questions pertained to executive's experiences with these products from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009. Figure 5 reveals that most of the executives reported they received intelligence bulletins (86.3%) and warnings/advisories (85.8%) from the SCIIC, with fewer reporting having received threat assessments (71.8%) or the gang intelligence bulletin (72.0%), and over half reporting they received Amber alert newsletters (57.3%) during this time period. It is important to note that executives indicating they did not receive these reports may not be the product of a failure of SCIIC dissemination. Rather, agencies may designate other personnel to act as the contact point with the SCIIC regarding the receipt of information and intelligence and, unless there is something exceptional, these individuals may not pass along the various intelligence products.

Table 8 presents responses to the question of how often executives review the products they receive. For those who indicated they had received a given product, the overwhelming majority, 80% or greater in each case, reported that they review the product most of the time or always. In addition, the executives that received products were also asked how they rated their usefulness, which is reported in Table 9. Overall, the executives gave favorable ratings on the products. For each product, more than 50% reported that it was very useful, and more than 80% reported they were either very or quite a bit useful.

Figure 5. Percent of executives reporting they received each of the SCIIC intelligence products




Table 8. Reported frequency that executives review the SCIIC intelligence products they receive

	<b>Never</b>	<b>Sometimes</b>	<b>Half the time</b>	<b>Most of the time</b>	<b>Always</b>
How often reviewed SCIIC intelligence bulletins	3.3%	6.5%	11.8%	27.5%	60.8%
How often reviewed advisories	1.3%	5.9%	5.2%	28.1%	59.5%
How often reviewed threat assessments	0.0%	10.9%	5.4%	24.0%	59.7%
How often reviewed gang intelligence	0.0%	7.7%	5.4%	31.5%	55.4%
How often reviewed Amber alert newsletter	1.0%	7.0%	4.0%	19.0%	69.0%


Table 9. Executives' ratings on the usefulness of each of the SCIIC intelligence products

	<b>Not at all</b>	<b>A little</b>	<b>Quite a bit</b>	<b>Very</b>
How useful was SCIIC intelligence bulletins	0.7%	14.2%	31.1%	54.1%
How useful was advisories	0.7%	11.2%	30.9%	57.2%
How useful was threat assessments	0.8%	18.8%	29.7%	50.8%
How useful was gang intelligence	1.5%	8.4%	31.3%	58.8%
How useful was Amber alert newsletter	1.0%	12.1%	27.3%	59.6%

*Overall Evaluation of SCIIC by Executives*

One of the last questions asked of the executives was how useful overall the SCIIC is to their agency. This question is intended to represent the general rating of the SCIIC by executives. Figure 6 provides the percent of executives who rated the SCIIC as very useful, moderately useful, somewhat useful, and not at all useful. The largest portion of executives (42.6%) reported that the SCIIC overall was very useful to their agency, followed by 32.5% of executives reporting it is moderately useful, 19.5% as somewhat useful, and only 5.3% reporting the SCIIC was not at all useful to their agency.

Figure 6. Executive ratings of the SCIIC usefulness overall to their agency.



Additional analysis was conducted to identify factors that may influence the overall SCIIC ratings provided by the executives. Table 10 provides the distribution of overall SCIIC ratings by agency size. There is no general trend relative to size. The agency categories most likely to have agencies that rated the SCIIC as very useful were those with 50 to 99 sworn personnel followed by agencies with 10 to 24 sworn personnel. However, a rating of not at all useful was only found among agencies with no sworn personnel or with agencies that have between 1 and 9 sworn personnel.

Table 11 provides the overall rating of the SCIIC by the level of priority given to ILP by executives. A notable pattern of SCIIC ratings exists across the priority levels. Consistent with the assertion above, executives reporting that ILP has a high priority in their agency are more likely to provide the SCIIC with a very useful rating. Over 60% of executives stating that ILP is a high priority gave the SCIIC a very useful rating, compared to 44.1% for those giving ILP moderate priority and 28.6% giving ILP low priority. Moreover, the percentage of executives with ratings of somewhat useful and not at all useful was highest in agencies with a low priority on ILP followed by those with ILP as a moderate priority.

Table 12 presents the relationship between overall executive support for the SCIIC and whether they received the different intelligence products of the center. Notable differences are observed in the extremes of reported usefulness (very useful and not at all useful) and whether executives reported receiving the products. For those executives reporting they received each of the products, 47% or more reported that the SCIIC was very useful overall to their agency. Moreover, only 2% or less of the executives who received the different products reported that the SCIIC was not useful at all. Alternatively, those executives who reported they did not receive the different products were much less likely to rate the SCIIC as very useful to their agency and much more likely to rate the center as not at all useful. It is important to note that the percentage

of those who reported they did not receive the products was relatively small, and 70% or more executives reported they received intelligence bulletins, advisories, threat assessments, or gang intelligence bulletins.

Table 10. Executive ratings of the SCIIC usefulness overall to their agency by agency size.

<b>Number of Sworn Officers</b>	<b>Not at all</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Moderately</b>	<b>Very</b>
No sworn	20.0%	40.0%	0.0%	40.0%
1-9 Officers	13.6%	23.7%	27.1%	35.6%
10-24 Officers	0.0%	23.5%	23.5%	52.9%
25-49 Officers	0.0%	19.4%	51.6%	29.0%
50-99 Officers	0.0%	0.0%	38.1%	61.9%
100 or more Officers	0.0%	15.8%	36.8%	47.4%

Table 11. Executive ratings of the SCIIC usefulness overall to their agency by priority placed on ILP by agency.

<b>ILP Priority</b>	<b>Not at all</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Moderately</b>	<b>Very</b>
Low Priority	9.5%	28.6%	33.3%	28.6%
Moderate Priority	4.4%	16.2%	35.3%	44.1%
High Priority	0.0%	10.8%	27.0%	62.2%

Table 12. Executive ratings of the SCIIC usefulness overall to their agency based on whether they reported receiving intelligence products.

<b>Intelligence Product</b>	<b>Not at all</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Moderately</b>	<b>Very</b>
<i>Receives Bulletins</i>				
Yes	1.3%	19.2%	31.8%	47.7%
No	41.2%	23.5%	35.3%	0.0%
<i>Receives advisories</i>				
Yes	2.0%	19.2%	31.8%	47.0%
No	33.3%	22.2%	38.9%	5.6%
<i>Receives threat assessments</i>				
Yes	0.8%	13.4%	36.2%	49.6%
No	20.0%	35.0%	22.5%	22.5%
<i>Receives gang intelligence bulletin</i>				
Yes	0.0%	19.4%	31.8%	48.8%
No	23.1%	20.5%	33.3%	23.1%
<i>Receives Amber alert bulletin</i>				
Yes	0.0%	18.8%	33.7%	47.5%
No	14.3%	20.6%	30.2%	34.9%

One additional question in the survey was an open ended solicitation that asked executives how the SCIIC could improve its services to their agency. The large majority of executives did not provide any comments, and most who did noted that the center was doing a good job and had no specific requests. There were, however, a couple points made by a few executives that are worth mentioning. Of interest was the finding that some executives expressed a need for more training on the SCIIC and intelligence analysis techniques. Furthermore, a couple of executives suggested that the products of the SCIIC should give more attention to smaller and rural agencies, noting that most information seems to be geared toward larger agencies.

## PERSONNEL SURVEY

The executive survey asked a mix of questions on agency characteristics related to intelligence and personnel perspectives of the SCIIC. The personnel survey had a more narrow focus on the use and evaluation of the center. As noted earlier, the personnel of agencies are more likely to use the fusion center than the executives, specifically when it comes to requesting SCIIC services and submitting SARs. The presentation of the personnel survey findings are

divided into five sections: Intelligence training experience; knowledge, use and evaluation of SCIIC products; use of SCIIC services, submission of suspicious activities report, and overall evaluation of the SCIIC.

*Intelligence Training Experience*


Similar to the executive survey, the personnel survey asked respondents what types of intelligence training courses they had attended. Table 13 provides the percentage of personnel stating they attended the various forms of training listed on the survey. The most frequent form of training attended were courses or presentations from SLED personnel, with 26.7% reporting that they received training on intelligence from SLED personnel at the South Carolina Law Enforcement Academy and 34.5% reporting they attended other training by SLED personnel on fusion center operations. Only a small percentage of personnel reported that they attended one of the various training courses presented by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) program, or the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). A substantial percentage (27.1%), however, reported they attended intelligence training provided by other sources, such as the FBI, the Regional Organized Criminal Intelligence Center (ROCIC), the U.S. military, or other training vendors.

Table 13. Percent of law enforcement personnel reporting type of intelligence training

<b>Intelligence Training</b>	<b>% Yes</b>
SLED courses at SC Law Enforcement Academy	26.7%
Intelligence commander's course provided by IIR and BJA	5.0%
SLATT-Investigator/Intelligence workshop	5.6%
FLETC intelligence course	10.6%
Other training by SLED on Fusion Center operations	34.5%
Other Intelligence courses	27.1%

Note that some personnel attended more than one training course listed in Table 12 and thus are represented in more than one category. Additional analysis was conducted to determine what percentage of personnel never attended any intelligence training. Figure 7 reveals that 45.9% reported they have never attended any intelligence training. It is important to consider that this rate only reflects those personnel in agencies who have signed up to receive intelligence products from the SCIIC and, subsequently, responded to the survey. Thus, this percentage may not reflect the rate of non-attendance for all law enforcement personnel in South Carolina. In fact, it is reasonable to assume the rate of individuals who have never attended an intelligence course is substantially higher among the general population of South Carolina law enforcement personnel. Given their voluntary contact with the SCIIC, the respondents to this survey are likely more oriented to issues of criminal intelligence than law enforcement personnel overall in the state and therefore more likely to have attended intelligence training.

Figure 7. Percent of law enforcement personnel with any intelligence training



#### *Knowledge, Use and Evaluation of SCIIC Intelligence Products*

Although each of the individuals selected for the personnel survey were based on a SCIIC list of those who received the center's intelligence products, the responding personnel nonetheless were asked to verify that they, in fact, received one or more of these products. More than 90% reported they had received an intelligence bulletin, warning/advisory, or threat assessment between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009. Similar to the executives, figure 8 a low percentage reported they received a gang intelligence bulletin (85.7%) or Amber alert newsletter (64.3%). It is not clear why some personnel reported that they did not receive these products given that they are on a list to receive them. This may be due to technical problems (e.g., e-mail issues), failure to recall having received certain products, personnel electing not receive them, or some other factor.

Respondents were next asked how often they review the intelligences products they receive. These results are shown in Table 14. For each of the intelligence products, 85% or more of the personnel reported that they review the products always or most of the time. Moreover, Table 15 reveals that the large majority rated the intelligence products they receive as very useful or quite a bit useful. Less than 2% percent rated any of the products they received as not at all useful. Like the executives, the personnel responses overall reflect a positive view of the SCIIC's intelligence products.

Figure 8. Percent of law enforcement personnel reporting they received each of the SCIIC intelligence products




Table 14. Reported frequency that law enforcement personnel review the SCIIC intelligence products they receive

	Never	Sometimes	Half the time	Most of the time	Always
How often reviewed SCIIC intelligence bulletins	0.6%	3.0%	3.2%	28.6%	64.6%
How often reviewed advisories	0.8%	4.2%	2.5%	29.7%	62.8%
How often reviewed threat assessments	0.9%	3.8%	5.4%	28.0%	62.0%
How often reviewed gang intelligence	0.7%	5.0%	8.2%	28.8%	57.3%
How often reviewed Amber alert newsletter	0.7%	4.6%	3.9%	26.4%	64.5%

Table 15. Law enforcement personnel ratings on the usefulness of each of the SCIIC intelligence products

	Not at all	A little	Quite a bit	Very
How useful was SCIIC intelligence bulletins	.4%	12.1%	30.0%	57.1%
How useful was advisories	.6%	14.2%	30.1%	55.1%
How useful was threat assessments	1.3%	21.7%	30.6%	46.3%
How useful was gang intelligence	1.9%	18.3%	30.4%	49.4%
How useful was Amber alert newsletter	1.9%	16.2%	31.4%	50.5%

*Use and Evaluation of SCIIC Services*

One set of questions that distinguish the personnel survey from the executive survey are related to the use of SCIIC services. It is the personnel of agencies involved in investigations and responding to citizen requests for service. As a result, they are more likely than executives to use SCIIC services. Figure 9 indicates that in 2009, 56.9% of the personnel reported using one or more services and 43.1% reported that they did not. Table 16 presents the assignment and rank of those personnel who reported they used the SCIIC services one or more times. The rates of use were highest among personnel assigned to investigations (70.1%) and crime/intelligence analysis (75.0%). The rate of use was similar across investigators/detectives, front line supervisors, unit/division leaders, and senior leadership, and lower among officers/deputies/troopers and civilian personnel.

Figure 9. Percent of law enforcement personnel reporting they used one or more SCIIC services between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009





Table 16. Percent of law enforcement personnel reporting one or more use of SCIIC Services between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009, by assignment and rank

<b>Assignment</b>	<b>% Reporting One or more Use</b>
Patrol	52.0%
Investigator	70.1%
Crime/Intelligence analysis	76.2%
Other	36.1%
Administrative leadership	62.5%
Specialized unit	50.0%
<b>Rank</b>	<b>% Reporting One or more Use</b>
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	45.3%
Detective/Investigator	60.5%
Frontline Supervisor (e.g. Corporal or Sergeant)	60.2%
Unit/Divisional Level Leadership (e.g. Lieutenant or Capitan)	57.4%
Senior Department Leadership (e.g. Chief/Sheriff, Major, Deputy Chief)	66.7%
Civilian	48.0%

Figure 10 presents the percentage of personnel that used specific services of the SCIIC in 2009. The most frequent services requested by personnel were SCIEx queries (36.4%) and DMV queries (32.1%), followed by requests for photo lineups (27.9%) and NCIC queries (26.2%). The least requested services were queries of the Consolidated Lead Evaluation and Reporting database (7.4%) and the production of flow charts and maps (7.8%). The research team offers the caveat that these request patterns are based only on personnel responding to the survey and therefore may not reflect the overall pattern of requests made of the SCIIC. The analysis based on the SCIIC request log reported in the following section is intended to provide this overall request analysis.

Figure 10. Percent of law enforcement personnel reporting they used the listed SCIIC services between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009.



Personnel who indicated they did not request a SCIIC service in 2009 were asked why. As noted in Table 17, a large percentage reported that they did not make a request for a NCIC or DMV query because their agency has the ability to perform the service (80.7% and 74.9% respectively), and about half indicated their agencies have ability to develop photo lineups (56.7%) and conduct SCIEEx queries (42.3%). Just over 50% of respondents indicated that they were unaware of the Consolidated Lead Evaluation and Reporting (CLEAR) database, partial vehicle tag analysis, and facial recognition services, and between 40% and 46% reported they were unaware of the SCIIC's services for checking probation and parole status, locating fugitives, and the production of flow charts and maps.

Table 17. Reported reasons why law enforcement personnel did not use SCIIC services.

SCIIC Service	Was not aware of service	My agency provides service	No need for service	Other reason
NCIC	11.0%	80.7%	7.1%	1.2%
SCIEx	29.0%	42.3%	26.2%	2.4%
Photo Lineups	24.9%	56.7%	17.4%	1.0%
Facial Recognition	52.6%	7.8%	38.2%	1.4%
Partial vehicle tag analysis	52.2%	10.8%	35.1%	1.9%
Consolidated Lead Evaluation & Reporting (CLEAR) database query	56.0%	9.7%	32.2%	2.1%
GangNet query	32.0%	24.2%	40.2%	3.6%
Probation or parole status check	39.8%	34.3%	25.0%	0.9%
Fugitive location assistance	42.9%	18.9%	36.6%	1.6%
Flow chart or map production for investigation or court	45.8%	19.5%	33.4%	1.4%
Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) query	13.7%	74.9%	9.6%	1.7%

Personnel who used the services of the center were also asked to rate their usefulness. Table 18 illustrates that the majority of personnel using NCIC queries, photo lineups and DMV queries rated these services as being very useful (over 80%). The percentage of personnel who rated the remaining services as being very useful was between 40% and 55%, with the exception of SCIEx, which was rated as being very useful by 67% of the respondents. Note that combining the "quite a bit useful" and the "very useful" percentages indicates that the vast majority of personnel rate the various services positively. In relation to "not at all useful" ratings, only facial recognition stood out with 15.1% of personnel giving it this rating. Partial tag analysis had the second highest negative rating with 6.3% of personnel reporting this service was not at all useful to them. The remaining services had less than 4% of personnel giving them a "not at all useful" rating.

One additional issue explored during the analysis of the surveys is the link between the use of SCIIC services and whether the personnel reported they had ever attended any form of intelligence training. This analysis is based assumption that personnel who have attended some form of intelligence training will have more interest in and appreciation for these services. Table 19 suggests that this relationship does exist. Personnel who reported that they had attended an intelligence course, whether presented by SLED personnel or another source, were more likely to have used the services of the SCIIC on one or more occasions, with 69.1% attending such training reporting they used the services at least once during 2009 compared to 47.4% who reported they did not attend this type of training.

Table 18. Rating of SCIIC services for personnel reporting they used listed service

SCIIC Service	Not at all useful	A little useful	Quite a bit useful	Very useful
NCIC	1.6%	0.0%	14.4%	84.0%
SCIEx	2.6%	7.3%	23.2%	66.9%
Photo Lineups	2.5%	2.5%	14.9%	80.2%
Facial Recognition	15.1%	17.0%	18.9%	49.1%
Partial vehicle tag analysis	6.3%	6.3%	21.3%	52.5%
Consolidated Lead Evaluation & Reporting (CLEAR) database query	0.0%	15.4%	34.6%	50.0%
GangNet query	3.6%	12.0%	38.6%	45.8%
Probation or parole status check	3.1%	7.7%	43.1%	46.2%
Fugitive location assistance	2.8%	13.9%	26.4%	55.6%
Flow chart or map production for investigation or court	3.4%	3.4%	44.8%	48.3%
Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) query	2.1	2.7%	15.1%	80.1%

Table 19. Percent reporting use of SCIIC services based on attending training courses on intelligence

Use of SCIIC services	Did not attend training course on intelligence	Attended one or more training courses on intelligence
Never used	52.6%	30.9%
Used one or more service	47.4%	69.1%

#### *Submission of Suspicious Activity Reports*

Another set of questions that was only present in the personnel survey addressed whether responding personnel had submitted any suspicious activity reports (SARs) to the SCIIC between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009. Figure 11 shows that only 14.3% of the personnel reported that they had submitted a SAR during this time period. Table 20 indicates that the majority of officers who submitted a SAR did so between 1 and 3 times during 2009, though there were a reasonable number of personnel who submitted a SAR 4 or more times during the year. Those personnel who did not submit a SAR were asked the reason for not doing so. As Table 21 reveals, the largest group personnel reported they had no need to submit a SAR

(46.3%). However, another 34.7% reported that they were unaware of the SAR reporting system.

Figure 11. Percent of law enforcement personnel reporting they submitted a SAR to the SCIIC between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009




Table 20. Frequency of SAR submissions between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009 among personnel submitting a SAR

How many times did you submit an activity report	% Yes
1 to 3 times	51.4%
4 to 6 times	34.7%
7 to 9 times	5.6%
10 or more	8.3%

Table 21. Reason law enforcement personnel reported for not submitting a SAR between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009

	% Yes
No need	46.3%
Not aware of form	27.1%
Report informally	13.8%
Other	12.8%

As with other reported statistics above, the findings presented here are likely not representative of overall SAR activity in the state as SARs may be submitted by law enforcement personnel not surveyed. It is, however, reasonable to assume that a substantial percentage of other law enforcement personnel in the state that were not a party to this survey are unaware of

the SAR system. For example, the intelligence products from the SCIIC often contain a SAR report form on the last page, which creates repeated exposure to the SAR system for those personnel who receive these products. Law enforcement personnel in the state that do not receive these products, as well as those who have never attended training provided by SLED/SCIIC, are not likely to be exposed to the existence of the SAR system and are therefore less likely to use it.

#### *Overall Evaluation of SCIIC by Personnel*

Similar to the executive survey, the personnel survey asked the respondents to rate the overall usefulness of the center for their agency. Figure 12 provides the percentage of personnel who reported that the center was very useful, moderately useful, somewhat useful and not at all useful. In general, the ratings were very positive, with 60.5% reporting that the SCIIC is very useful to their agency and only 1.1% reporting it was not at all useful. Additional analysis was conducted to examine some factors that may be related to these findings. Table 21 reports the percentage of personnel who gave the center an overall rating of very useful based on whether or not they had used the services of the SCIIC on one or more occasions during 2009.

The assumption of this analysis is that those who have used the services of the SCIIC are more likely to agree that it has utility to their agency. The results in Table 22 are consistent with this assumption. Across each of the services, there is a notable difference in the overall rating of the center between those personnel who had used the services and those personnel that did not, with a much higher percentage of personnel who had used the services giving an overall rating of very useful. The differences in the percentage points between those who used the fusion center to those who did not ranged from 18 to 35 points higher among the former. Additional analyses not shown here also examined a more simple comparison of those who had used any service at least once compared to those who had not based on the percentage of each group that provided a very useful rating to the SCIIC overall. The results were similar, with 68.8% who used an SCIIC service at least once reporting a very useful rating for the center compared to 47.2% for those that did not.

Figure 12. Law enforcement personnel ratings of the SCIIC usefulness overall to their agency.




Table 22. Percent of law enforcement personnel reporting the SCIIC is "very useful" to their agency by whether they used specific SCIIC services

	Used service	Did <u>not</u> use service
NCIC check	74.4%	54.3%
SCIex query	76.0%	50.0%
Photo lineup	78.1%	52.9%
Facial recognition	75.8%	57.6%
Partial vehicle tag analysis	76.0%	55.9%
CLEAR database query	91.9%	57.2%
GANGnet query	77.2%	55.3%
Probation or parole status check	81.7%	55.1%
Fugitive location assistance	82.8%	54.4%
Flow chart or map production	81.1%	58.2%
DMV query	77.0%	51.0%

Additional analysis examined the difference in the overall rating of SCIIC usefulness relative to whether the personnel had attended an intelligence training course. Table 23 presents the percentage of personnel who reported the different ratings of overall SCIIC usefulness based on whether they had attended any intelligence training. The results reveal higher ratings among those who had attended an intelligence training course. Table 24 provides the results for a more narrow analysis that focused on whether they had attended intelligence training specifically provided by SLED/SCIIC personnel, which produced similar higher ratings among those who did. It is important to note that few, if any, personnel in both the training and non-training groups provided a "not at all useful" rating.

Table 23. Law enforcement personnel opinion on the overall usefulness of the SCIIC to their agency based on whether they have ever attended an intelligence related training course

	<b>Has <i>not</i> attended any intelligence training course</b>	<b>Has attended one or more intelligence training course</b>
Not at all useful	1.4%	0.8%
Somewhat useful	17.4%	7.2%
Moderately useful	29.0%	24.7%
Very useful	52.2%	67.3%

Table 24. Law enforcement personnel opinion on the overall usefulness of the SCIIC to their agency based on whether they have ever attended an intelligence related training course taught by SLED/SCIIC personnel

	<b>Has <i>not</i> attended any intelligence training course provided by SLED/SCIIC personnel</b>	<b>Has attended one or more intelligence training course provided by SLED/SCIIC personnel</b>
Not at all useful	2.0%	0.0%
Somewhat useful	15.3%	7.4%
Moderately useful	29.8%	22.7%
Very useful	52.9%	70.0%

The individuals responding to the personnel survey were also asked to provide comments on how the SCIIC could improve its services their agency. Nearly 30% of respondents provided comments. A number of the comments were positive and suggested that SCIIC was doing a good job. However, an overwhelming number of comments indicated a need for the SCIIC to publicize its services to the South Carolina law enforcement community. Many of the personnel comments noted that they were unaware of the services listed in the survey and felt they would be helpful in their work. Moreover, some of the personnel were convinced that the patrol officers in their agencies were completely unaware of these services and that they could request them. Equally, many of the personnel noted that if patrol officers were aware of the SCIIC services they would be more likely to use them. A number of personnel called on the center to also provide more training and some further suggested that the training include information about the services offered by the SCIIC. Additional comments suggested more analysis on multijurisdictional criminal activity, simplifying access to databases, the ability to explore multiple databases, data-mining methodologies, and the provision of more information on local

crime issues. A few personnel also indicated that it would be useful to have a point of contact for their region in the state.

## ANALYSIS OF REQUEST DATABASE

One of the limitations in asking questions about the use of SCIIC services in the personnel survey was that those individuals did not represent all law enforcement personnel in the state who can request the centers services. There were 510 personnel survey respondents but there are approximately 11,000 sworn law enforcement personnel working for agencies in South Carolina. Although the survey provides some insight regarding the use of services, it cannot provide overall trends on the use of services. The SCIIC keeps a log of all requests made from agencies within and outside the state that includes information on the requesting individual and their agency, the types of crimes or issues linked to the requests, and the services provided to the requesting individual by the SCIIC. This information is used here to examine the prevalence of use and types of services provided. The analysis contains only requests made by the 294 state, county, municipal, campus, and special service law enforcement agencies in the South Carolina.

### *Rates of SCIIC Service Use*

The first set of analyses examined the characteristics of agencies requesting the services of the SCIIC between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009. Figure 13 reveals that 143 (or 49%) of the agencies in the state made one or more requests for services during this time period, and the remaining 51% (151 agencies) made no requests. Table 25 shows that nearly all county sheriffs' departments made at least one request during 2009 (99%), whereas only 49% of police departments made requests. Much lower rates of use were found among campus law enforcement (13%) and other law enforcement agencies (9%).

Figure 13. Percent of agencies in South Carolina that made one more requests for SCIIC services between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009.




Table 24. Rate of SCIIC service requests by type of law enforcement agency.

Agency Type	Did not use SCIIC Services	Used SCIIC services on one or more occasions
Police Department	51.1%	48.9%
Sheriff Department	2.2%	97.8%
Campus Law Enforcement	86.8%	13.2%
Other Law Enforcement	90.1%	9.1%

Additional analyses examined usage rates by agency size, categorized by the number of sworn personnel. We had a number of expectations regarding usage and agency size. First, it was anticipated that requests for SCIIC services would be lower among small agencies. These agencies may experience a level of criminal activity that does not warrant making requests for SCIIC services. Additionally, the analysis related to the executive surveys revealed that larger agencies were more likely to have ILP as an agency priority, which would likely increase the use of SCIIC services that can support ILP efforts. Second, the highest usage rates may not be among the largest agencies, which was defined here as agencies with 100 or more sworn personnel. This is because the largest agencies are more likely to have their own resources for ILP and thus less frequently request services from SCIIC. This expectation assumes that requests made for SCIIC services are primarily related to analytical efforts in support of ILP.

Analysis of the requests by agency size supports the first expectation but not the second. Table 26 reveals that for each of the largest three categories (25-49 officer, 50-99 officers, and 100 or more officers) 86% percent or better requested SCIIC services at least once. Although, the largest agencies (those with 100 or more sworn) had the largest percentage for requests (92%). Table 27 provides the total, minimum, maximum, mean and median number of requests per agency across the six agency size categories. The results show that mean number of requests by the largest agencies are nearly three times greater than the mean number of requests from agencies with 50 to 99 sworn personnel.

Table 28 presents the rate of requests for services by agencies as the number per 10 officers. The total number of requests for each agency were divided by agency size and multiplied by 10. This gives a normalized rate of requests that provides insight into the rate of requests by agency size. These results show a slightly different pattern. The average number of requests per 10 officers was highest among agencies with 50 to 99 sworn personnel, followed by agencies with 100 or more sworn personnel and then agencies with 10-24 sworn personnel. The median rates of requests per 10 sworn personnel, which is less influenced by a handful of agencies in each categories with high usage rates, reveals that requests per 10 officers is still highest among agencies with 100 or more sworn personnel.

Table 26. The percent of agencies requesting SCIIC services at least once between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009 by agency size.

<b>Agency Size</b>	<b>Did not use SCIIC Services</b>	<b>Used SCIIC services on one or more occasions</b>
No Sworn	100.0%	0.0%
1 – 9 Officers	80.2%	19.8%
10 – 24 Officers	52.2%	47.8%
25 – 49 Officers	13.7%	86.3%
50 – 99 Officers	9.5%	90.5%
100 or more officers	7.7%	92.3%

Table 27. The distribution of requests per agency requests by agency size (January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009).

<b>Agency Size</b>	<b>Minimum number of requests</b>	<b>Maximum number of requests</b>	<b>Mean number of requests</b>	<b>Median number of request</b>
No Sworn	0	0	0	0
1 – 9 Officers	0	16	.7417	0
10 – 24 Officers	0	57	6.0727	0
25 – 49 Officers	0	69	10.4400	7.5000
50 – 99 Officers	0	121	34.8077	22.0000
100 or more officers	0	205	91.4815	94.0000

Table 28. The rate of agency requests per 10 officers of SCIIC services by agency size (January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009).

<b>Agency Size</b>	<b>Minimum number of requests</b>	<b>Maximum number of requests</b>	<b>Mean number of requests</b>	<b>Median number of request</b>
No sworn	0	0	0	0
1 – 9 Officers	0	4.00	1.4209	0
10 – 24 Officers	0	34.62	3.5720	0
25 – 49 Officers	0	15.68	3.1470	2.1825
50 – 99 Officers	0	14.50	4.8889	3.0999
100 or more officers	0	16.27	4.5085	3.8462

*Types of crimes/issues linked to the requests*

A brief analysis was also conducted on the types of crime or issue that was associated with each request. The requests were initially categorized into three broad types: violent crime, property crime, and other crimes or issues. Figure 14 provides the percentage of requests that fell into each category. The largest group of requests were associated with property crimes (40.4%), followed by violent crime (33.2%) and other crimes or issues (24.8%). Tables 29 through 31 provide additional details about the specific crimes within these general categories. Table 29 shows that robberies were the most common violent crime associated with violent crime requests, followed by assaults. Slightly less than 10% of cases that fell under violent crime requests were associated with homicides. Crimes that fell under the Other category included kidnapping and abduction. Table 30 shows that the most common property crime requests fell into a general other property crime category that included shoplifting, forgery and fraud. The second most common property crime request was burglary, followed by larceny. Table 31 provides the distribution on more specific types of crimes and issues related to requests for SCIIC services. Drug violations were the most common specific offense identified (33.5%) followed by gang activity (6.7%). The remaining crimes and issues that were classified as other included such incidents as weapons violations, missing children, indecent expose, hit and run accidents, and motor vehicle violations.

Figure 14. Types of crimes linked to SCIIC service requests




Table 29. Distribution of requests related to violent crimes by specific crime type.

Type of Violent Crime	%
Homicide	9.6%
Robbery	41.6%
Assault	35.9%
Rape/Sexual assault	9.3%
Other violent crime	3.6%

Table 30. Distribution of requests related to property crimes by specific crime type.

<b>Type of Property Crime</b>	<b>%</b>
Burglary	31.8%
Larceny	24.1%
Motor vehicle search	4.4%
Other property crime	39.7%

Table 31. Distribution of requests related to other crimes and issues by specific crime type.

<b>Type of Other Crime/Issue</b>	<b>%</b>
Drug Violations	33.5%
Gang Related	6.7%
Other crime/Issue	59.8%

*Types of SCIIC Services Provided*

The final analysis related to the SCIIC request database examined the specific types of services provided by the SCIIC to requesting law enforcement personnel. A distinction is made here between requests for services and services provided by the SCIIC. Although many cases involved law enforcement personnel requesting a specific service that was subsequently provided, it is also possible that a substantial number of requests ultimately resulted in the provision of additional services by SCIIC personnel in order to best assist the requesting officer or deputy. The database only contained information on the services actually provided, thus, the term “services provided” is used in this analysis. The analysis examined the number of services provided by type, and the percent of total requests accounted for by each type. The categories included the eleven services examined in the surveys. A review of the request database revealed there were a few other categories of requests made of the SCIIC: other database queries, requests to assist in locating an individual, a single photograph of an individual that may come from the DMV or a jail booking photograph that would not constitute a photo lineup, assistance in getting information from agencies or organizations outside the state, requests to produce a threat assessment, and a general miscellaneous category. Table 32 provides the number of times each service was provided, along with the associated percentage. Photo lineups are overwhelmingly the most common type of service provided by the SCIIC, with nearly 88% of requests involving this service. The second and third most common services provided were queries of databases otherwise not listed and DMV queries, which were only provided in 3.8% and 3.3% of requests, respectively. Most of the services provided appeared to provide support to ongoing investigations of the agencies. The only analysis-based products observed were 18 requests that involved the SCIIC producing threat assessments.

In sum, the analysis of the request data base reveals that approximately half of the law enforcement agencies in South Carolina made requests for SCIIC services on one or more occasions in 2009. Large agencies were the most likely to make requests, and requests were more likely to be related to incidents involving property crimes in the jurisdiction of the requesting agency. In addition, most of the services provided appeared to support ongoing investigations as opposed to producing analytical products for agencies, with request for photo lineups being the primary service provided.

Table 32. The number and distribution of types of SCIIC service provided from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009.\*

<b>Service</b>	<b>Number of requests involving service</b>	<b>Percent of 4,320 total requests involving service</b>
NCIC check	76	1.8%
SCIEx query	43	1.0%
Photo lineup	3785	87.6%
Facial recognition	29	0.7%
Partial vehicle tag analysis	37	0.9%
CLEAR query	0	0.0%
Gangnet query	19	0.4%
Probation and parole check	3	0.1%
Fugitive location assistance	0	0.00%
Flow chart or map production	9	0.2%
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) query	142	3.3%
Other database queries	166	3.8%
Locate an individual	55	1.3%
Single photo request	108	2.5%
Assist with out of state information	43	1.0%
Threat Assessment	18	0.4%
Miscellaneous	119	2.8%

\* Some requests involved the provision of more than one service. As a result, the total services provided is more than 4,320.

## SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The events of 9/11 led law enforcement in the United States to become more involved in intelligence efforts to support homeland security. As part of this paradigm shift, most states and a few large law enforcement agencies created intelligence fusion centers, which have the intended goal of being the primary conduit for connecting state and local law enforcement agencies to the increasing homeland security efforts of federal agencies. Many of these centers have moved beyond their initial anti-terrorism-only focus to an "all crimes" approach, essentially taking an intelligence approach to day-to-day criminal activity in addition to terrorism activity. This "all crimes" orientation is consistent with the broader intelligence-led policing movement that has emerged in law enforcement over the past decade. Despite this expanded role, however, little is known about the actual operations of fusion centers. The present study attempted to partially fill this knowledge gap by examining the connection between the state fusion center in South Carolina (the SCIIC) and local law enforcement agencies within the state. The study was based on surveys of law enforcement executives in South Carolina and their personnel. Analysis of a database containing the requests of the SCIIC services by local law enforcement in the state was also conducted.

The results indicate that the intelligence products the SCIIC disseminates are generally viewed positively by the executives and personnel. The large majority of the executives reported that they received the different SCIIC intelligence products and usually reviewed them upon receipt. Moreover, they evaluated these reports positively, with more than 80% of the executives indicating that each of the products were quite a bit or very useful to them. Comparatively, a few executives commented that some products could focus more on local issues, particularly those faced by small and rural agencies. Survey results regarding the intelligence products were similar among personnel. The large majority of personnel reported they read the intelligence products most of the time or always. Most personnel also reported that the products are quite a bit or very useful, with 75% or more the respondents providing these responses for each product.

The personnel respondents were also asked about their use of various SCIIC services. Each of the SCIIC services was used by a relatively small portion of the personnel. Requests for SCIEx queries were the most frequently reported, with 36.4% reporting that they requested this service one or more times in 2009. Requests for DMV queries were the second most frequent service requested, with 32.1% of personnel requesting a DMV query on one or more occasions. The responses for using the remaining services one or more times ranged from 7.4% to 27.9%. A subsequent question asked personnel why they had not used the various services, which revealed that many of the personnel were not aware that the services were provided by the SCIIC. More than 50% percent of the respondents who indicated they did not request the use of facial recognition, partial vehicle tag analysis, or the Consolidated Lead Evaluation and Reporting (CLEAR) database reported they were unaware these services existed. More than 40% of those not requesting fugitive location services or flow chart/map production reported they did not know these services existed. There was also an observed relationship between the use of

SCIIC services and whether the personnel reported they had attended a course on intelligence presented by SLED/SCIIC or other personnel. Specifically, 69.1% of personnel who stated they had attended such training reported they used one or more of the SCIIC services during 2009 versus 47.4% who stated they did not attend such training.

A similar pattern of low SCIIC services usage was found in the analysis of the request for services database. This analysis revealed that 51.4% of the state's 294 law enforcement agencies made no requests for SCIIC services during 2009. It was assumed that usage rates would be higher among larger agencies because of levels of criminal activity in those jurisdictions and the generally higher levels support for ILP. It was also assumed that the largest agencies, such as those with 100 or more sworn officers, may not be the highest users since those agencies may have the resources to conduct their own analyses and thus have no or little need to call on the SCIIC. Analysis of the request database supports the first assumption, but rejects the second assumption. An increase in agency size was related to increases in requests for SCIIC services but, on average, the largest agencies in the state had the highest level of requests. Additional analysis of the request database showed that the overwhelming majority of requests were for photo lineups (87.6%). The next most frequent requests were for a search other databases (3.8%). This would suggest that other than photo lineups, the services of the SCIIC are being underutilized, which is not necessarily surprising given the findings from the personnel survey that indicate many of the respondents were unaware of the services provided by the center.

After asking questions on the use and evaluation of products and services, both surveys asked the executives and personnel to rate the overall usefulness of the SCIIC to their agency. In general, the executives provided positive ratings for the center, with 43% reporting the SCIIC was very useful to their agency and 33% reporting it is moderately useful. Additional analysis found that executives who placed a high priority on ILP in their agency were more likely to provide a very useful rating, and executives who received intelligence products also were more likely to provide a very useful rating. A higher percentage of the surveyed personnel provided a very useful rating for the center overall (61%). Supplementary analysis of the personnel survey showed that those personnel who used the SCIIC services at least once were more likely to give the fusion center a very useful rating than those who reported they did not use any services. Personnel who attended any form training on intelligence were also more likely provide a very useful rating compared to those with no such training.

Overall, the analysis of the surveys and database provides positive reviews for the SCIIC and its intelligence products and services. However, limitations of the study should be recognized. The executive and personnel surveys did not have a 100% response rate, so the findings presented only reflect those of the respondents and may not be representative of the populations of executives and personnel. This issue is particularly relevant to the findings of the personnel survey. All of the personnel survey respondents were individuals who requested SCIICs intelligence products, and thereby show some level of interest in and familiarity with the center. It is reasonable to assume that the remaining South Carolina law enforcement population is less familiar with the SCIIC and its services.

While acknowledging these limitations, the findings nonetheless do provide a basis for recommending that the SCIIC improve its outreach to law enforcement agencies and personnel in South Carolina. This recommendation is based on the idea that improving knowledge about the SCIIC and the usefulness of its services will improve and help maintain communication between the center and local agencies as well as service utilization on a broader scale. This would increase the center's ability to support agencies in addressing crime problems within and across their jurisdictions, as well as assist the center's mission to link these agencies to the national homeland security intelligence network. Within this framework, the current study makes the following three recommendations:

**1. *Market the SCIIC services to all law enforcement personnel in the state.***

The SCIIC offers a variety of investigative support and analytical services that no single agency in the state possesses. Yet, the findings from the survey and request database suggest these services are currently underutilized by the South Carolina law enforcement community. A substantial proportion of the personnel survey respondents acknowledged that they were unaware of many services offered by the SCIIC, and this lack of knowledge is likely higher among the general law enforcement population who have little or no contact with the fusion center by way of receiving the intelligence products. Increasing the knowledge of services to the law enforcement community should increase the use of center services and subsequently increase the ability of all agencies to address crime and disorder problems in their communities. The current implementation of the Field Liaison Officer program should assist this dissemination of knowledge, particularly if it contains a strong orientation of marketing the SCIIC services. However, one issue that should be considered if such efforts to increase SCIIC use are to be successful is the potential need for the center to increase its personnel and resources to have the capacity to meet increased requests for support.

**2. *Increase the provision of intelligence training to law enforcement personnel in the state.***

The findings from the personnel survey indicate that individuals are more likely to use the fusion center's services and rate the fusion center more positively overall if they have received training on intelligence, particularly training from SLED/SCIIC personnel. Thus, the center might consider increasing knowledge of the SCIIC and its services through greater outreach and training, particularly if the training is provided by personnel from the center. An additional benefit is that this may promote the use of the intelligence-led policing model among agency personnel, as called for in the Fusion Center Guidelines (USDOJ, 2005b).

**3. *Promote Intelligence-Led Policing to law enforcement executives in the state.***

The findings from the executive survey showed that executives who said their agency places a high priority on ILP are more likely to view the center as being very useful to their agency. Executives set the expectations and orientation of the personnel in their agency. Thus, implementing strategies that increase executive support of the center should also improve the

support and use of the SCIIC from their personnel. If executives place a high priority on ILP in their agency, it can then be assumed that they understand the value of crime and intelligence analysis and, subsequently, will create an environment for their personnel that is supportive of using the center's services. This, in turn, should increase not only requests for investigative case support from the center's services but also increase the number of requests for the center to provide analytical products. As noted above, although agency executives may buy into the philosophy of ILP, they may not have all the resources in-house to support such efforts. The SCIIC could be a major resource to help these agencies incorporate ILP practices. In sum, the promotion of ILP among law enforcement executives could increase the support for and use of the SCIIC's mission and services as well as increasing the adoption of ILP.

Beyond these recommendations, consideration should also be given to the need for additional research that can assist fusion centers in accomplishing their mission. Little is known about the operations and effective practices of fusion centers, particularly as it relates to the interest of the present study on the connection between centers and their constituent agencies. More in-depth interviews with law enforcement personnel in constituent agencies can provide insight on additional services fusion centers can provide to assist these agencies in their day-to-day operations, particularly as it relates to assisting agencies in adopting an ILP strategy. Analysis of fusion center practices conducted across multiple centers can be useful in identifying lessons learned and effective practices that form the basis for a best practices model. Evaluation of the Field Liaison Officer program implementation across multiple sites can similarly serve as a basis for identifying best practices for connecting with constituent agencies. These research efforts and others will provide empirical and practical knowledge on the operations of fusion centers that build on existing guidelines.

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# Appendix A



**SECTION B****INTELLIGENCE & FUSION CENTER TRAINING**

7. Have you **ever** received intelligence-based training by attending any of the following?

- |                                                                                                                                  |         |        |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|--------|
| Criminal intelligence of the Chief Executive                                                                                     | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| Intelligence commanders course provide by the Institute<br>Intergovernmental Research (IIR) & Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| SLATT – Investigator/Intelligence workshop                                                                                       | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| SLED courses at the S.C. Law Enforcement Academy                                                                                 | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) Intelligence Course                                                              | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| Presentations on the Fusion Center at the S.C. Police Chiefs<br>or Sheriff’s Association                                         | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| Other intelligence training                                                                                                      | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |

If Yes, specify: \_\_\_\_\_

**SECTION C****INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES**

- |                                                                                                                                                                                |         |        |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|--------|
| 8. Does your agency have any personnel assigned to <u>crime analysis</u> full or part-time?                                                                                    | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| 9. Does your agency have any personnel assigned to <u>intelligence analysis</u> full or part time?                                                                             | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| 10. Does your agency possess the following types of software?                                                                                                                  |         |        |
| Crime mapping software (e.g., ArcGIS, MapInfo).....                                                                                                                            | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| Crime analysis software (e.g., ATAC, CAT).....                                                                                                                                 | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| Intelligence software (e.g., i2 Analyst’s Notebook, MEMEX)?.....                                                                                                               | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| 11. Does your agency maintain one or more criminal intelligence databases (e.g., gang database, narcotics database)?.....                                                      | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| 12. Does your agency have an electronic records management system?.....                                                                                                        | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |
| 13. Does your agency have a formal policy guiding information collection, analysis, product development, or dissemination in relation to crime and intelligence analysis?..... | [ ] Yes | [ ] No |

14. Does your agency conduct any of the following analyses? (Check all that apply.) (Check yes if you conduct any of the specific examples.)

Crime Analysis: i.e. Crime pattern analysis, geographic analysis, time-series analysis, frequency-distribution analysis, behavioral analysis, and statistical analysis..... [ ] Yes [ ] No

Investigative (Evidential) Analysis: i.e. Network analysis; telephone record analysis; event, commodity, and activity-flow analysis; timeline analysis; visual investigative analysis; bank record analysis; net worth analysis; business record analysis; content analysis; post-seizure analysis; case analysis; and conversation analysis..... [ ] Yes [ ] No

Strategic Analysis: i.e. Threat assessments, vulnerability assessments, risk assessments, problem profiles, target profiles, and strategic targeting..... [ ] Yes [ ] No

15. Does your agency produce any of the following intelligence reports/products (check all that apply)

Routine Intelligence Bulletins (i.e. daily, weekly or monthly bulletions)..... [ ] Yes [ ] No

Warnings/Advisories (i.e. BOLOs, information on wanted individuals)..... [ ] Yes [ ] No

Threat/Intelligence Analysis Reports (Reports that are the product of detailed analysis on specific crime problems)..... [ ] Yes [ ] No

Other Intelligence Reports/Products ..... [ ] Yes [ ] No

If yes, specify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

16. To whom are these reports/products disseminated? Check all that apply.

- [ ] Personnel in your agency
- [ ] Other local law enforcement agencies within your county
- [ ] Other local law enforcement agencies outside your county
- [ ] State agencies
- [ ] Federal agencies
- [ ] Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

We would next like your opinions on Intelligence-led Policing (ILP). ILP is defined as a process for systematically collecting, organizing, analyzing, and utilizing intelligence to guide law enforcement strategic, operational and tactical decisions. ILP aids law enforcement in identifying, examining, and formulating preventative, protective, and responsive operations to specific targets, threats, and problems. ILP provides the ability to collect, examine, vet, and compare vast quantities of information and enables law enforcement agencies to understand crime patterns and identify individuals, enterprises, and locations that represent the highest threat to the community and concentration of criminal and/or terrorist-related activity.

17. How high of a priority is intelligence-led policing for your agency at this time?

Very low priority	Low priority	Moderate priority	High priority	Very high priority
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

18. If you checked low or very low priority above, please indicate why:

- Not enough resources to devote to intelligence-led policing
- No real need for intelligence-led policing in my jurisdiction
- Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

19. Agencies may place higher or lower priority on the use of intelligence-led policing for addressing different issues. Please indicate how high of a priority your agency currently places on intelligence-led policing for addressing the following:

	Very low priority	Low priority	Moderate priority	High priority	Very high priority
Homeland Security.....	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gangs.....	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Drugs.....	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
General Crime.....	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

The SCIIC sends certain bulletins, advisories, and other notifications to law enforcement agencies throughout the state. Please indicate below whether or not you received such bulletins or advisories between **January 1, 2009 – December 31, 2009** by placing a check in the appropriate box, and if Yes, indicate how often you read them and your opinion of their usefulness. If you do receive a specific bulletin or advisory, please check “NA – do not receive”.

20. Please place a check in the box indicating whether or not you received the following:

	Yes	No
Intelligence Bulletin (counterterrorism, officer safety articles).....	[ ]	[ ]
Advisories (BOLOs, advisories on wanted individuals, etc.....)	[ ]	[ ]
Threat Assessments (i.e. analysis reports of potential criminal or terrorist threats).....	[ ]	[ ]
Gang Intelligence Bulletin.....	[ ]	[ ]
Amber Alert Newsletter.....	[ ]	[ ]

21. How often did you review each product?

	Never	Sometimes	Half the time	Most of the time	Always	NA – did not receive
SCIIC Intelligence Bulletin..	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
Advisories.....	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
Threat Assessments.....	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
Gang Intelligence.....	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
Amber Alert Newsletter....	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

22. How useful did you find each product?

	Not at all useful	A little useful	Quite a bit useful	Very useful	NA – did not receive
SCIIC Intelligence Bulletin.....	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
Advisories.....	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
Threat Assessments.....	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
Gang Intelligence.....	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
Amber Alert Newsletter.....	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

23. Overall, how do you rate the usefulness of the SCIIC to your agency?

Not at all useful	Somewhat useful	Moderately useful	Very useful
[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

24. Please indicate how the SCIIC could improve its services to your agency:

**SECTION F**

**USE OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE SOURCES**

25. Do you or your personnel use any of the following online intelligence resources?

- |                                                          |                              |                             |                                   |
|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC)..... | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No | <input type="checkbox"/> Not sure |
| Law Enforcement Online (LEO).....                        | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No | <input type="checkbox"/> Not sure |
| Antidrug Network (ADNET).....                            | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No | <input type="checkbox"/> Not sure |
| Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES).....  | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No | <input type="checkbox"/> Not sure |
| Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (ATIX).....          | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No | <input type="checkbox"/> Not sure |
| Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).....        | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No | <input type="checkbox"/> Not sure |

***Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.***

Please return the survey in the self-addressed stamped envelope, fax or email to:

Bob Kaminski  
Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice  
1305 Greene Street  
University of South Carolina  
Columbia, SC 29208  
FAX: 803-777-9600  
EMAIL: kaminskb@mailbox.sc.edu

# Appendix B

**RETURN TO:**  
Bob Kaminski  
Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice  
1305 Greene Street  
University of South Carolina  
Columbia, SC 29208  
FAX: 803-777-9600  
EMAIL: kaminskb@mailbox.sc.edu

**SOUTH CAROLINA INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATION CENTER USABILITY SURVEY**  
University of South Carolina  
Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice

Thank you for participating in the USC study on law enforcement use of the South Carolina Intelligence and Information Center (SCIIC), also known as the South Carolina Fusion Center. Your responses will help us understand local law enforcement's use of the SCIIC's services and how the Center may better serve your needs. We appreciate your honest and candid responses. All information provided will be kept confidential. No individual or department will be linked to the responses provided.

**INSTRUCTIONS**

- Unless otherwise noted, please restrict responses regarding the SCIIC to the time period **January 1, 2009 – December 31, 2009**.
- Please complete the front and back of each page and do not leave any items blank.
- Please return the completed survey within two weeks of receiving it.
- Please retain a copy of the completed survey for your records as project staff may call to clarify responses.
- If you have any questions regarding the survey, please call or e-mail Bob Kaminski at (803) 777-1560, kaminskb@mailbox.sc.edu.

**SECTION A**

**BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS**

1. How many years have you worked for your current employer? \_\_\_\_\_
2. What is your current position? (Select all that apply)
  - Patrol
  - Intelligence Analyst
  - Investigator
  - Crime Analyst
  - Gang Unit
  - Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_
3. What is your current rank?
  - Officer / Deputy / Trooper
  - Lieutenant
  - Master or Senior Patrol Officer / Deputy / Trooper
  - Captain
  - Detective / Investigator
  - Major
  - Corporal
  - Colonel
  - Sergeant
  - Deputy or Assistant Chief
  - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

## Section B

## SCIIC PRODUCTS

The SCIIC sends certain bulletins, advisories, and other notifications to law enforcement agencies throughout the state. Please indicate below whether or not you received such bulletins or advisories between **January 1, 2009 – December 31, 2009** by placing a check in the appropriate box, and if Yes, indicate how often you read them and your opinion of their usefulness. If you do not receive a specific bulletin or advisory, please check "NA – do not receive".

4. Please place a check in the box indicating whether or not you received the following:

	Yes	No
SCIIC Intelligence Daily Bulletin	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Advisories (BOLOs, advisories on wanted individuals, etc...)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Threat Assessments (i.e. analysis reports of potential criminal or terrorist threats)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gang Intelligence Bulletin	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Amber Alert Newsletter	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

5. How often did you review each product?

	Never	Sometimes	Half the time	Most of the time	Always	NA – did not receive
SCIIC Intelligence Bulletin	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Advisories	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Threat Assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gang Intelligence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Amber Alert Newsletter	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

6. How useful did you find each product?

	Not at all useful	A little useful	Quite a bit useful	Very useful	NA – did not receive
SCIIC Intelligence Bulletin	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Advisories	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Threat Assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gang Intelligence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Amber Alert Newsletter	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<b>SECTION C</b>	<b>SCIIC SERVICES</b>
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7. The SCIIC provides several services that law enforcement personnel may utilize. Please indicate below whether or not you requested SCIIC personnel to conduct any of the services listed below for you between **January 1, 2009 & December 31, 2009** by placing a check in the appropriate YES or NO box for each service listed. Also, if you check NO for a service, please indicate why you did not request that service.

			Was not aware SCIIC provides service	My agency has own resources to provide service	No need for service	Other reason
	Yes	No				
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) check.....	[ ]	[ ] →	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
SCIEx query.....	[ ]	[ ] →	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
Photo lineups.....	[ ]	[ ] →	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
Facial recognition.....	[ ]	[ ] →	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
Partial vehicle tag analysis.....	[ ]	[ ] →	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
Consolidated Lead Evaluation & Reporting (CLEAR) database query.....	[ ]	[ ] →	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
GangNET query.....	[ ]	[ ] →	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
Probation or parole status check.....	[ ]	[ ] →	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
Fugitive location assistance.....	[ ]	[ ] →	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
Flow chart or map production for investigations or court.....	[ ]	[ ] →	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) query.....	[ ]	[ ] →	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	

8. Law enforcement officers can request SCIIC personnel to query the SCIEx database for them or they can query the SCIEx database themselves directly. Did you query the SCIEx database yourself between **January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009**?

[ ] Yes      [ ] No

9. How frequently did you use each service? If you didn't use a specific service, check "NA-did not use."

	Never	Somewhat frequently	Frequently	Very frequently	NA - did not use
NCIC check	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCIEEx query	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Photo lineups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Facial recognition	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partial vehicle tag analysis	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CLEAR database query	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GangNET query	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Probation or parole status check	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Fugitive location assistance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Flow chart or map production	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DMV query	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

10. How useful was each service?

	Not at all useful	A little useful	Quite a bit useful	Very useful	NA – did not use
NCIC check	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCIEEx query	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Photo lineups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Facial recognition	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partial vehicle tag analysis	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CLEAR database query	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GangNET query	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Probation or parole status check	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Fugitive location assistance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Flow chart or map production	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DMV query	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

11. Overall, how do you rate the usefulness of the SCIC to your agency?

Not at all useful	Somewhat useful	Moderately useful	Very useful	NA - did not use
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**SECTION D****SUBMITTING INFORMATION TO THE SCIIC**

12. Did the SCIIC ever request information from you or your agency between **January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009**?  
 Yes       No       Not sure

13. How many times did you respond to requests for information between **January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009**? (If no requests were received, please check "NA – no requests received".)

Never     Sometimes     Half of the time     Most of the time     Every time     NA – no requests received

14. Did you submit any *suspicious activity reports* to the SCIIC between **January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009**?

Yes       No

15. If you responded no, why not:

No need

Not aware there is a reporting form

Report suspicious activity informally (e.g., phone call, email, during meetings)

Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

16. How many times did you submit a suspicious activity report to the SCIIC between **January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009**?

0       1–3       4–6       7–9       10 or more

17. Please indicate how the SCIIC could improve its services to your agency:

**SECTION E****USE OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE SOURCES**

18. Did you use any of the following intelligence centers or online resources between **January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009**?

Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Law Enforcement Online (LEO)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Antidrug Network (ADNET)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (ATIX)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No

**SECTION F****INTELLIGENCE-BASED TRAINING**

19. Have you **ever** received intelligence-based training by attending any of the following?

SLED courses at the S.C. Law Enforcement Academy	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Intelligence commanders course provide by the Institute of Intergovernmental Research (IIR) & Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
SLATT – Investigator/Intelligence workshop	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) Intelligence Course	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Other presentations or training by SLED on the Fusion Center’s operations and services	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Other intelligence training	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No

If Yes, specify: \_\_\_\_\_

***Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.***

Please return the survey in the self-addressed stamped envelope, fax or email to:

Bob Kaminski  
 Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice  
 1305 Greene Street  
 University of South Carolina  
 Columbia, SC 29208  
 FAX: 803-777-9600  
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