|
|
COLLOQUIA & CONFERENCES
DREAMING
Jody Azzouni
Department of Philosophy
Tufts University
September 25, 2003
Thursday, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Nursing, Room 125
Two versions of "the" dreaming argument are distinguished. A strong version
of the argument, which uses very weak premises, in particular, which does
not require assumptions about the epistemic relevance of "possibilities,"
is here examined. It is shown how considerations involving both impaired
judgment and lucid dreaming are entangled in ways that give the argument
plausibility. An "intoxication" argument (how do I know that I'm not drunk
right now?) is used to show that psychological states that induce poor
judgment are not themselves (alone) powerful enough to motivate skepticism;
and plausible symmetry conditions on confusion (that if A can be confused
with B, then B should be confusable with A as well), show that "lucid
dream" considerations, if powerful enough to motivate skepticism, are not
compatible with what actual dreams are like.
 |
|