Skip Navigation

		COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES PHILOSOPHY HOME PAGE CHAIR'S STATEMENT
CHAIR'S STATEMENT FACULTY GRADUATE STUDENTS COLLOQUIUM CALENDAR UNDERGRADUATE PROGRAM GRADUATE PROGRAM GRADUATE PLACEMENT MASTER SCHEDULE UNDERGRADUATE BULLETIN GRADUATE BULLETIN ACADEMIC CALENDARS USC LIBRARIES CAS COMPUTING & IT USC COMPUTER SERVICES ABOUT COLUMBIA SC RESTRICTED ACCESS: Faculty | Graduate Students Search USC   THIS SITE		COLLOQUIA & CONFERENCES EVIDENCE IN METAPHYSICS: A PUZZLE AND A NON-SOLUTION   Michael Dickson Department of Philosophy University of South Carolina   November 5, 2004 Friday, 4:00pm-6:00pm Nursing, Room 127   This talk will begin with an account of the nature of metaphysical inquiry derived from Aristotle, and supplemented by contemporary sources. (The aim is to characterize what contemporary metaphysicians take themselves to be doing.) Given the nature of metaphysics, it turns out that there is a serious question -- recognized already by Aristotle -- about what, if anything, could possibly serve as evidence in a metaphysical inquiry. I consider, and reject, one recently popular answer: personal intuition. First, I will argue that George Bealer's arguments in favor of the use of intuition in metaphysics are circular (a charge of which he is aware, but he thinks he can avoid it). Second, I will suggest that evidence from contemporary psychology should, at the least, raise serious doubts about the suitability of personal intuition to serve as evidence in metaphysics.
RETURN TO TOP		USC LINKS: DIRECTORY MAP EVENTS VIP	SITE INFORMATION
Last updated 4/8/08 10:32 PM • burke@sc.edu   © 2006 University of South Carolina Board of Trustees