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Dermot Moran School of Philosophy University College Dublin October 10, 2007 Wednesday, 5:00pm-6:30pm BA, Room 008 In several recent articles John Searle has attempted to distinguish his practice of logical analysis from what he takes to be phenomenological analysis. He bases his account of phenomenological analysis on Hubert Dreyfus' discussions of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Searle maintains that Dreyfus thinks Searle is really a kind of phenomenologist but a Husserlian one, while Dreyfus is advocating a more Heideggerian or Merleau-Pontian approach. Searle, on the other hand, denies he is doing phenomenology at all. In his positive assessment of phenomenology, Searle says that phenomenology is, at best, only the first step in logical analysis. Furthermore, Searle thinks that Dreyfus and other phenomenologists are often misled by something he calls "the phenomenological illusion." In this paper, I want to give an account of the phenomenological approach that corrects the misconceptions of both Searle and Dreyfus.  |
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Last updated 11/6/08 11:10 PM
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