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COLLOQUIA & CONFERENCES
THE PECULIAR LOGIC
OF VALUE
Ray Jackendoff
Seth Merrin Professor of Philosophy
Co-Director, Center for Cognitive Studies
Tufts University
November 15, 2007
Thursday, 7:00pm-8:30pm
Law School Auditorium
How do humans conceptualize systems of value? The hypothesis is that value
is conceptualized as an abstract (non-perceptible) property attributed to
objects, persons, and actions. The value of an entity plays a role in a
suite of inference rules which affect the way one reasons about the entity
and acts on it.
There are several distinct types of value, including Affective value (does
it feel good or bad?); Utility (is it good for me?); Prowess (is so-and-so
good at doing such-and-such); Normative value, which includes moral value
as a sub-case (is it good of so-and-so to do such-and-such?); Personal
Normative value (is so-and-so a good person?); and Esteem (does so-and-so
have a good reputation?). In addition, values can be differentiated as
subjective (is it good for me? for you?) verses objective (is it good,
period?). Each of these kinds of value plays a different role in the
ecology of the value system.
I will work through several important inference rules that determine the
interaction of multiple values in determining one's course of action and
one's expectations of others' actions. I will develop formal treatments of
fairness, reciprocity, restitution, honoring, shaming, and apology, and I
will address the question of what constitutes "true" altruism rather than
concealed self-interested behavior. It will be possible to ask what
aspects of values are culture-dependent, and what aspects are consequences
of human (and even primate) universals.
This talk is co-sponsored by the Linguistics Program, the Department
of English, the Department of Languages, Literatures, and Cultures,
and the College of Arts and Sciences.
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