R.I.G. Hughes

Philosophy Department

Tel. 803-777-3728

Fax 803-777-9178

e-mail address: righ@sc.edu

Areas of professional specialization:

Philosophy of Physics, Philosophical Logic, Theater Aesthetics

Interest in Science Studies:

Areas - Philosophy of Physics (esp. quantum theory); nature of scientific theory

Figures - All and sundry (Aristotle, Descartes, Newton et al.);

Issues - Representation, realism

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Synopsis of Presentation:

Meeting of the Science Studies Group on Wednesday, October 17th, 1995. The presenters were R.I.G. Hughes (Philosophy) and Jose Vargas (Physics). While this was quite unplanned, both contributions questioned the very character of physical theory. As such, they took us right into the heart of traditional philosophical reflections on science. Here is a very brief and superficial synopsis of R.I.G. Hughes's presentation:

R.I.G. did not present a particular case but advanced a theory about theories and indicated how he uses a variety of case studies to investigate his theory. He introduced his theory of theories by referring to the work of Ron Giere (even though I might add that the work of Bas van Fraassen also lurks in the background): theoretical definitions specify a class of models, theoretical hypotheses then select models from that class to represent parts of the world. The "laws of physics" are therefore not "laws of nature" in that they specify only what is true for the models. A "law of physics" can help us understand nature only to the extent that the model actually represents nature (and physics may not have very much by way of laws to say about that). R.I.G.'s view differs from many traditional conceptions of scientific theories according to which the sciences formulate laws of nature which straightforwardly explain natural phenomena. The notion of 'representation' is much richer, also more complex, than the notion of 'explanation': Galileo's inclined planes represent a part of nature or vice versa, he then introduces purely geometric diagrams (though they do not "look like" it) as theoretical representations of the inclined plane . . .

When R.I.G. talks about 'models' he includes but does not limit himself to 'formal models' (Jose's geometrizations might be considered as such). Again, the experimental set-up of the inclined plane may serve as a model. One of R.I.G.'s articles discusses "The Bohr Atom, Models, and Realism" (Philosophical Topics, vol. 18, 1990). I should also mention his books The Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Harvard University Press, 1989), and (co-edited with Phillip Bricker) Philosophical Perspectives on Newtonian Science. Two further articles are perhaps especially relevant to this topic: "Theoretical Explanation" (published in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 18, University of Notre Dame Press, 1993) and "Laws of Physics, Laws of Nature, and the Representational Account of Theories" (forthcoming in Proto-Soziologie).

Alfred Nordmann