I began by noting that recent developments in the history and philosophy of science have made it increasingly difficult to assume what 'science' is. Gone are the days of Logical Positivism where everyone understood that physics provides the best example of 'science' and that we could develop normative prescriptions (such as Popper's demarcation-criterion of 'falsifiability') which seem to fit much of recent physics and which may enable other disciplines to become 'scientific.' But if we don't know what 'science' is, what is the subject-matter of the history of science, the philosophy of science, the sociology of science? Obviously we don't want to approach our subject-matter with preconceptions that allow us to see and study only those practices which confirm our preconceptions! In my dissertation I developed the following suggestion (as a critique and further development of suggestions by Imre Lakatos): we should start with a very minimal, extremely comprehensive ('weak') conception of science, and then observe how the community of inquirers develops more exclusive and stronger conceptions of science.
What is that weak conception of science? In brief: any attempt to provide an explanation (very broadly conceived) raises certain issues, the negotiation of these issues is 'science.' More interestingly, how does the community of inquirers establish and maintain a more exclusive conception of science? In brief: by imposing (linguistic) 'discipline' upon itself, by determining what kinds of arguments are good and appropriate arguments as one negotiates the issues raised by proposed explanations. I discussed this using a fairly simple and straightforward example. After his basic ideas and insights, it took Darwin 30 years to write the Origin of Species because he had to frame evolutionary theory in such a way that evolutionary biology could be practiced without reference to metaphysics, theology, and politics, but from an empiricist point of view. In order to do so, he 'committed' evolutionary biology to gradualism (vs. saltationism - a restriction that has only recently been relaxed): he suggested that all evolutionary explanations can be discussed in terms of causes which are presently and continuously in operation. A community of scientists (even of sceptics and opponents) can now discuss this claim and might find, as many did, that the theory of Natural Selection cannot fully satisfy this condition. At this point, however, Darwin and his opponents are already united in a common pursuit and they are both accepting the fact of evolution as that which requires an explanation. The theological, political, metaphysical debates are by no means resolved, but a disciplined 'scientific' discourse is used to conduct this debate without direct appeal to 'external' motives and interests.
In our discussion of this we came upon another example: superstring theory as a 'theory of everything' questions the traditional boundaries between physics and mathematics and prompts debates about the true character and purpose of physics; and then there is David Willer's case: as he designs experiments, publishes his results, discusses the findings with friends and colleagues, David is always also (simultaneously) upholding a certain conception of 'properly scientific' sociology. The same is true, of course, for those outside his community who also defend and negotiate some idea of what they consider 'scientific' work.
By creating, modifying, and policing certain conceptions of 'science,' enquirers shape their own identity as scientists (whatever they do is an example of what they consider good science); they also establish the conditions under which understanding and communication and consensus are possible (Kuhn calls this 'normal science'); and they thereby make (publically maintained) civility a pre-condition of objectivity. These latter dimensions create philosophically interesting links to the work of Kant, Peirce, and Wittgenstein.
Have I published this account anywhere? Not really. You will find numerous case-studies, however, which exemplify my approach. A pair of articles provides most (technical) detail: 'Persistent Propensities: Portrait of a Familiar Controversy,' Biology and Philosophy, vol. 5, 1990, pp. 379-399; and 'The Evolutionary Analysis: Apparent Error, Certified Belief, and the Defects of Asymmetry,' Perspectives on Science, vol. 2, 1994, pp. 131-175. More enjoyable reading might be provided by 'Goodbye and Farewell: Siegel vs. Feyerabend,' Inquiry, vol. 33, 1990, pp. 317-331; and Community, Immortality, Enlightenment: Kant's Scholarly Republic. (Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995, vol. II, pp. 705-712.
Alfred Nordmann
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