This synopsis of their presentation does not do justice to their different points of view but paints only with a very broad brush.
The discussion established various lines of argument, all relating to psychology as it is precariously positioned between science and philosophy or art.
Under the pressure of market forces much of today's psychology is the craft of reducing symptoms. To the extent that chemical modification can have the same effect as far more time-intensive, costly, painful behavioral modification, medication often takes the place of traditional therapy. And to the extent that this craft relies on scientifically established causal relations, psychology can consider itself properly scientific.
What is wrong with this picture?
Leigh presented one line of argument according to which the task of psychology should not consist merely in decreasing symptoms and tending to people's problems, their pain. Its task is also to increase function, to develop a rich language for joy and the quality of life, to serve as a tool of self-realization and the accomplishment of an authentic life.
David presented a second line of argument, an argument for a non-reductionist psychology which is grounded not in causal relations but in stories, cases, and hermeneutic strategies for retro-fitting world and experience. This would be a science cautious about its inferences but rich in narrative resources, closer to Freud's own ideal of science and opposed to the scientific orientation of those who first appropriated and then shipwrecked Freudianism in the United States.
Both Leigh and David therefore raised the question whether the relevant "facts of psychology" or phenomena of the mind are perhaps inaccessible to scientific observation, whether the methods of natural science are doomed to fall short when dealing with human thought and action. Needless to say, this suggestion opens the floodgates of numerous debates concerning metaphysics, neuroscience, theories of mind, and the commitment of science to rationalize the world.
They also share in the strong conviction that psychology (and therapy) should open up possibilities, that it should provide opportunities for imaginative reconceptualization, that it should enhance human flourishing. This vision brings political and philosophical ideals (overcoming alienation, autonomy and authenticity) to bear on a society in which proper functioning and being well-adjusted appear as necessary conditions for economic survival, let alone happiness. Is their call for a "psychology of liberation" also a protest against this society? And to the extent that they simply want to help people come to terms with their conditions of life, would they justified to withhold effective medication and insist on imaginative reconceptualization?
Alfred Nordmann
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