Keith Topper is a political scientist who contributes to the Philosophy of Social Science. Indeed, he is disturbed by the fact that most researchers in political science subscribe to a division of the empirical vs. the normative, of research vs. theory, and of science vs. philosophy. He wants to overcome these divisions and reestablish a dialogue between concrete empirical research and philosophy of social science.
Much has changed since the positivists first asked the question: "What makes a theory of social phenomena scientific?" For the positivists, the answer to this question would follow from their demarcation-criteria, i.e., their extremely general theory of what distinguishes science from pseudo-science. Indeed, for the most part the positivists weren't really interested in the social sciences at all. They were much more interested in the "unity of science": since "science" can be defined by a single set of criteria (derived from the model of the natural sciences), there can be a social science only if it, too, can deal with facts in a value-neutral manner.
In contrast, Keith proposes to raise a second question and see how it relates to the first: "What is political?" The answer to this question defines a domain of inquiry, and perhaps orients the methodology of political science. Therefore, it clearly bears on "What makes a theory of social phenomena scientific?" At the same time, the question "what is political?" appears to be a political question in its own right. "The political" is a contested notion - as is the idea of "political science." And already we find ourselves in the midst of post-positivist debates which invite a fresh look at the relationship between the human and the natural sciences.
So-called "post-positivist" philosophy of science dates back to the work of Thomas Kuhn, N.R. Hanson, and Stephen Toulmin in the late 50s and early 60s. Their work (and that of their successors) has had a contradictory effect on the positivist unity-of-science thesis. On the one hand, it explodes the thesis by focusing on the disunity of science, on the absence of universal demarcation criteria which define all science at all times, and on the break-down of so-called meta-narratives. On the other hand, it reestablishes the unity of science, though now on the model of the social sciences. Ever since Max Weber, social scientists knew that only meaningful events can count as human actions. And ever since Kuhn, philosophers of the natural sciences concede that only meaningful events can count as facts. Both, the social and the natural sciences therefore involve "interpretive access" to the world.
One of the most prominent defenders of the new unity-of-science thesis is Richard Rorty. Keith does not agree with Rorty, however, and favors the approach of Pierre Bourdieu. Even if we grant that all science is interpretive at some level, Keith would insist on a profound ontological difference between social life and physical nature, between the human and the natural. These two spheres comprise very different kinds of phenomena: the social sciences deal with 'power,' 'freedom,' or 'symbols' - indeed, it is phenomena like these which constitute 'the political.' For example, defenders of the old or the new unity-of-science thesis cannot offer an adequate account of political power (but cf., for an alternative viewpoint, David Willer's presentation to our group). The ontological differences between the spheres of social life and nature require methodological differences.
Instead of erecting a new unity-of-science thesis on the model of the social sciences, Keith argues for the disunification of the social sciences. After all, even the natural sciences aren't nearly as unified as the positivists would have it. Keith refers to historians like Peter Galisonwhen he suggests that natural science requires disunification: disciplinary cultures of experimentation or instrumentation define and provide specialized access to a specific domain of phenomena; consensus about the true representation of these phenomena becomes possible among the experts. Pierre Bourdieu's theory of the social field reflects this insight and provides a model for research in the social sciences. Bourdieu couples the virtues of pragmatist and hermeneutical approaches to social and political inquiry. Recognizing the limits of formal thought, he is concerned to remain true to the exigencies of political life. His detailed case studies show, in particular, how power and 'symbolic violence' operate objectively and subjectively.
For more on Bourdieu and Keith's general proposal, cf. his dissertation "Sciences of Uncertainty: Perspectives on Naturalism, Politics and Power." Keith's publications include two articles on Richard Rorty: "The Politics of Postmetaphysics: Richard Rorty's Liberal Utopia" (Strategies 7, 1993, pp. 79-97) and "Richard Rorty, Liberalism, and the Politics of Redescription" (American Political Science Review 89, 1995, pp. 954-965). Forthcoming are articles on the theory of international politics (in Human Studies) and an extended review (in Political Theory) of Roy Bhaskar's Plato etc.: The Problems of Philosophy and their Resolution.
Alfred Nordmann
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