See if you can answer the following questions:

A distinctive feature of the American states versus the national government is the line item, or partial, veto. Under the national Constitution, the President must accept or veto all of a bill passed by Congress. Most state constitutions, however, allow the governor to veto items in appropriations bills while allowing the remainder of the measures to become law. To be exact, 43 state constitutions allow the use of the partial veto, and 42 of them specify that it is restricted to appropriations measures. When and why did such a practice begin?

    Interestingly, the item veto first appeared in this country in the Confederate Constitution of 1861. The motive was two fold: first, it was felt the ordinary veto was inadequate when applied to appropriations bills; and, second, supporters wanted to adopt English budget principles in order to further harmony between the legislative and executive branches. Following the American Civil War the idea spread among the states until the vast majority had adopted a constitutional item veto for the governor.

    What motivated the states to adopt such a provision enhancing the power of the executive? A number of concerns actually spurred this movement. Initially the idea was to give the governor the power to veto unconstitutional or improper appropriations by the legislature, but this later evolved into a way to control extravagant spending on the part of the legislature. Some of this extravagance sprang from the practice of "logrolling" in which legislators agree to support one another's local spending measures in order to obtain a majority for the total bill. Thus, individual measures which could not muster a majority may, when joined with other like measures, find a majority as a result of "horsetrading." A related practice involved the attachment of "riders" to appropriations bills that were not related to the subject of the appropriations measure. This practice is sometimes referred to as "dovetailing" and has been criticized by many observers as a circumvention of the legislative process.

    Most state constitutions also contain a provision requiring that the state budget be balanced. The line item veto gained support as one method of helping assure balanced budgets by giving the governor added power to curb state spending. During the late 19^th and early 20^th century there was widespread public feeling that legislatures were profligate with state revenues.

    Finally, the line item veto also fit nicely with a drive in the early 20^th century to establish an executive budget in most governments. Thus, reformers wanted the governor to be responsible for submitting a budget to the legislature, and later to carry out the budgetary goals adopted. Many felt that the executive would have greater motivation to act with fiscal restraint and not be subject to local or parochial interests like locally elected legislators.

    Together these ideas joined to build a powerful argument for giving the governor an item veto. What seemed like a straightforward idea, however, is not when subjected to careful analysis. The dilemma is maintaining some kind of balance between the executive and legislative branches of government. At what point does allowing a governor to veto portions of a bill result in the remaining measure being something that does not reflect the legislative process and compromises that went into passage of the original bill? Or, worse, when does the use of the executive veto result in the executive essentially writing legislation that does not have to go through an approval process?

    State courts have grappled with the item veto for many years. The disputes tend to concentrate in two areas: (1) Is the provision the governor vetoed an item subject to veto, or, put somewhat differently, at what level of specificity may the executive weld the veto power? And, (2) may a governor veto a non-monetary provision in an appropriation bill, or again phrased differently, when does a non-monetary item constitute a discrete item wedded to an appropriation subject to veto?

    Regarding the first question, state constitutions typically do not define an "item" thereby leaving it to the courts to fashion some standards to be used. Generally the courts have said that the legislature must itemize appropriations since lump-sum funding would negate the governor's veto powers. Concerning the second question, a number of cases, including one in South Carolina, have examined whether a governor can veto language in an appropriation bill. Words obviously are important in a bill and carry the meaning of the measure. South Carolina's Supreme Court has ruled that the governor cannot excise or alter language in a bill. Rather, a "common sense construction" should be used which requires the governor to strike whole items distinctly labeled by the legislature. Otherwise, by selectively striking a "word, phrase, clause, or sentence, the Governor creates legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the General Assembly." (Drummond v. Beasley, 331 S. C. 559 at 563 (1998) )

    A related issue concerning line item vetoes has concerned legislative measures passed at the end of the legislative session and whether the governor can veto items in such measures since the legislature will not be returning to vote on the veto. Such "post adjournment" vetoes have been upheld in South Carolina, but other states differ on this point.

    The line item veto is a powerful tool in the hands of the American governor. It also marks a major difference between state governments and the national government in the United States. In addition, it also illustrates how the separation of powers and doctrine of judicial review work in tandem. The legislature appropriates money, the governor vetoes some items, and the courts often have to decide whether the two branches have acted within their sphere of constitutional powers. When something is an appropriation and what constitutes an item continue to be questions that legislative officials and governors disagree over on occasion. South Carolina's governor and legislature are no exception.

For further reading on this topic see:

Beckman, Ada E. (1957). "The Item Veto Power of the Executive," Temple Law Quarterly 31: 27-34.

Briffault, Richard (1993). "The Item Veto in State Courts," Temple Law Review 66: 1171-1204.

Drummond v. Beasley, 331 S.C. 559 (1998).

Lee, Robert D., Jr. (2000). "State Item-Veto Legal Issues in the 1990s," Public Budgeting and Finance 20, no. 2 (Summer): 49-73.

Wells, Roger H. (1924). "The Item Veto and State Budget Reform," The American Political Science Review 18, no. 4 (November): 782-791.