I. A BRIEF HISTORY
OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION IN NORTHERN AMERICA
International policing in
Northern America was historically less well-developed than in Europe (which
is not surprising given the multitude of European national states and their
geographical closeness), but it nonetheless has antecedents going far back
in the respective histories of the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Among
the more important chapters of the history of international police work
in Northern America can be mentioned the policing initiatives involved
with the changing borders of the three countries considered here. Foreshadowing
some aspects of present conditions on these matters, American police in
past centuries entertained easier relationships with its Canadian than
with its Mexican counterpart. Indicative, for instance, is that the International
Association of Chiefs of Police since its inception in 1901 counted mostly
American and Canadian police among its members, without many representatives
from Europe or Latin America.
U.S.-Mexican police relationships
were historically dominated by issues surrounding the control of the Mexican
border. Depending on political conditions in Mexico and hampered by the
country's various periods of turmoil, police collaboration and bilateral
treaties between the USA and Mexico were never easily achieved. Border
controls in Northern America also centered on smuggling activities. The
U.S. Customs Service, created in 1789, fought smuggling by either cooperating
with foreign governments or by sending its own agents abroad.
Relationships between police
of countries in Northern America and those in Europe were historically
not as prominent as they are today. The geographical distance with the
European mainland presented a physical barrier which could not easily be
transcended. Furthermore, the United States did for a considerable period
of time not have a federal police force of sufficient organizational strength
for other national police to collaborate with.
Relationships with Europe
would not be intensified until after the formation of the International
Criminal Police Commission, the forerunner of Interpol, in 1923. But, as
will be explained below, though the United States, Canada, and Mexico joined
Interpol many years ago, relationships with Interpol have never been very
extensive and the international police network remained dominated by European
police until very recently. Interestingly, police of Latin America were
the first to organize international cooperation as early as 1901, when
the idea to foster collaboration was suggested at an international conference.
However, these initiatives did not produce any lasting results and although
they at times attempted to include the United States and Mexico, they typically
remained restricted to South-American countries, especially Brazil, Argentina,
and Chile.
In sum, what this brief review
reveals is that U.S. law enforcement remained rather insulated from cooperation
with foreign police and that whatever contacts that did take place across
American borders were intended to serve nationally defined interests. Additionally,
relationships of United States police with Canada, on the one hand, and
with Mexico, on the other, were quite different. These historical patterns,
it will be shown, are still relevant today.
II. INTERNATIONAL POLICING
IN THE UNITED STATES
Law enforcement in the United
States is largely the responsibility of local governments, specifically
at the municipal and state levels. Over the years, however, federal police
duties have expanded to produce a multitude of law-enforcement agencies.
Most all of these agencies have international police tasks, but two federal
police forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), stand out. Next to these, American police is also
involved in bilateral and multilateral collaboration initiatives.
1. Issues, Forms, and Structures
of American International Policing
The Federal Bureau of
Investigation
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
is the principal investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Justice. The
international duties of the FBI comprise: 1) enforcement of federal violations
with international dimensions (e.g., terrorism, drug trafficking, and extradition);
2) maintenance of a system of liaison agents abroad; and 3) international
police training programs.
The FBI’s system of foreign
agents is operative in all continents of the globe. In March 1997, the
FBI (which employs some 10,000 agents in total) had 82 agents and 61 support
employees in 30 countries around the world. In 1996, these offices handled
over 3,000 cases and over 5,000 lead assignments. One function of the FBI’s
system of legal attaches (the so-called LEGATs) is to provide assistance
and training. Mainly for that reason, the FBI opened an office in Moscow
in July 1994 (Asnis 1996). Cooperation between police from the United States
and Russia comprises various activities and involves federal as well as
local police (Vassalo 1996). Russian police are involved in training operations
with the FBI in the United States. And the liaison system is used to tackle
international crime and the increase of specific types of crime in areas
of the world outside the U.S., especially the growth of organized crime
in Russia. Similarly, FBI legal-attaché offices have been opened
in Estonia, Ukraine, and Poland.
The FBI, furthermore, engages
in criminal investigations abroad and can assist in arrests on foreign
soil. An official government directive of 1989, the so-called Barr opinion,
authorizes the FBI to aid with extraterritorial arrests (Woods 1996). But
the Mansfield Amendment specifies that U.S. police cannot actually participate
in foreign arrests.
The international training
program directed by the FBI has recently undergone an important development.
Since many years, the FBI has been training foreign police agents in the
FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Additionally, the FBI has been
the main agency to set up the International Law Enforcement Academy in
Budapest, Hungary. Opened in April 1995, the Academy offers to students
from Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states courses in advanced
techniques to combat modern crime with respect for human and civil rights.
The FBI has also set up police training programs in other countries, especially
with a view of tackling the rise in international crime related to drugs
and terrorism.
The U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration
Established in 1973, the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration is the primary American agency
responsible for the fight against illicit drugs. Thus the DEA is also responsible
for programs associated with drug enforcement at the U.S. border as well
as abroad and serves as liaison with various organizations involved with
international drug control. In the DEA’s Operations Division is located
the Office of International Operations to oversee its international work.
The DEA plays the leading role in U.S. world policing and has more officers
abroad than any other American police agency.
DEA agents are stationed
in towns at America’s borders and near major ports of travel by air and
at sea. Most recently, the U.S. Justice Department has stepped up its efforts
alongside the 2,000 mile U.S.-Mexican border where the DEA cooperates with
other police agencies. The Southwest Border Project, in particular, is
a major investigative anti-drug effort involving FBI and DEA at the U.S.-Mexican
border. At the U.S.-Mexican border, nearly one hundred DEA agents are currently
stationed to target the operations of the Mexican drug cartels.
The DEA has a foreign liaisons
system even more extensive than the FBI’s. In 1994, more than 300 DEA agents
(out of a total of about 3,000 special agents) and some 120 staff persons
stationed in 73 foreign locations. By 1996, about 500 DEA agents were stationed
abroad. In various countries of the world, but mainly in the so-called
drug-producing nations, DEA agents also collaborate with foreign police
in investigative work and in training programs.
Interpol Washington
The International Criminal
Police Organization, better known as Interpol, is a cooperation of 176
member states and aims to provide and promote mutual assistance between
criminal police authorities within the limits of national laws and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United States originally joined
Interpol in 1938. Authority for Interpol in the U.S. rests with the Attorney
General, but while originally the FBI represented the United States in
Interpol, from the late 1950s onwards it was the responsibility of the
Treasury Department. In 1969, the U.S. National Central Bureau (USNCB)
was established within Treasury. Currently the Bureau, or Interpol-Washington,
is an office directed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and managed jointly
by DOJ and the Treasury Department. USNCB is headed by chief Shelley Altenstadter,
a former U.S. Customs official, employs some 81 people, and is functionally
divided in five divisions. The Alien/Fugitive Enforcement Division coordinates
work surrounding international fugitives from justice. The Financial Fraud/Economic
Crimes Division handles economic crimes, while the Criminal Investigations
Division focuses on a variety of international crimes and the Drug Investigations
Division on drug crimes in particular. The fifth division is State Liaison.
The investigative staffs of these divisions exist exclusively of state
and federal agents from various police agencies. The Financial Fraud/Economic
Crimes Division, for instance, is staffed by agents from the U.S. Customs
Service, the Secret Service, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Postal
Inspection Service. The USNCB is also linked through a liaison system with
various local police in the United States and through an automated information
network with Interpol Ottawa in Canada.
American Involvement in
Multilateral and Bilateral Police Cooperation
American participation in
multinational efforts of law enforcement is not very well developed. Mention
can be made of American participation in Interpol and law-enforcement projects
directed by the United Nations, but, clearly, the United States has an
ambivalent relationship with these multinational agencies (Zagaris 1996a).
Instead, unilateral and bilateral cooperation strategies are favored by
American police. Next to the FBI and DEA, many other American police agencies
are (often simultaneously) involved in international police work. First,
there are various local and state police forces with international assignments.
Examples are the San Diego police and other municipal forces close to the
border. Additionally, local police is involved with training programs with
foreign law enforcement personnel. Furthermore, the following federal agencies
have important international police tasks: the U.S. Coast Guard, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (including U.S. Border Patrol), the U.S. Customs
Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Secret Service,
the Internal Revenue Service, the Postal Inspection Service, the Criminal
Division’s Office of International Affairs in the Justice Department, and
the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (McGillis 1997).
The American "war on drugs"
is a major factor in the internationalization of American police power.
It influenced the work of many other agencies to also become more international
in scope. U.S. Customs Service in Southern California, for instance, stepped
up law enforcement efforts against the flow of drugs from Mexico to the
U.S. The U.S. Marshals Service is also affected, for among its tasks are
fugitives, terrorism and drug trafficking. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
within the U.S. Department of Transportation is also involved in the fight
against drugs, specifically the flow of drugs over the high seas and waters
that are under U.S. jurisdiction.
The U.S. State Department
is increasingly involved in international police matters because the U.S.
government views the international crime problem as a component of foreign
policy and national security, not just a law enforcement issue. The State
Department has a division specialized in International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs and its Bureau of Diplomatic Security has agents at
embassies and consulates throughout the world.
Another important recent
development in the internationalization of U.S. policing relates to the
increase in monetary crimes (money laundering) and the accompanying rise
in organized crime. International fraud schemes operated by mail and phone
from Canada to the USA, for instance, are handled by the U.S. Postal Inspection
Service and U.S. Customs. Mention should also be made, finally, of the
rise of private initiative in international police work. The National Insurance
Crime Bureau, for instance, cooperates with the FBI on cases involving
stolen cars (U.S. House 1995:16).
Protecting America at
Home and Abroad
Next to the war on drugs
and the rise of monetary crimes, the defense of the American border and
the protection of American interests in political stability abroad have
done most to intensify U.S. involvement in international police work.
Sealing the Border
In terms of control of America’s
borders, the Immigration and Naturalization Service is mainly responsible
for administering and enforcing the nation’s laws on immigration (U.S.
General Accounting Office 1996). Three of the principal enforcement divisions
of INS are Border Patrol, Investigations, and Inspections. Investigations
and Inspection are responsible for 1) identifying criminal and illegal
aliens, 2) reviewing employers’ records to look for unauthorized labor,
3) investigating smuggling, 4) inspecting passengers aboard ships and airplanes
entering the country, and 5) enforcement of laws against drugs and smuggling.
U.S. Border Patrol, created
in 1924, operates alongside of Investigations and Inspections. By 1994,
there were more than 4,000 Border Patrol agents stationed in 145 stations.
Agents are required to patrol the border to prevent smuggling and illegal
entry and apprehend smugglers and illegal aliens after entry. Most recently,
the strategy has been to station more and more agents at the borders in
a very visible fashion in order to deter aliens from attempting illegal
entry. As of early 1996, new agents have been stationed at the control
posts and new equipment, including a computerized fingerprint tracking
system, and new fencing have been added. Since April 1997, Border Patrol
is in the process of upgrading its weaponry to include semi-automatic guns.
Also, military forces have joined in the fight against border crimes and,
relatedly, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) has a division
of agents specialized in international enforcement, especially of gun and
liquor smuggling.
The American Export of
Democratic Policing
As part of the U.S. policy
to foster the development of democratic regimes abroad, American police
also aid in promoting the rule of law, especially to create independent
but effective systems of police in various parts of the world and particularly
in the new democracies. Special mention should be made of the U.S. police
training program which was put into practice when in 1994 President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide was restored to office in Haiti. Supported by the U.S. Justice
Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program,
the FBI directed a National Police Academy in Port-au-Prince, with instructors
from the U.S., France, Norway, and Canada. The U.S. in the meantime withdrew
from the program and left control to a U.N.-mandated civilian police.
2. Achievements and Limitations
of American International Policing
There are various vices and
virtues of American participation in international law enforcement. Reviewing
these, mention can first be made of the uneasy membership of the United
States in Interpol. The international organization has often been criticized
for a number of reasons, including its Nazi past, its negligence in fighting
terrorism and Nazi war criminals, its inclusion of nations suspected of
involvement in terrorism (Deflem 1996a). Interpol often also faces local
resistance and limits placed by host governments. From the U.S. point of
view, there has never been much enthusiasm for Interpol, because the network
is thought to be slow and dependent on national governments (Anderson 1997).
Additionally, the U.S. war
on drugs, while entailing impressive and technically sophisticated operations,
has according to many observers had little effect on the availability and
price of drugs. Mostly, it seems, there occurs only a dispersion of the
problem: the drug trade moves away from locales with heightened enforcement
activities into regions were policing activities are relatively few or
ineffective. Some observers even suggest that the very strategy of prohibition
is not only inefficient and costly but also a major cause of criminal activity,
because it leads to the formation of organized gangs violently taking and
maintaining control of the drug trade (Nadelmann and Wenner 1994). Hence,
the very strategy of prohibition, national as well as international, is
questioned (Nadelmann 1998; Gardner 1993). Others, however, feel that only
better and more international police cooperation within a prohibitive framework
can lead to reduce the flow of drugs.
Serious issues, moreover,
are posed by the military involvement in American border control operations
and the redefinition of border policing as a "militarized" national security
issue (Dunn 1996). At the border, especially with Mexico, the INS and other
U.S. police have reportedly been guilty of an excessive use of force, leading
to serious concerns surrounding human rights (Holmes 1998; Martinez 1994;
Nunez 1992; Dunn 1996:85-90).
Furthermore, there are some
remarkable manifestations of differential enforcement at the United States’
two borders. Indeed, the role of Border Patrol greatly expanded during
the 1980s but mainly for reasons of a greater protection of the U.S. economy
from a "Mexican invasion" of illegal workers, a Canadian-American equivalent
of which is absent. Assisted by many other law enforcement agencies, Border
Patrol’s means of policing have expanded and become more sophisticated
to target the U.S.-Mexican border as a "war zone". INS also made the U.S.-Mexican
border its top priority because the drug trade has shifted to that country.
Currently plans are to increase the number of the Patrol agents to a total
of 7,000. The northern border, in comparison, accounts for only 1% of all
of the Patrol’s arrests.
Perhaps most critical is
that American law enforcement at the borders and abroad is mostly, and
despite participation in cooperation efforts, unilaterally involved in
international activities. This may create, and has in fact often created,
tensions with foreign police because of a perceived American autonomy which
impedes cooperation. Similarly, moreover, there occur problems within the
United States because of a lack of inter-agency cooperation. Often, indeed,
various U.S. agencies work on the same issues, but hardly together. Past
problems include failure to participate in one another’s fugitive task
forces, disagreements over responsibilities, and failure to cooperate with
the apprehension of foreign fugitives.
On the international level,
lack of cooperation and distrust between American law enforcement officers
and police of other nations are even more poignant problems. Particularly
troublesome to American law enforcement is the lack of professionalism
and the corruption of police abroad, for which reason U.S. police sometimes
forgoes cooperation altogether and works abroad unilaterally. But this
is no perfect solution either, as the case of Alvarez-Machain will illustrate.
Since the early 1980s, when
U.S. and Mexican authorities began cooperating in the fight against drug
trafficking, DEA special agents have conducted numerous operations in Mexico.
On February 7, 1985, one such agent, Enrique Camarena-Salazar, was kidnapped
by drug traffickers in Guadalajara, Mexico. He was tortured and killed.
Several Mexican nationals were tried and convicted for the crime. Humberto
Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician, was suspected to have aided in the
torture. In 1990, Alvarez-Machain and others were abducted and brought
to the United States, where they were arrested by DEA officials. DEA agents,
it was revealed, had assisted in the kidnapping (Aceves 1996; McDonnell
1996; Michell 1996).
A district court in California
ruled that the abduction violated the extradition treaty between the U.S.
and Mexico. The United States appealed and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling. On June 15, 1992, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision (U.S. v. Alvarez Machain 1992). Based on the
so-called "Ker-Frisbie" doctrine, the Court decided that the transborder
abduction of Alvarez did not violate conditions of the extradition treaty
between the U.S. and Mexico. The trial against Alvarez-Machain started
on December 1, 1992, in Los Angeles, but two weeks later, the judge in
the case granted a motion for acquittal because of a lack of evidence.
The Supreme Court was heavily
criticized in the United States because its decision in this case could
lead to a state of lawlessness and because it could hinder further international
cooperation. U.S. Congress held hearings on the matter and legislation
was proposed. Abroad, the decision was also criticized and, as a result,
several countries sought that their extradition treaties with the U.S.
would contain a prohibition on transborder abductions. Mexican authorities
threatened to suspend cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies. The
Mexican Foreign Ministry announced that all foreign national participating
in law enforcement activities in Mexico would be arrested. All cooperation
with the DEA was initially suspended. Following negotiations between Mexican
and U.S. officials, then President Bush announced that the U.S. would no
longer engage in transborder abductions. The Department of Justice in August
1992 issued a memorandum that specified that U.S. law enforcement agencies
could not partake in abductions abroad. After President Clinton took office
and talked with then Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, he also
expressed opposition to transborder abductions. In 1994, the U.S. and Mexico
officially agreed upon a "Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions."
III. INTERNATIONAL POLICE
WORK IN MEXICO
In Mexico, the police function
is assigned to federal and local levels of government. Even more so than
in the United States, however, it is mainly Mexico’s federal police which
is involved in international police tasks. Most strikingly, the story of
Mexican involvement in international police work relates to problems and
failures much more than any achievements.
1. Issues, Forms, and Structures
of Mexican International Policing
The Mexican Federal Judicial
Police
The Federal Judicial Police
is Mexico’s national law enforcement agency.It answers to the Mexican attorney
general and is responsible for the enforcement of serious federal crimes,
such as drug trade, arms running, and piracy. The federal police also entertains
a system of liaison officers posted with Mexican consulates. Over the years,
political instability has affected Mexico’s police tremendously, particularly
through the changing perception of the police involvement in the drug trade.
Mexican police, indeed, is widely reported to be involved in the trade
of drugs, actively through assistance or passively through corruption.
In August 1996, more than 700 of the about 4,400 federal police agents
were dismissed. In the border state of Baja California, the entire federal
police division was replaced. Relatedly, federal police can often not rely
on local police in Mexico to aid in their investigations. City police sometimes
claim that they are not responsible for narcotics and thus they can remain
passive and non-cooperative.
In the late 1980s, the Mexican
government stepped up its anti-drug trafficking efforts. This renewed policy
was instigated because of changes in the flow of drugs and U.S. calls for
heightened alertness against the Mexican drug cartels. The drug flow from
Southern America into the USA, indeed, has since the 1980s experienced
a shift from Colombia to Mexico. Some reports claim that the significance
of the Colombian cartels (the Cali and Medellin cartels) has been eclipsed
by the work of Mexican-based drug traffickers. Ironically, this could be
the result, at least in part, because of heightened anti-drug enforcement
in Colombia.
In 1990, the Northern Border
Response Force (NBRF) was set up in the Mexican Federal Judicial Police
in order to fight drug traffickers operating from Mexico. In 1993, the
Mexican government established the National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD)
to specifically target the drug trade. Considering the developments of
this office, the difficulties typical for Mexico’s policing are immediately
revealed. In December 1996, the head of the anti-drug Institute was fired
and former army general Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo was appointed as the Institute’s
new head. Gutierrez was the third person to head the Institute in as many
years of existence. Also in December 1996, Mexico’s seventh attorney general
in 8 years was appointed and various army officers were given command of
state and municipal police forces.
The Mexican office of Interpol
resides with the Federal Judicial Police bureau in Mexico City. The Mexican
Interpol office is a clearinghouse, but its officers have been known to
be involved in operational work. In 1994, agents from Interpol-Mexico investigated
the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, a candidate for the Mexican
presidency. In Tijuana, a Mexican town close to the U.S. border, their
efforts were accompanied by similar investigations carried out by Mexico’s
judicial police, the FBI, and the San Diego police. In July 1994, the Federal
Police Commander and director of Interpol-Mexico, Emilio Islas Rangel,
was arrested by the Mexican attorney general’s office for insubordination.
But in August 1996, the then director of judicial police was fired and
replaced by Rangel.
Bilateral Police Cooperation
Between Mexico and the U.S.
Police cooperation between
U.S. and Mexican law enforcement mainly concerns anti-drug efforts and,
relatedly, border control. The Northern Border Response Force, for example,
is a specialized unit within the Mexican federal police which cooperates
with DEA agents. Mexico also collaborates with the U.S. in enforcing immigration
laws (Dunn 1996:94-96). In turn, the Mexican government separately enforces
laws against undocumented immigrants en route to the USA. During the presidency
of George Bush in the USA and Salinas in Mexico, collaboration between
U.S. and Mexican police generally improved. In 1990 an elite group of police
officials was formed, the so-called Grupo Beta, in Tijuana, designed to
curb violence in the area and the influence of corruption. The group collaborated
with U.S. Border Patrol and the Border Crime Intervention Unit, a joint
project of Border Patrol and the San Diego Police (Dunn 1996:96-98). Mexican
law enforcement, furthermore, participates since 1994 with American police
in the Southwest Border Project. Also proposed are a series of Bilateral
Task Forces comprised of U.S. and Mexican police. A more formal memorandum
of understanding to foster and regulate law enforcement cooperation between
the two countries was signed in 1996. Finally, there is cooperation between
the U.S. and Mexico on matters of police training (Dunn 1996:138-140).
2. Achievements and Limitations
of Mexican International Policing
Institutionalized Corruption
Two problems haunt Mexican
international police efforts and overshadow all else: corruption and violence
as a result of actions by the powerful drug lords and organized crime groups.
The violence by and against Mexican police has since the growth of Mexican
involvement in the drug trade taken on dramatic proportions. According
to one estimate, some 200 Mexican law enforcement officers were killed
in the fiscal year ending October 1996. Most recently, in April 1997, Mexican
authorities requested and received the aid from two FBI agents to help
in investigations related to the killing of two anti-drug agents. These
killings usually go unsolved and deter police actions against drugs and
intimidate people from a career in law enforcement.
The extent of corruption
related to the drug trade and organized crime is so widespread in Mexican
public life that the country has been referred to as a "narcodemocracy"
(Law Enforcement News, January 15, 1997). From top to bottom and across
all levels of government, it seems, corruption and active involvement in
drug trafficking play a role. In 1993, former Interpol chief Migual Aldans
Ibarra was sentenced to 12 years in prison on drug and weapon charges (PR
Newswire, June 30, 1993). Recently, on February 6, 1997, two Mexican generals
and the head of Mexico’s National Institute to Combat Drugs, Gutierrez,
along with 36 of his partners in crime, have been arrested. Guiterrez’
arrest came less than two months after he had accepted to head Mexico’s
national anti-drug agency. The Institute was then reportedly in total disarray.
Mexican judges and politicians,
moreover, are also not immune from corruption. In April 1997, a judge in
Guadalajara granted an appeal to a Mexican drug trafficker convicted for
the 1985 murder of DEA agent Camarena. Another judge in the same Mexican
city dropped all charges against a man accused of heading a powerful Mexican
drug cartel. These and other cases have raised suspicions from U.S. and
Mexican officials. Most publicly of the political involvement in corruption
and drugs, the brother of former Mexican president Salinas has, according
to Swiss authorities, been paid millions of dollars to protect narcotics
shipments.
Consequences of Police
Corruption
Corruption has had detrimental
consequences for police in Mexico and the USA and for U.S.-Mexican police
cooperation. While Mexican authorities are appalled by the implication
that Mexico would inevitably be a country rampant with criminality and
corruption, the Mexican government was forced to respond to the undeniable
fact of corruption in, and lack of cooperation from, its police. In April
1996, Mexican authorities drafted new anti-crime laws designed to more
forcefully punish money laundering, crack down on drug manufacturing, and
use new means of electronic surveillance (Dallas Morning News, April 27,
1996). President Ernesto Zedillo has also turned to the military, putting
army generals in top police positions and recruiting soldiers into the
ranks of agents involved in the war on drugs. In Mexico City, for instance,
some 3,000 soldiers were deployed in March 1997 to direct traffic and walk
the beat.
In the United States, the
political response to the problem of police cooperation with Mexico has
been critical but diplomatic nonetheless. In February 1997, a U.S. House
committee first voted to decertify Mexico as a partner in the war against
drugs, and on March 12 the U.S. House voted to impose sanctions on Mexico
for not fully cooperating with the United States in the fight against drugs.
Yet, eventually, the Senate approved President Clinton’s designation of
Mexico as a U.S. ally in anti-drug efforts. Likewise, Barry McCaffrey,
a former general who now is President Clinton’s drug czar as the Director
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, confirmed that the United
States government remains committed to enhanced cooperation with Mexico
(NBC Evening News, February 10, 1997). These actions came after Mexican
officials had threatened to expel DEA agents from Mexico if the U.S. government
would censure Mexican efforts against drug trafficking.
There are, as noted, various
cooperation efforts involving American and Mexican police. These are not
without results. In January 1996, for instance, Mexican drug agents arrested
one of America’s most wanted drug trafficker and deported him to Houston.
The suspect, a Texas native called Juan Garcia Abrego, featured on the
FBI’s 10 most wanted list and his arrest was heralded as the result of
joint efforts by U.S. and Mexican police. Most often, however, cooperation
between the U.S. and Mexico is criticized, particularly by American officials.
U.S.-Mexican police cooperation has been condemned as a farce because of
the rampant existence of corruption in Mexico’s police, because the Judicial
police has a very poor record on matters of human rights and because of
Mexico’s reluctance to honor American requests for extradition. DEA agents
have gone as far as to argue that they never really trust their Mexican
counterparts, even when they do collaborate. Mexican authorities, in turn,
have asserted that the U.S. should reduce the demand for drugs in the United
States rather than focus exclusively on the drug trade. Needless to argue
that these mutual suspicions are serious obstacles in police collaboration.
IV. INTERNATIONAL POLICING
IN CANADA
In Canada, law enforcement
is a responsibility shared by local and national levels of government.
Next to the Canadian federal police, there are regional police forces in
Canada’s eight provinces, two territories, and 200 municipalities, with
additional provincial police in Ontario and Quebec. International police
duties are to some extent shared by police agencies at all levels, but
Canada’s federal police, the famous Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP),
is the most important force with assignments international in scope.
1. Issues, Forms, and Structures
of Canadian International Policing
The Royal Canadian Mounted
Police
The Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP) was formed in the late 19th century and is under the authority
of the Canadian Department of Justice. Next to its many domestic functions,
the RCMP engages in the following tasks of international policing: 1) it
has a system of liaison officers attached to Canadian embassies or high
commissions abroad; 2) it engages in other work as part of bilateral agreements,
including Canadian representation in Interpol; 3) it organizes foreign
police missions for special assignments; and 4) as with most other national
police agencies, some tasks of the RCMP concern international crimes, including
an Immigration, Passport and Citizenship Program and a Customs and Excise
Program. Furthermore, local as well as central police also cooperate with
the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC), a central bureau located
in the RCMP headquarters (www.cisc.gc.ca). The CISC unites all Canadian
law enforcement agencies in the fight against organized crime. In cooperation
with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP), the CISC and
various other intelligence bureaus across Canada are also in contact with
American, European, and Australian police.
The International Liaison
and Protective Operations Directorate was set up in February 1995. Its
components include, amongst others, Interpol (see below) and the divisions
of Foreign Services and Protective Services. The division of Foreign Services
maintains a system of liaison officers and provides coordination and assistance
to Canadian police missions abroad.
As part of a broad bilateral
system of cooperation, the RCMP cooperates most intensely with American
police agencies. The significance of ties between the U.S. and Canada is
obvious for reason that the United States is the only country that borders
with Canada. The practical implementation of this cooperation is mostly
governed by memoranda of agreement. U.S.-Canadian police collaboration
concerns various activities, such as joint investigative operations and
scientific detection techniques (e.g. DNA-testing). The centrality of the
border explains much of the RCMP’s extradition-related activities. With
other countries, the RCMP also maintains bilateral collaboration, especially
with other nations that belong to the Commonwealth. These countries, indeed,
share much of their system of government and police with Canada and so
more easily find common ground for cooperation. Furthermore, the RCMP also
trains foreign police in developing countries and in emerging democracies
as part of the Department of Foreign Affairs’ foreign aid program. Training
assistance also involves the organization of investigative structures which
foreign police can rely on whenever cooperation in investigative matters
is called for.
Finally, the RCMP is involved
in police missions abroad on the occasion of certain special assignments,
such as with the Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia, in the Summer of 1996.
Among these missions abroad, the Canadian presence in aiding the changing
police landscape in Haiti after the country’s return to democracy was particularly
relevant. Haiti is predominantly French-speaking and thus French-Canadian
police was well suited to assist the United States. Haitian police officials
of the new democratic regime were also being trained in Canada. Specifically,
Michel-Gabriel Jean-François, the current chief of Haiti’s national
police, and 99 other Haitian exiles held four months of training work at
the RCMP Police Academy in Regina, Saskatchewan. The main emphasis of the
training was to teach police how to engage in effective work with respect
for human rights.
Interpol Ottawa
Canadian representation in
Interpol is since 1949 administered and operated at RCMP Headquarters in
Ottawa. The National Central Bureau of Canada, generally known as "Interpol
Ottawa," provides special assistance for police in the areas of offenses
against persons and property, the location and extradition of fugitives,
and information on stolen cultural property. To track down fugitives, Interpol
Ottawa relies on the well-known system of International Notices or circulars.
The Cultural Property Desk is in charge with providing expert assistance
in areas of crimes against cultural property (paintings, sculptures, etc.).
And a specialized database, the Register of Stolen Art and Artifacts (ROSA),
is used to keep track of theft reports and exchange information with national
and international police agencies.
Interpol Ottawa forwards
relevant inquiries received from Canadian law enforcement agencies to foreign
National Central Bureaus and it conversely passes on inquiries from abroad
to Canadian police agencies. The Interpol office is also responsible for
extradition matters in Canada or extradition requests made to cooperating
countries. Furthermore, Interpol Ottawa operates two electronic data-networks
that provides links with the Interpol General Secretariat in Lyons, France,
and with American police. Interpol Ottawa is also linked with the FBI legal
attaches on post at the American Embassy in Ottawa and with other U.S.
law enforcement agencies, especially with respect to police work concerning
fugitives. Two RCMP officers, finally, are permanently assigned at Interpol
Headquarters in Lyons.
Bilateral and Local Canadian
Involvement in International Police Cooperation
Next to the work done by
the RCMP, various other Canadian police agencies are involved with international
police tasks. In terms of bilateral cooperation, Canada entertains Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) with a number of countries. These treaties
enable police of different countries to help each other in collecting evidence
against international criminals and to aid in the international rendition
of fugitives from justice. Within the Canadian Department of Justice, the
International Assistance Group is responsible for the preparation of letters
of request for legal assistance as part of the MLAT policy. Canada entertains
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with many countries, such as the USA,
the United Kingdom, Australia, France, and the Ukraine.
Cooperation between Canadian
law enforcement forces and their counterparts in the United States is most
intense and involves a variety of areas. For instance, there is more and
more collaborative work on organized crime and money-laundering activities
that affect both the United States and Canada. There is also a joint U.S.-Canadian
Customs post maintained on the border between British Colombia and the
State of Washington. In recent years, the cooperation between the U.S.
and Canada in matters of the fight against drugs has also intensified.
The drug flow mostly used to go from the U.S. into Canada, but now it has
reversed. Possibly diverted from heightened control at the U.S.-Mexican
border, drugs are now imported more and more into Canada, from South America
and Asia, destined for the United States. Since March 1995, Canada and
the U.S. mutually share proceeds of seized assets in cases that involved
cooperation. The RCMP is the chief Canadian agency responsible for drug
work, but it receives assistance from the Canada Customs Border Service,
the Canadian Coast Guard and the Canadian Navy (which has been asked to
step up patrol at sea).
Canada entertains Treaties
of Extradition with other countries typically only when certain conditions
are met, especially that criminal procedures in the foreign country requesting
an extradition abide by standards of due process and human rights. Yet,
the possibility of implementing the death penalty Canadian authorities
do not consider an obstacle to deportation in case the crime was committed
on foreign soil (even when it concerns a Canadian national and although
the Canadian Justice Department does not consider the death penalty appropriate
on Canadian territory). These bilateral agreements do not only involve
the Canadian federal police, but also other law enforcement agencies, such
as customs and immigration services. The American INS, moreover, has access
to the Canadian Police Information Services (CPIC).
Bilateral cooperation additionally
involves non-operational work, such as police training. Canadian police
officers are particularly sent for training missions to England, Australia,
or other countries in the Commonwealth. On matters of intelligence, similar
bilateral collaboration structures are also operative with intelligence
agencies from foreign countries and the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service (CSIS) and the Canadian Communication Establishment within the
Department of National Defense. These forms of collaboration primarily
concern issues of national security but may on occasion also pertain to
criminal matters, notably when they occur on the fringes of (international)
politics and crime (e.g., terrorism).
Local Canadian police forces,
finally, especially those stationed close to the U.S.-Canadian border,
also entertain international contacts. Mostly, only the larger local police
services do their own international work, while the smaller services lack
the necessary resources to cooperate in international matters and mostly
delegate such duties to the RCMP. It should further be noted that, as in
the United States, private police and security organizations have recently
begun to take control of the international market. Major accounting firms,
for instance, tackle organized and white-collar crime and its international
dimensions. Private investigators include some well-known former public
police officials (e.g. a former RCMP commissioner), who are privately much
more free-wheeling and unrestrained by diplomacy and law.
2. Achievements and Limitations
of Canadian International Policing
The problems Canadian law
enforcement authorities have faced with international cooperation concern
past errors and technical deficiencies in international police work and
additionally relate to differences in legal systems on the two sides of
the U.S.-Canadian border.
In response to criticisms
on mishaps that occurred in international police strategies directed from
Canada, the country’s Mutual Legal Assistance (MLAT) policy has recently
been changed. In February 1997, former Justice Allan Goodman was assigned
by Allan Rock, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada,
to review the MLAT policy in response to a case of civil litigation resulting
from a letter of request the RCMP had sent to Switzerland as part of its
Airbus investigation. Former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in
November 1995 filed a libel lawsuit against the government of Canada, arguing
that Canadian law enforcement, especially the RCMP, had falsely accused
him of receiving kickbacks in a commercial jet purchase and that police
had been overzealous in trying to obtain international help in their investigations.
Specifically, a letter written on behalf of the RCMP and sent to Swiss
authorities suggested that Mulroney was implicated in the purchase by Air
Canada of jet aircrafts from the European company Airbus Industrie. The
letter requested information on secret bank accounts allegedly opened by
associates of Mulroney. But Mulroney was never charged with any crime.
Hence, the appointment of Goodman should secure that the letters that are
typically sent as part of an MLAT from Canadian authorities to a police
abroad abide by certain legally specified standards. Specifically, these
letters should follow guidelines concerning confidentiality and due process.
Canadian foreign police missions
have also faced setback. Some years ago, for instance, an RCMP undercover
agent was killed while in action abroad. Since then, Canadian authorities
more carefully scrutinize involvement in international initiatives taken
by such international bodies as the United Nations. New guidelines specify
how Canadian involvement has to be conducted. Chief among these guidelines
is that the officer can only be in a foreign country by explicit agreement
of the government of that country and must respect its laws and abide to
Canadian human rights legislation. Whenever Canadian authorities are aware
of corruption or human-rights violations abroad, cooperation is not favored.
Hence, there has been little or no collaboration with Soviet law enforcement
and South-African police of he Apartheid regime. Such reservations, however,
do not seem to apply to other less than democratic countries, such as China,
where Canadian police delegations have been sent (and which in turn has
sent delegations to Canada).
In terms of border-related
crime and the differences between the Canadian and the American criminal
justice system, the smuggling of guns and liquor have posed special problems.
Gun laws are much tighter in Canada than in the USA (Ram 1995), thus creating
a greater demand for guns south of the U.S.-Canadian border. Canadian Customs
and other law enforcement agencies also focus on the smuggling of guns
from the United States into Canada. The smuggling of liquor is of special
concern because of the high taxes on alcoholic beverages in Canada. While
extradition policies between the U.S. and Canada generally seem to run
smoothly, there has occurred at least one case where Canada refused to
extradite a man wanted in the United States on drug charges, because the
man, now in jail in Canada, would be subject to mandatory sentencing in
the U.S. (Leeson 1996). The potential consequences of this incident could
be that American suspects of crimes would flock to Canada and that forced
abductions may be applied by U.S. police. Then it could become very relevant
that Canadian government authorities condemned the Alvarez-Machain action
and stated that any similar enterprise in Canada would violate existing
extradition treaties (Leeson 1996:658).
In relation to Canada’s immigration
policies, various problems of international police have surfaced. In late
1996 and early 1997, criticisms flared against Canada for being a safe
haven for Nazi war criminals. In 1995, the Canadian government adopted
a policy of denaturalization of deportation of such criminals, but Canada’s
policies have nonetheless been lamented as generous and hospitable to war
criminals. Information turned over to the RCMP on such matters is said
to have not been effectively used. Only one person has ever been deported
by Canada for war crimes, a Dutch collaborator in 1992. The Office of Special
Investigations in the United States, in comparison, has been involved with
hundreds of such cases.
In addition, Canada faces
more and more migration from Asia, especially from China and Hong Kong,
and this poses special police problems. On one occasion, for instance,
Canadian officials let in a Chinese drug trafficker, who was wanted by
Interpol, whereupon Asian law enforcement officials lamented Canadian laxness
of immigration policies (Boston Globe, April 14, 1996).
Most recently, there have
been problems with the arrest in Canada of a Saudi national suspected of
terrorist involvement. On March 18, 1997, Canadian authorities arrested
a Saudi national in Ottawa suspected of involvement in the bombing on June
25, 1996, of the Khobar Towers barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The bombing
killed 19 American soldiers and wounded hundreds of others. Based on a
7-month long phonetap inquiry, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
revealed that the man, identified as Hani Abdel Rahim al-Sayegh, was suspected
to have committed a criminal act abroad, had been involved in an act of
terrorism, and was a member of a terrorist organization. After al-Sayegh’s
indictment, Canadian court documents accused the suspect of having scouted
the bombing site and of having given the go-ahead for delivery of the truck
bomb by flashing his headlights. The Hezbollah involvement is supported
by more recent events. Specifically, U.S. and Saudi authorities have linked
Ahmad Sherifi, an Iranian intelligence officer, to al-Sayegh and other
members of a group of Shiite Muslims.
V. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
It was no coincidence that
in this paper I treated first international police issues in the United
States, then in Mexico and Canada, for, indeed, the dominance of U.S. law-enforcement
agencies relative to their Mexican and Canadian counterparts is clearly
the central component of international police cooperation in Northern America.
This is manifested, most clearly, by the international work of the FBI
and the DEA, which dwarfs the contributions to international policing initiatives
by police from the United States’ neighboring countries. In this sense,
international police work cannot rely on various participating police operating
on equal footing or well-concerted efforts between nations (McDonald 1997b).
Instead, as Ethan Nadelmann (1990:524) observes, international police work
tends to mirror the practices of those states that play a dominant role
in international society in respects other than and beyond law and police.
As such, U.S. police has a global standing which matches that of the United
States in world political, economic, and military affairs. Parallel developments
between police, politics, and industry are no coincidence, if not in intent,
then definitely and minimally with respect to their consequences.
1. Continued "Americanization"
and American Dominance
It would of course be naive
to argue or to accept the argument that American (and other national) involvement
in international police cooperation must be stepped up, and is being stepped
up, only because there is a rise in international crime (Bunnell 1995).
Rather, it is critical that this connection is made by high-ranking police
officers and is more and more easily accepted by political authorities
in charge of offering a legislative basis and allocating funds for the
planning and execution of international police operations. Most recently,
it has particularly been FBI Director Freeh who has spoken out in favor
of further expanding what he calls "cops-to-cops bridges". In fact, the
FBI Director proclaimed the enforcement of international crime to be one
of the Bureau’s major challenges, especially because of the rise in economic
espionage, transnational monetary crimes (money laundering), organized
crime (old and new), drug trafficking, terrorism, the smuggling of aliens
into the USA, and the illegal weapons trade. These developments, in the
words of Howard Shapiro, General Counsel of the FBI, require the FBI "to
think more globally" and concentrate efforts on crime overseas before its
consequences can reach the U.S. (Shapiro 1995:224).
Incited by some tragic incidents
such as the World Trade Center bombing in February 1993 and the Oklahoma
City bombing in April 1995 and because of continuing perceptions of a flood
of illegal aliens and the hazards of the drug trade, the call by American
police to step up international operations has by and large been successful
and will likely remain so in the near future. This is also clear from the
political attention and approval the issue gets. Regularly, public hearings
are held on these matters in committees of the U.S. House and Senate, the
legislative bodies of the American government. Strikingly, in the political
forum, law enforcement officials often defend their international tasks
in terms of American national security interests, at the same time emphasizing
that conflicts in matters of diplomacy and concerns of foreign policy should
be avoided. Indeed, the enhanced cooperation between police of the United
States and other countries does definitely not mean a total abandonment
of nationalist policies reminiscent of the Cold War era. Frictions between
the "East" and the "West" continue to exist and may lead to undermine,
or at least weaken, cooperative law-enforcement efforts across national
borders.
2. Towards a Normalization
of U.S.-Mexican Police Relations?
As noted earlier, cooperation
between the United States and Mexico in police matters mostly revolves
around the drug trade and has relatedly been hampered by the influence
of corruption. The most drastic action to revive Mexico’s anti-drug effort
to date was the elimination of the National Institute to Combat Drugs and
its replacement, on April 30, 1997, by a new agency, the Special Prosecutor’s
Office for Crimes Against Health. This Office will be headed by Mariano
Herran Salvatti, the chief of the now abolished Institute, and will be
located in the Institute’s former headquarters in downtown Mexico City.
The 1,100 officers of the former anti-drug unit can apply to join the new
force, but they and others will have to undergo rigorous testing and screening.
Agents of the new drug enforcement agency will receive higher salaries
and better medical and retirement benefits. Mexico’s Attorney General Jorge
Madrazo Cuellar, who led the initiative, also set up a new Organized Crime
Unit, specialized in fighting money laundering and arms trade. Earlier,
President Zedillo had announced that U.S. police would aid in the organization
of Mexico’s new anti-drug force (Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1997).
In the USA, it has been suggested
that Mexico’s creation of the new anti-drug unit was but a symbolic gesture,
an act of window dressing, to prepare for President Clinton’s visit to
the country in early May of 1997. While Mexican officials denied the allegation,
Clinton welcomed the creation of the drug force as "a very good first step."
On May 2, just few days before Clinton’s visit to Mexico, U.S.-Mexican
relations again appeared to be cooling off when President Zedillo stated
that two requests from U.S. law enforcement would be denied without any
further discussion because they violated Mexican sovereignty. The requests
were intended to give DEA agents in Mexico the right to carry guns (a practice
Mexico outlawed since 1992) and would give U.S. officials the right to
administer polygraph tests to Mexican applicants for the new anti-drug
agency. President Zedillo denied the requests because they interfered with
Mexican sovereignty and violated principles of international law. At the
same time Zedillo was quick to praise President Clinton’s efforts to promote
international police collaboration and expressed to favor further cooperation
between the two nations in matters of law enforcement (New York Times,
May 3, 1997).
President Clinton’s visit
to Mexico in May of 1997 produced a treaty signed by the Mexican and U.S.
governments. This so-called Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance
Against Drugs forms the current basis of U.S.-Mexican police cooperation,
particularly on matters of drugs. The declaration led to the formation
of the United States-Mexico High Level Contact Group for Drug Control,
which drafted a binational working plan, the United States-Mexico Bi-National
Drug Strategy in February of 1998. The Bi-National Strategy provides for
cooperation between Mexican and U.S. police in matters of money laundering,
arms trafficking, chemical control, and drug demand reduction. These initiatives
seem to provide for better bilateral working relationships, but distrust
and suspicion have not been eradicated.
3. Canadian Dependence on
U.S. Law Enforcement
Relationships between Canadian
and U.S. law enforcement officials have also undergone tensions and at
present also appear to be improving, though for quite different reasons
and in quite different ways than U.S.-Mexican relations. It was most critically
as a result of the Saudi case that enthusiasm for Canadian cooperation
from the United States diminished. Canada’s generous immigration laws have
been partly blamed for Canada being a safe house for terrorist individuals
and organizations. Canadian authorities acknowledged that the Islamist
group Hezbollah had developed a supportive infrastructure of Muslim radicals
in Canada. The Saudi suspect Canadian authorities arrested in the case
of the bombing of the American military base in Saudi Arabia had entered
Canada in August of 1996 and requested residence as a political refugee.
Immediately following the arrest, the FBI issued a statement saying it
hoped to question the suspect, but few days later U.S. officials said that
there was no conclusive proof that the man was involved in the bombing.
Early April 1997, American government and police officials said they were
uncertain whether evidence against al-Sayegh was sufficiently strong to
warrant a request for his extradition. In fact, officials of the FBI, who
is primarily in charge with investigations of the bombing, stated that
they had been refused permission from Canadian authorities to question
the man. In response to the criticism, a spokesperson for the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service said that the arrest was made on the basis
of the perceived threat to Canadian security, independent of any American
needs. The FBI thereupon mounted its criticisms and alleged that the arrest
may have hurt ongoing investigations because it aborted a long-term surveillance
effort. The FBI had earlier already criticized the Saudi authorities for
a lack of cooperation, because the FBI did not receive access to suspects
apprehended in Saudi Arabia in connection with the bombing. One of these
suspects had been arrested in September of 1996 in Syria, but he died while
in prison. American officials demanded information from Syria about the
death, but faced a lack of cooperation.
The FBI later stated that
it was grateful for the work of Canadian police in the investigations into
the Dhahran bombing and the degree of cooperation afforded to U.S. authorities.
The FBI’s public statement came shortly after April 8, 1997, when U.S.
president Bill Clinton met with Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien in
Washington, DC. President Clinton then said he was satisfied with Canada’s
handling of the case against the Saudi suspect. In fact, during their meeting,
Clinton and Chretien promised to collaborate on a whole series of customs,
migration, and police-cooperation efforts in order to make the U.S.-Canadian
border more user-friendly for ordinary citizens while cracking down on
criminals. Specifically, the statesmen agreed to set up automated checkpoints
at the border, a joint Canada-U.S. customs and immigration point, and an
enhanced information exchange system (among local and federal authorities)
to curb transborder kidnappings involving children. Much like was the case
with Mexico, then, Canada appears to have entered a more stable phase of
police cooperation with the United States on the basis of signs of goodwill
on the part of the countries’ political leaders.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have reviewed
the most important manifestations of contemporary practices, strategies,
and goals of international police cooperation in Northern America. Briefly
summarizing the key findings, it is clear that, first, in terms of the
major issues involving international police cooperation, the trade
in illicit drugs forms the prime focus of attention. Specifically, the
central catalyst of international policing is the prohibitionist regime
of the war on drugs. Relatedly, border control is an important concern,
further accelerated by police issues surrounding immigration and illegal
aliens. Additionally, though less prominently, police institutions from
the United States (and to a much lesser extent Canada) have been involved
with exporting democratic principles of police, especially in the newly
emerging democracies.
Second, with respect to the
forms
of international police cooperation, there are no territories left uncharted
in international police work in Northern America. Investigative assistance,
the training of personnel, extradition treaties, and many other forms are
operationalized. Importantly, however, the United States clearly has the
upper hand in all of these initiatives. Thus, as Ethan Nadelmann (1993:189-249)
has argued, an Americanization of international policing occurs at various
levels: institutionally (e.g., in providing help in creating specialized
drug units); operationally (e.g., training of foreign police and aiding
in detective work); as well as legally (e.g., influencing the legalization
of certain police techniques). Importantly, these three domains operate
simultaneously and reinforce one another. And, furthermore, the flow of
assistance is clearly not reciprocally mutual, but moves from center (United
States) to periphery (Mexico, Canada).
Third, American dominance
is also, and even more poignantly, reflected when considering the various
structures
of international police cooperation. Indeed, reviewing international police
practices in Northern America, nothing stands out more than the preponderance
of unilateral work by American police (especially the DEA and FBI) and
the dominance of the same in bilateral structures. This is manifested in
the case of relationships with both Canadian and Mexican police, though
there is also a marked differential aspect in terms of border controls
of, and willingness to cooperate with police from, both countries. This
is furthermore reflected in the bilateral arrangements, such as the Mutual
legal Assistance Treaties with Canada and the bilateral structures set
up with Mexico (e.g., the United States-Mexico Bi-National Drug Strategy).
Multilateral structures, especially Interpol, are consequently of minor
significance. This situation is unlikely to change in the near future,
for, as Gary Marx (1997) argues, when tensions on the appropriate ways
of law enforcement occur in international police work, it is often because
of conflicts with principles, interests, and concepts of national jurisdictions.
And, ironically, precisely under those circumstances, misunderstandings
are even more likely to occur and unilateral work may even more be preferred,
which in turn can lead to an acceleration of tensions and conflicts.
Reviewing the strengths and
limitations of international police cooperation in Northern America, certain
achievements cannot be denied. In particular, some cooperation forms and
structures have been relatively successful in terms of effectively fostering
collaboration between various national police on the basis of common concerns
and/or in terms of traditional measured of effectiveness (e.g., arrests,
convictions). Yet, it would be unwise to accept that merely because a certain
strategy of international police brings about accomplishments in certain
technical respects, it would also be acceptable in terms of legality, constitutionality,
and ethics (Marx 1988:89-107, 1995a). In this chapter, for instance, I
have alerted not only to more or less technical gains and deficiencies
of international police but also, and more importantly, uncovered more
critical aspects in respect of legality (e.g., police corruption), constitutionality
(e.g., in the Alvarez-Machain case), differential law enforcement (e.g.,
controls at the Mexican and the Canadian border), political power and dependency
(e.g., American dominance in international policing), and human rights
(e.g., militarization of the U.S.-Mexican border). In fact, some scholars,
like James Sheptycki (1996, 1998b), have gone as far as to argue that the
very practice of international police cooperation often lacks democratic
accountability because and when it is unclear where and how citizens could
possibly control police activities that by definition surpass the jurisdictions
of national states and their legal safeguards (see, also, Deflem 1997b;
McDonald 1997a; Mullan 1997). It is ironic, indeed, to note that international
police practices aimed at strengthening the democratic nature of police
abroad may well serve a very limited role in securing a country’s democracy.
Police expert David Bayley (1997), notably, has argued that political developments
are more important in that they create conditions that make nations receptive
(or not) to fundamental changes at all other levels of society, including
law and law enforcement.
As has been suggested elsewhere
(e.g., Deflem 1997b; Marx 1995b; Nadelmann 1993:466), international police
practices are shaped by a large number of factors, many of which we know
from empirical research, but some of which we do not yet understand or
which may undergo changes in the future. Thus it is extremely precarious
to formulate bold statements on future developments of international policing.
Yet, although several factors are involved in the evolution of international
police cooperation and the creation of what Ethan Nadelmann (1990) has
labeled "global prohibition regimes," it is clear that traditionally European
and American societies have played a dominant role relative to other nations
in the world. On the North-American continent this posits the United States
versus Canada and Mexico, and, indicating a second inequality in international
partnerships, the United States and Canada versus Mexico, whereby the latter
two nations often similarly face dependencies but lack a common agenda
to tackle the issue. The attempted, and largely successful, control by
U.S. police in past and present initiatives of international cooperation
in Northern America (and, in fact, in much of the rest of the world) is
impossible to overlook. The key question for the future, then, is whether
American dominance will continue to be willingly or unwillingly accepted
and whether it will remain a stable factor or, conversely, will be more
or less resisted and transformed? Regardless of the outcome, this is the
central issue international police cooperation on the North-American continent
will face in the years to come.
Notes
1 I am indebted to
the participants of a seminar on international policing which I organized
in the Spring of 1997 in the Law and Society Program at Kenyon College.
I am especially grateful to Layne Buckley and Erin Hockman for their valuable
assistance. I also thank Charles Frayer for comments on a previous draft.
2 Newspaper sources
and testimonies were retrieved through Lexis-Nexis and are cited only in
footnotes or text. Other sources are listed in the References section at
the end of this chapter.
3 I only briefly
discuss the history of international police work and refer to other sources,
on which I rely here, for more detailed information; see Deflem 1996a,
1996b, 1997a; Nadelmann 1993:15-102.
4 Marenin, this
volume, provides a more detailed treatment of international policing in
the USA. My concern is primarily to outline the basic patterns of
U.S. involvement in international police work, with a particular focus
on its relationships with Mexico and Canada, the two countries which I
discuss more in-depth in the following sections of this chapter.
5 See Nadelmann
1993; McGillis 1997; and the websites of the FBI (www.fbi.gov) and the
U.S. Department of Justice (www.usdoj.gov).
6 On the FBI’s training
programs, see Dunphy and Sutton (1991); "Ex-communist cops get FBI's
know-how," Chicago Tribune, February 17, 1997, p. A1; "FBI takes a nibble
out of crime in east Europe," Christian Science Monitor, May 7, 1996, p.1;
"The role of a lifetime," Los Angeles Times, April 6, 1997, p.E2; "FBI
Director announces graduation of first session of international law enforcement
academy," U.S. Newswire, June 16, 1995; testimony by FBI Director Louis
Freeh before the Senate Appropriations Committee, March 20, 1997.
7 I rely in this section
heavily on the study of the DEA’s international work by Ethan Nadelmann
(1993) and the DEA’s webpage (www.usdoj.gov/dea). See also Verbruggen 1995:174-176;
"An inferno next door," U.S. News & World Reports, February 24, 1997,
p.36; and congressional testimony by various DEA officials, such as AThe
Threat of Heroin to the United States, testimony by DEA Administrator Thomas
Constantine before the House Subcommittee on National Security, September
19, 1996 and testimony by DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine before the
Senate Appropriations Committee, April 10, 1997.
8 See AU.S. Law
Enforcement Response to Money Laundering Activities in Mexico, testimony
by Donnie Marshall, DEA Chief of Domestic Operations, before the Subcommittee
on General Oversight, September 5, 1996; ADrug Control Along the Southwest
Border, testimony by Harold D. Wankel, DEA Chief of Operations, before
the House Judiciary Committee, July 31, 1996; ADrug Trafficking in Mexico,
and testimony by DEA Administrator Thomas A. Constantine before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, March 28, 1996.
9 See Anderson
1997; Deflem 1996a; Mills 1993; www.usdoj.gov/usncb/interpol.htm.
10 See Ethridge 1996;
McGillis 1997; Nadelmann (1993); the webpage of the U.S. Department of
Transportation (www.dot.gov), Department of Justice (www.usdoj.gov) and
U.S. Customs Service (www.customs.ustreas.gov).
11 See U.S. House (1995,
1996); AFBI Involvement in Haiti, Hearing of the House Judiciary Committee,
Federal News Service, January 31, 1996.
12 From a legal
viewpoint, the Alvarez-Machain case involves many complexities (Peterson
1992). In terms of customary international law, foreign police activities
are only lawful when they take place with the host country’s consent. Yet
an official Department of Justice memorandum once proclaimed that the FBI
can engage in arrests abroad Ain a manner that departs from international
law (cited in Aceves 1996:145). International treaties appear to outlaw
transborder abductions but they usually do not address the matter explicitly.
13 This section
relies on Zagaris 1996b; "Mexico's law enforcement turnover frustrates
war on drugs," Washington Post, December 5, 1996, p.A4; and "Mexico's military
leads drug fight," Boston Globe, December 8, 1996, p.A16.
14 See "One Mr. Paron
here, and another one there," New York Times, October 20, 1995, p.A9; "In
the Americas: Interpol-Mexico chief is arrested," Miami Herald, July 24,
1994, p.A19; and "Interpol quietly begins its own investigation of Colosio
killing," The San Diego Union-Tribune, April 16, 1994, p.A4.
15 Testimony
by DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine, February 25, 1997.
16 On the role
of violence in Mexican policing, see Chevigny 1996 and "Mexico reforms
drug force," New York Times, May 1, 1997, p.A2.
17 The problem of corruption
in the Mexican police and its implications for the war on drugs and cooperation
with U.S. law enforcement is well documented, especially because it has
drawn much attention from the American press. I have especially relied
on "Mexico army takes police role, Chicago Tribune, April 11, 1997, p.A8;
"Mexican corruption is cause for concern here," Dallas Morning News, February
28, p.29A; "Mexico threatens to oust DEA agents," Dallas Morning News,
March 19, 1997, p.1A; "Mexico's anti-drug effort faces corruption at every
level," The Houston Chronicle, March 9, 1997, p.A34; "Mexico deports alleged
drug cartel chief to U.S., Los Angeles Times, January 16, 1996, p.A1; "Decision
met with relief in Mexico, ire in Colombia," Los Angeles Times, March 1,
1997, p.A8; "Drug case tests Mexico's cooperation," Los Angeles Times,
March 7, 1997, p.A1; "Mexico takes aim at police drug corruption," Los
Angeles Times, April 25, 1997, p.A1; "Shadow on the border," New York Times,
February 23,1997, p.A1; "Drugs connect Mexico leaders to abduction," New
York Times, March 9, 1997, p.1; "Senate backs Clinton on endorsing
Mexico's anti-drug efforts," New York Times, March 21, 1997, p.A5; "Swiss
to seize Malinas millions, tying the money to drugs," New York Times, April
4, 1997, p.A3; and "Latins certify anger at U.S., Washington Post, February
28, 1997, p.A16.
18 "DEA chief's comments
spark uproar," Dallas Morning News, April 27, 1996, p.A2.
19 The head of the
DEA, Thomas Constantine, blamed anti-drug efforts on the fact that Mexican
police are low-paid and insufficiently trained and that they do not have
various means at their disposal, such as wiretaps and witness protection
programs. More commendable, according to Constantine, is that the Mexican
legislature has been passing tougher laws (see ADrug Control in the Western
Hemisphere, testimony by DEA Administrator Thomas A. Constantine before
the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 6, 1996).
20 Various sources
provided useful information on the international tasks of Canadian police
agencies. I especially rely on the websites of the RCMP (www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca),
the Canadian Department of Justice (canada.justice.gc.ca), the Criminal
Intelligence Service Canada (www.cisc.gc.ca) and the Canadian Police College
(www.cpc.gc.ca), newspapers, and articles by Leeson (1996) and Ram (1995).
21 Sheptycki
(1998a) reports that the RCMP plans a computerized data base system on
serial killers and violent criminals (the Violent Crime Linkage System)
that would link information across police agencies from various countries.
22 See "Haiti police struggle
for respect," Chicago Sun-Times, April 14, 1996, p.65; "Haiti pins future
on police courts," Washington Post, February 1, 1995, p.A15; and "In Canada,
99 Haitians learn police work from Mounties," New York Times, January 10,
1995, p.A8..
23 See the website
of Interpol’s national central bureau in Canada, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/interpol.htm.
24 See Roach and Friedland
1996; "Toll soars in Canada's drug war," Boston Globe, March 22, 1995,
p.A1; " "Smugglers shipping drugs from Asia through Canada to U.S., New
York Times, January 31, 1995, p.A6; and "U.S. will not get share of Canadian
proceeds from drug arrests," New York Times, March 26, 1995, p.A3.
25 On the airbus case,
see "Mulroney sues Canada for $37 million," Washington Post, November 21,
1995, p.A13; "Canada extends apology to pair," Washington Post, January
10, p.A27; and "In settling, Canada seen in ill light," Boston Globe, January
13, 1997, p.A2.
26 See "Tightening
of gun laws attracts U.S. smugglers," Dallas Morning News, September 24,
1995, p.31A; "U.S.-Canada gunrunning booms," Washington Post, September
16, 1995, p.A19; "To curb violence, Canada tries to block guns from U.S.,"
The Christian Science Monitor, March 14, 1995, p.1, and "Liquor bootleggers
go north," Baltimore Sun, April 24, 1996), p.1A.
27 On the Canadian
record in prosecuting Nazi war criminals, see :Hunting for Nazis in Canada,"
Los Angeles Times, January 13, 1997, p.A1 and "Canada to look harder for
suspected Nazis," Boston Globe, November 27, 1996, p.A1.
28 See "The new Canadians,"
Boston Globe, April 14, 1996, p.14.
29 See "Canada holds
two Saudi suspects in Dhahran bombing," Los Angeles Times, March 23, 1997,
p. A1; "Canada places suspect at scene of deadly bombing, Los Angeles
Times, March 28, 1997, p. A21; "Hezbollah support network in Canada alleged,
Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1997, p. A6; "Canada arrests Saudi too
soon, U.S. officials say," Los Angeles Times, April 4, 1997, p.A14; "Syria
reportedly rebuffed bid to name terrorist," Los Angeles Times, April
5, 1997, p.A10; "Syria refuses to seize Saudi blast suspect, Washington
Post, April 5, 1997, p.A1; "Iranian aide linked to bombing suspect," Washington
Post, April 13, 1997, p.A1; "Iran link to Saudi bombing alleged," Chicago
Tribune, April 3, 1997, p.A3; "F.B.I. exits Saudi investigation," New York
Times, November 2, 1996, p.A3; "Second Saudi held by Canada cleared
in bombing," New York Times, April 3, 1997, p.A7; "Foreign role in '96
Saudi bombing unproven, U.S. says," New York Times, April 5,
1997, p.A4; "Chretien could face heat in the U.S., The Toronto Sun, April
4, 1997, p.37; "Chretien off to U.S.," The Toronto Sun, April 6,
1997), p.1; "Syria refused to seize bombing suspect," International
Herald Tribune, April 7, 1997, p.9; and Arm's length friends," Time, April
7, 1997.
30 See testimony by
Louis Freeh, Senate Appropriations Committee, hearing on the fiscal year
1997, FDCH Congressional testimony, May 16, 1996.
31 Committee hearings
on international crime affecting U.S. law enforcement have been held quite
regularly in recent years, especially since the U.S. involvement in Haiti
and the easing of relationships with eastern Europe; see, e.g., AFBI Involvement
in Haiti, Hearing of the House Judiciary Committee, January 31, 1996; AInternational
Crime, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee, March 12,
1996; AFBI Investigation into Saudi Bombing, Hearing of the House Judiciary
Committee, February 12, 1997.
32 See "Mexico replaces
inept, corrupt anti-drug force," Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1997, p.A1;
"A promising fresh start for Mexico in drug war," Los Angeles Times, May
2, 1997, p.B8; "Mexico reforms drug force," New York Times, May 1, 1997,
p.A2; and "Mexico scraps corrupted drug agency," Washington Post, May 1,
1997, p.A25...
33 "Mexico takes aim
at police drug corruption," Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1997, p.A1.
34 "Zedillo describes
'cancer' of drugs eating at Mexico, New York Times, May 3, 1997, p.A20.
35 For recent
developments of U.S.-Mexican police relations, see the DEA statements on
AAnti-Narcotics Cooperation with the Government of Mexico, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and Senate Drug Caucus, October 29, 1997; AInternational
Organized Crime Syndicates and Their Impact on the United States, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, February 26, 1998; and the website of the
U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov.
36 See AFBI Investigation
into Saudi Bombing, Hearing of the House Judiciary Committee, Federal News
Service, February 12, 1997.
