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David
Garland’s
book, The Culture of Control, is an
analysis of the social, economic, and political forces that gave rise
to the
contemporary culture of crime control in the US and UK. This analysis
is an
effort to explain the radical changes that have occurred in the fields
of crime
control and criminal justice since the 1970s. The central elements of
contemporary crime control, such as mandatory sentencing, victim
rights,
private policing, community notification laws, and the reliance on the
prison
system, that are dominant today are very different from the
perspectives and
frameworks that were prevalent in the field thirty years ago. How and
why have
these changes taken place?
1. A
History of the Present
Historically, it is
remarkable that the penal welfarism of the 1970s is
now
totally reversed. Penal welfarism refers to the institutional
arrangements that
characterized the field from the 1890s up until the 1970s. Over the
last thirty
years, there has been a strong movement away from the framework that
guided the
crime control and criminal justice fields for the better part of the 20th
century. This movement is an abrupt reversal of the historical pattern
of the
last century.
Penologically, it is
noted that
practitioners are very divided over what to do and why. As a result of
the
movement away from the previous framework of penal welfarism, the
current field
of crime control and criminal justice has lost its core ideology and
culture. Practicioners
from the 1980s have been trained for a system that is no longer in
place, and
their previous ideologies are unfit for the changed system. The defined
culture
of penal welfarism has been replaced by new, fractured and disorganized
ideologies and orientations.
Sociologically, crime
control reveals much
of society as a whole. The changes in the fields of crime control and
criminal
justice are important since these institutions are a part of a system
of
governance and social order, which is connected with other social
institutions.
These institutions are interrelated within the rest of society.
The central changes in
the fields of crime
control and criminal justice include:
1)
The decline of the rehabilitative
ideal: The rehabilitative ideal refers to the
correctionalist and welfarist rationales that were essential to the
penal
welfarism framework. These perspectives focused on the rehabilitation
or
treatment of criminals. This change occurred first in academics, and
resulted
in the further abandonment of the ideal among practitioners. The ideal
of the
rehabilitation became viewed as an impossible ideal and an unworthy
policy
objective that was misguided and counter-productive. This is especially
significant since the rehabilitative ideal was the central support that
the
penal welfarism framework was based on.
2)
The re-emergence of punitive and expressive
justice: In addition to the decline of rehabilitative programs, there
has been
a re-emergence of retributive justice. This focus on revenge in
criminal
justice has developed out of the elimination of individualized
sentencing in
favor of proportional and fixed sentencing guidelines, since
individualized
sentencing was perceived as unfair. This change has re-established
retributive
justice, which greater reflects public sentiment as opposed to the
recommendations
of experts and professionals.
3)
Changes in the emotional tone of crime
policy: There has been a further change in
the emotional tone that has been invoked during the discourses on crime
policy.
Before the 1970s, under the penal welfarism framework, the emotional
tone emphasized
progress in combating crime and rationalizing the criminal justice
system. The
dominant tones related to decency and humanity, and these values were
dominant
in the development of crime policy. Since the 1970s, fear of crime has
become
dominant, and crime has been increasingly viewed as a social problem.
The
general public is characterized as viewing crime rates as increasing,
and that
the criminal justice system is incapable of providing a solution. The
new
emotional tone is that of public anger, and demands for protection and
retribution.
4)
The return of the victim: Under the
penal welfarism framework, the interests of the
victim were never considered as above those of the general public, and
especially not in conflict with the interests of the offender. The new
perspective is that the victim must be protected, and that the system
must be
for victims and against offenders. The symbolic image of the victim,
which
communicates that anyone could be a victim, has emerged, and it is
regularly
invoked during policy discussions.
5)
The public
must be protected: Increased efforts to protect the public have led to
developments such as the regular use of imprisonment, surveillance
cameras, and
community notification laws. This change notably departs from the
previous
concerns about the need for protection from the state towards a
preference for
protection by the state. Public concern has become focused on
developing
protection from crime as opposed to the abuse of powers that have been
invested
in the state and its agencies.
6)
Politicization
and populism: The discussion on crime
control policies has shifted away from the experts and has increasingly
become
apart of the political process. Experts
in the field have become excluded from the policy making process, and
the new
source for policy support has become the public. Crime initiatives are
now a
major part of the electoral process, and as a result crime policy is
developed
based on the public approval of the measures. Crime control is
politically
appropriated without much disagreement between political parties, and
new
slogans are used to gain public approval (e.g., 3 strikes,
zero-tolerance,
tough on crime).
7)
Reinvention of the prison: The penal
welfarism framework considered prison essentially
problematic, and contradictory to the correctionalist goals of the
field. This idea
led to a growing shift away from the use of prisons until the 1970s, at
which
point this trend was reversed. The US incarceration rate rose 500%
between 1973
and 1997. The use of prisons has become essential to the maintenance of
social
order, and it further satisfies the public demands for safety and
retribution.
8)
The transformation of criminology:
Under the penal welfarism framework, criminology
viewed treatment and social reform as the solution to crime. This view
has been
replaced by theories of social control, which assume a pessimistic view
of
human nature in contrast to the previous optimism. The current view of
the
field of criminology focuses on the utility of greater controls on
behavior and
enforcing discipline.
9)
The expanding infrastructure of crime
prevention and community safety: Whereas
issues of crime prevention and community safety were once the sole
domain of
the state, new alliances have formed at the local and central levels to
provide
greater protection against crime. Neighborhoods and communities have
begun to
essentially police themselves, and this change has been further
encouraged by
the state.
10)
The commercialization
of crime control: The state and the criminal justice system no longer
dominate
the crime control field, as private security has expanded. Once the
sole
jurisdiction of the state, crime control has now become an effort of
citizens,
communities, and companies as well, dissolving the sovereignty of the
state in
matters of crime control and criminal justice.
11)
New management
styles: The managing styles have also changed, becoming more focused on
performance
indicators and cost-effectiveness. These measures have led to greater
selectivity in enforcement and practice, as well as creating tensions
and
contradictions within the field, specifically, a contradiction in
increasing
attempts to cut costs, while increasing spending on popular measures
that are not
always effective.
12)
A perpetual sense of crisis: Due to the
developments in the field, a feeling of crisis
has developed amongst the experts and professionals in the field. The
failures
of the existing system are becoming self evident, and there is a
growing
difficulty to view these problems as temporary. Under the penal
welfarism
framework such a crisis would have been attributed to implementation
failure, a
need for further powers or resources, but under the current system the
problems
are viewed as the result of theory-failure. The problems in the system
are
based in the use of an institutional model that is inappropriate for
the task
of crime control. As a consequence of this, experts in the field have
become
discredited.
2. The
Penal-Welfare State
The negative
evaluation of penal welfarism
took place in a certain socio-historical context.
The state of criminal justice was the result of a developmental
process, and as
a result its various aspects were developed with reference to
particular time
periods and the historical basis that came before them. The
jurisdictional
foundation of the criminal justice system is 150 years old, upon which
rests a modernist
superstructure, with correctionalist and specialist arrangements. The
resulting
system of penal welfarism combined the legal liberalism (due process,
proportionate punishment) with correctionalism (rehabilitation). By the
1970s
there was a consensus on the correctionalist approach.
As states gained a
monopoly over the means
of coercion (police, law, military), these new institutions were
defined in
terms of a contract with the citizens
of the state. The state imposition of law and order became an
obligation of the
state to the citizens, guaranteeing security through law and order.
Crime,
which was once an issue dealt with privately, became a problem that the
authorities handled. The developed policeman state practices and the
social
mores of the period served to reinforce each other and decrease crime.
By the 1970s, these
practices were
understood to be guided by the rehabilitative
ideal. Penal measures were focused on being rehabilitative and not
retributive,
and the principle of rehabilitation was the organizing principle for
the penal
framework. This focus gave a central place to specialists and experts.
Criminologists were relied upon to provide accurate information on how
to
accomplish rehabilitation (no penal sanction without expert advice) in
terms of
the nature of crime and the methods to most appropriately deal with it.
The
leading principle of the time was no treatment without diagnosis and no
penal
sanction without expert advice. Thus, the state
was seen as an agent of reform as well as repression, of care as well
as
control, welfare as well as punishment. This modernist understanding of
crime policy
placed great confidence in the regulatory powers of the state.
Criminological
knowledge also supported
this conception and was oriented towards rehabilitation, cf. forensic
psychiatry, medico-legal science, and individualized treatment based on
crime-causation
models. Criminological theories focused on the dispositions and social
conditions that resulted in crime, with most of the focus upon “the
delinquent,
the criminal character, and …the ‘psychopathic offender’” (p. 42). The
causality of criminal behavior was seen as rooted in the dispositions
of
offenders through the formation of personality and attitudes. As social
equality increased, criminological theories increasingly examined the
gap between
expectations and achievements as opposed to deprivation.
The development of
these advancements in
the penal welfare system paralleled the US and UK’s development as
welfare
states. Socially and politically, social-democratic
policies responded to any inequalities that existed in the class
structure
in a generally growing economy. Professionals were placed in charge of
various
social ills (social workers, doctors, criminologists), as problems were
increasingly adopted as social problems to be remedied. These problems
were
remedied through state interventions and regulation, actions which were
further
informed by expert authorities and sought to develop new social norms
and
standards for areas previously unregulated. Examples of these are child
rearing, health care, and moral education. A solidaristic culture,
characterized by networks of trust and mutual reliance, supported these
developments.
In sum, we have
social-democratic
politics, informal and formal social controls, a prosperous economy,
expert
professionals, responsive governments, supporting academic knowledge,
and a
supportive (or at least non-opposing) general public. This resulted in
the
development of a society governed by the welfare state, generally
promoting
equality and better standards of living, and more specifically the
penal
welfare system, which sought to reduce crime through social policies
and treat,
as opposed to punish, criminals through professional advice.
3. The
Crisis of Penal Modernism
From the mid-1970s
onwards, the rehabilitative
faith collapses. In the US, a report appeared that stated that the
notion of treatment
ideal was theoretically faulty and inconsistent with some basic
conceptions of
justice. The critiques of the penal welfare system centered on the
utility of
correctionalism and the use of indeterminate sentencing and
individualized
treatment practices. These critiques led marked the beginning of a
radical
change in the trajectory of the development of the criminal justice
institution. Indeterminate sentencing was viewed as discriminatory, as
a tool
of repression which was disguised by the treatment model. These
critiques and
the suggestion for reforms were based in the experiences during the
Civil
Rights movement. There was a distinct focus by the early reformers on
sentencing procedures, which up until this point were determined on a
case by
case basis in order to provide individualized treatment. The variations
in
sentencing were seen as a violation of due process rights, as well as a
source
of discrimination.
Furthermore, the penal
welfare system was described
as paternalistic. The emphasis on treatment was viewed as a means to
enforce
conformity, and retributive justice was considered a better means to
maintain
individuality and freedom of expression. Criminologists also began to
debunk
rehabilitation and social programs, marking the collapse of the
intellectual
foundation for the penal welfare system. The movement for sentencing
reform
began in the US, but also spread to the UK, however the legislative and
practical changes that emerged from this movement were wholly
inconsistent with
the goals of the critics of the treatment model. The effort to create a
fair
and just system based on ‘just desserts’ resulted in a system focused
on
deterrence, restraint, incapacitation, and later, expressive justice
and mass imprisonment.
Due-process
considerations were re-introduced and retribution replaced
rehabilitation.
Determinate sentencing replaced treatment-based parole, and liberal
concern for
proportionate sentencing was transformed into a focus on deterring and
incapacitating
offenders by policy makers. As a result of the negative evaluations of
the
penal welfare systems outcomes, as well as the increasing crime rates,
treatment
was perceived as an inefficient and incapable method of dealing with
crime. The
penal welfare system was seen as a failure-model,
a framework for dealing with crime that was unfit to accomplish its
task. The
crime control and criminal justice system increasingly became viewed as
a
failure, and the fields’ central ideology was dismissed and pushed to
the
background. However, there was no alternative to the penal welfare
framework,
leading to an ideological vacuum and a field without guiding principles
to
redirect the fields of crime control and criminal justice.
This negative
evaluation took place in a certain
socio-historical context which provided the criticisms a contextual
power
without which they could have been dealt with within the system instead
of
dismantling it. Negative research findings had been presented before,
and the
new research did not completely refute the systems capability. Without
the
particular socio-historical context, these criticisms would have been
approached as implementation-failure and resulted in reform. Instead,
these
criticism, coupled with the socio-historical context, resulted in the
view of
the failings of the penal welfare system as a result of theory-failure,
despite
the level of institutional inertia that normally would have prevented
this.
The new, radical
criminology also attacked treatment-based control and the
criminologies they were based on. This new criminology emerged as a
result of
the academic critiques of the old criminology, and its focus centered
around
deviance. The perception of deviance had also changed after the 1960s,
and was
seen as a normal and healthy as opposed to pathological. Deviance, and
by
extension crime, were seen as widely engaged in behaviors, and the real
problem, according to the radical criminologists, was control. Radical
criminology’s central themes were of individualism and expressive
freedom. However,
these intellectual developments were limited to academia, while its
criticisms
of the penal welfare system resonated with the political critiques of
the
criminal justice and crime control institutions. Thus, the intellectual
foundations
for justifying the penal welfare framework were undermined as
practitioners and
professionals tried to defend the system from criticisms.
The movement against
the penal welfare
system was not based solely upon penological considerations, but upon
the
appeal and resonance that these criticisms had with society at the
time. The
power that the movement accumulated was not due to the intellectual
foundation
upon which the criticism were founded, but in the reactionary nature of
the
movement, and context that these criticisms were formed in. The
reactionary
movement against penal-welfarism further gained strength on the basis
of a “momentary
alliance of the accumulated enemies of the now established
penal-welfare
approach.” (p. 71). But the suggested reform proposals were not
followed, and
the fields of crime control and criminal justice were formed by the
problems,
culture, and technologies of power of the late twentieth century.
4. Social Change and Order
in Late
Modernity
The changes in the
fields of crime control
and criminal justice were not only driven by intellectual developments
in the
field of criminology, but also historical forces that became dominate
in the
late twentieth century, or the coming of the period of late-modernity.
Two of
these historical forces are especially relevant: 1) the social,
economic, and
cultural changes of late modernity that apply to West; and 2) political
and
policy changes in response to late modernity, in the US and UK
specifically. In
the 1970s the social climate that supported the penal welfare framework
of the
crime control field began to become eroded as late-modern trends
altered the
political, economic and cultural supports that underpinned the welfare
state.
Late modernity refers
to the large scale
social changes that occurred during the last half of the twentieth
century. This
period of change is described as a distinct phase of history, and
refers to
several distinct trends that developed, namely the advances in
technology and
the changing dynamics of capitalist production and market exchange, the
restructuring of the family, changes to the social ecology, the rise of
the
mass media, and the democratization of social and cultural life.
a)
Late
20th-Century Socio-Economic Changes
The
period of late modernity was driven primarily by the developing
dynamics of
capitalist production and market exchange. Market capitalism had
expanded, but
the motivation for new and greater profits lead to the rapid
transformation of
social life through advances in technology, transportation (the
automobile),
and communication (mass media and the internet). These changes lead to
the
development of the information society, as well as the development of
the
consumer society.
The period before the decline in the
faith in the welfare state, from 1950 to 1973, was marked by an
increasing
growth and increased living standards, so that a general level of
economic
prosperity was enjoyed by the majority of people. The increased wealth
further
lead to what is now known as consumer capitalism. These developments
were
connected with the welfare state ideals, and the US and UK governments
were
expected to ensure the prosperity and well-being of their respective
populations. After the boom period of the 1950s-1970s, the oil crisis
struck,
and unemployment rose to new heights. The job security which was
enjoyed during
the post-war years declined, and growing inequalities developed out of
it, as
well as diminishing the previous period’s social solidarity.
The structure of
families was changing:
people married later, had fewer children, women worked more, and family
size
went down. Divorce rates increased considerably, and a growing number
of
children were born to unmarried women. The expansion of opportunities
for women
that result from the Civil Rights movement created more opportunities
for
women, developing a growing trend towards two income families. The
traditional
structure of the family was supplanted by the tolerance for alternative
family
structures, and these changes have resulted in consequences in other
areas of
social life.
The spread of car
ownership lead to
several further transformations in society. As a result of automobiles
there
became a decreased need to live in close to work, leading to the
development of
suburbs outside of cities. In the US, this influx was further
influenced by
‘white flight’, as whites moved to the suburbs in response to a growing
influx
of southern blacks to the Northern and Midwestern cities. As a result,
an
informal segregation resulted between the white suburbs and the black
inner
city neighborhoods.
The development of
radio and television
resulted in the mass media becoming a major institution in modern
societies. Television
was the central driving force in this transformation, providing
unprecedented
access to the experiences of other groups and resulting in a growing
recognition of inequalities by disadvantaged groups. Also, the
lifestyles of
the rich and famous became public knowledge, increasing expectations
and
feelings of deprivation. An additional result in the development of the
mass
media was increasing the level of transparency and accountability with
regards
to governmental and social institutions.
The democratization of
social life and
culture meant that social rights were guaranteed for more and more
people. Political
culture became centered on the pursuit of equality and equal rights.
The
changes in norms that resulted from the 1960s resulted in eroding the
power and
credibility of moral absolutes, allowing for the development new,
relativistic,
norms in areas of divorce, sexual conduct, etc. These developments had
further
implications, since the pluralism that developed out of the
relativistic norms
resulted in the upheaval of the political parties, and a shift toward
identity
politics.
As a result of these
changes in society,
crime rates increased. Increased crime rates became an evident social
fact
during this period, and there is a considerable amount of evidence to
suggest
that late modernity, and the social changes that resulted from it,
caused the
increase in crime rates. This is because of the increased
opportunities,
reduced situational controls, increase in the risky population (teenage
males),
and a reduction in social and self controls that resulted from the
changes
brought by late modernity. The consumer boom resulted in an increase in
valuables, increasing criminal opportunities. The development of self
service
shops, anonymity through the increased size of cities, and empty houses
created
by two working parents decreased situational controls that previously
deterred
crime. The automobile helped to create this decrease in situational
controls,
but also provided a new target for crime.(Grand Theft Auto) The
development of
relativistic norms and social divisions that arose as a result of the
changes
in social ecology and demography further decreased the previous social
and self
controls to crime. As a result of these various conditions, crime rates
increased
drastically from the 1960s onwards.
Ironically, welfare
was also being
attacked under these better conditions which it had helped to create.
As a
result of welfare’s tendency to increase as a result of finding new
demands to
be met, welfare shifted dependency towards the state, as opposed to
traditional
sources, such as family. An additional result of the welfare states was
increasing expectations by increasing the standard of living. The
bureaucracies
that performed the duties of the welfare state additionally lead to the
decreased acceptance of the welfare state framework by appearing
unresponsive
and incapable of providing the tailored results that were becoming the
standard
in a consumer society. The welfare state succeeded in addressing
economic and
political problems, but its success diminished the recognition of these
problems
and focus shifted on the problems that the welfare system was perceived
as
creating.
b)
Political
Climate
After World War II,
politics emphasized
economic control and social liberation. But the new politics from the
mid-1970s
onwards was opposed to big government and the permissive culture of the
60s:
the neo-liberal policies of Ronald Reagan in the US and Margaret
Thatcher in
the UK were committed to undoing the social arrangements that had
earlier been
instituted. This also involved a call for tighter and more control.
Thus, the
emphasis shifted to economic freedom and societal control. The new
policies
were general in intent, but had specific, class-based consequences, and
in
effect these policies targeted specific groups and behaviors. Under
these
conditions, crime rose and began to be seen as a result of a lack of
control,
committed by ‘wicked’ individuals that must be deterred and punished.
5. Criminal Justice Policy
Adaptations
The adaptations of the
criminal justice
institution were not guided by a concerted reconstruction effort, but
through
individual attempts to address problems in the system more akin to
patchwork. These
problems revolved around two key issues; the acknowledged normality of
high
crime rates and the limitations of the criminal justice state. The
proposals of
academics at this time did not receive much public or political
support, and a
majority of the major trends now dominant in the field of crime control
are the
result of minor initiatives that gained strength over time. The
developmental
process of the crime control field has been the result of various
forces
converging into several key trends which have had unanticipated
implications
for the fields of crime control and criminal justice.
a)
The
Challenges
High crime rates have
become acknowledged
as a normal social fact based in the new vulnerabilities created by
late
modernity. Crime rates have risen to historically high levels in both,
the US
and the UK, and public perception has recognized it as such. The
perception of
crime as a serious problem is considerable. Opinion polls since the 1970s indicate that the public has viewed
crime as a serious problem in society, and that it has been
consistently
getting worse, regardless of the actual rates of crime.
The criminal justice
state has begun to
acknowledge its limitations. The system of criminal justice is
generally seen
as a failure, not as a positive challenge as it was under the penal
welfare
system. The mood in criminal justice is pessimistic about its ability
to
guarantee law and order on its own. Over the years, reports from
governmental
agencies have increasingly reported that the capacity of the criminal
justice
system to address crime control and provide security is limited and
that the
institution, by itself, is incapable of fulfilling its task. As a
result,
policies have increasingly focused on the effects of crime as a more
attainable
goal.
Therefore the state no
longer sees itself,
and it is no longer seen, as being able to provide the only and
complete answer
to the problems of crime control. This is due to the high crime rates
that have
become dominant in society, as well as the acknowledged limitations of
the
criminal justice system. This is a complete reversal of the previous
trend
toward the function of the state to enforce law and order and to
provide
security that was dominant until late modernity.
b)
The
Reponses
Politicians and
administrators have
approached the problems in the criminal justice system with different
focuses
respective of their positional goals. Politicians need to be re-elected
and are
therefore more interested in policy responses which have public
support. The
policy choices favored by politicians are those with popular support
and
political appeal, despite research findings or expert advice.
Administrators,
in contrast, are professionals and want efficient responses. They are
affected
by political influences, but are much more concerned with the
maintenance of
their organizations and enjoy distance from public scrutiny.
1)
The
professionalization and the rationalization of justice occurred as a
response
to the increased crime rates, and by extension the increased workloads
that it
put on the criminal justice system. The perceived failure of the
criminal
justice system to control crime rates further motivated these changes.
Professionalization particularly occurred among the police, who wanted
to
become expert crime fighters through the use of technology and reactive
policing. This developed into the 911 response system, with officers
patrolling
less and instead responding to complaints. However, this response led
had its
own problems, and as police patrolled less, the fear of crime increased
since
it appeared to the public that the police had ceased to have a presence
in the
community.
Rationalization took
place in a more
systematic approach towards criminal justice as a whole, e.g. by using
information technologies, computers, and so on to manage the system
efficiently. The goal of the rationalization of justice was to create a
better
means to monitor and assess the performance of the criminal justice
system in
order to determine the most effective methods and what worked.
Furthermore,
this was an attempt to lower costs and create a more efficient system.
2)
The
commercialization of criminal justice developed out of the growing
concern for
efficiency and effectiveness of criminal justice organizations, as
measured by
performance indicators. As such, criminal justice agencies started to
be run
like businesses, and crime control has privatized as a result of this
growing
concern. Specific functions of the criminal justice system, such as
prisons, have
been contracted out to corporations since it has become more efficient
for the
state to focus on monitoring these institutions instead of carrying out
these
functions. Recently, private police have developed in cooperation with
public
forces.
3)
Because
of the high crime rate and the new focus on efficiency and
effectiveness, minor
deviance had to be filtered out of the system, e.g. minor offenses, in
order to
focus resources on serious offences. Defining deviance down was
supported by
the criminological theories of the time which viewed minor deviance as
a normal
and its enforcement as unessential and counterproductive. This practice
has
resulted in the informal decriminalization of minor offenses in favor
of
efficiency.
4)
State
agencies have also begun to redefine success in the field of criminal
justice. Expectations
have been lowered as the limitations of the criminal justice system to
control
crime have been publicly acknowledged. Prisons detain without efforts
in rehabilitation,
and the focus as shifted toward individual responsibility within the
system. People
are told to lock their doors and inmates are responsible for whether or
not the
seek reform or rehabilitation programs. The criminal justice
institution is
increasingly trying to be measured on its own scale of success, and the
focus
has shifted from crime control towards the punishment of offenders.
5)
State
agencies have increasingly focused on the consequences of crime,
instead of its
causes:
-
Victims
have become a central component to the redefined mission of the
criminal
justice system. Strongly punitive responses are now justified in terms
of the
victim, and victims now have their own rights regarding their cases.
For
example, the victim impact statements are now made during court
proceedings and
sentencing trials. This change is in stark contrast to the penal
welfare
system, wherein the victim’s interests eclipsed by the public’s.
-
Reducing
the fear of crime has become an additional goal in the new criminal
justice
system. People’s perceptions (right or wrong) of crime are a major
factor in
policy decisions, and efforts are now made to reduce the fear of crime
even if
these efforts have no effect on crime rates. Police patrols and
neighborhood
watch programs, for instance, have been reintroduced in order to
alleviate
public fear even though these measures have little effect on reducing
crime.
6)
The
criminal justice system has relocated and redefined responsibilities as
a
result of the recognition that crime control is beyond the state, by
instituting informal crime control mechanisms that operate in society
independent of governmental policy.
-
The
community has developed as the solution, and is now recognized as
valuable
arena in which to reduce crime. This effort has led to the
reintegration of the
public and the police in an effort to informally reduce crime rates.
This has
resulted in efforts in community policing and neighborhood watches.
-
There
has been a refocusing of responsibility in regards to crime control.
The state
now relocates some of its responsibilities in the area of criminal
justice away
towards the private sector and the community, and a new complex is
forged that
disperses social control functions across society as a whole. This
effort has
focused on reducing opportunities for crime and the development of a
network of
individuals and agencies that can put into practice informal controls
to
prevent crime.
c)
The
New Criminology
The new ways of
thinking about crime
assume that crime is a normal element of society. The new
criminological
theories focus on the situations which produce crime and on controlling
situations which present opportunities for crime. This knowledge is
predictive,
focusing on risks that people will face in aggregate terms. The focus
is on
engineering of the conditions in which crime occurs, e.g. theft is
addressed by
installing burglary alarms; credit cards are used instead of cash
money;
cameras monitor street behavior. The root causes of crime are not
looked at,
only the price of ways to eliminate the negative consequence of crime.
d) Denial
and Acting Out
Clearly some of the
proposals have no
basis in reality and are not successful, but they are publicly
advocated
nonetheless. This has arisen out of politicians’ need to restore public
confidence in the criminal justice system and the state. Political
rhetoric and
expressive actions against offenders have developed as a means to
reassure the
public and to denounce crime. Alongside
of this is another kind of criminology that focuses on very spectacular
aberrant crimes and criminals (super-predators), demonizing offenders
and
legitimizing the effort remove and detain criminals.
6. The
Culture of High-Crime Societies
A new collective
experience on crime and
security offers the background for the discussed changes. This
background
drastically increases the probability of the aforementioned changes,
and
therefore underpins the altered trajectory of the fields of crime
control and
criminal justice.
a)
Punitive
Segregation
The new strategies in
sentencing and
imprisonment have become populist and politicized, and experts have
lost their
previous ability to influence policy changes. The new harsh punishments
that
are suggested have an expressive dimension (punish offenders) and an
instrumental one too (seclude criminal from society, protect the
public). These
new policies are defended in political rhetoric (e.g., “three strikes
and you’re
out”). The victim has become the new focus of attention of policy
developments (e.g.,
Megan’s law) as well as in denouncing crime and advocating for the
protection
of “victims” of crime. Anyone is presented as a potential victim of
crime.
Since World War II,
professionals were at
first able to de-politicize crime control and to make crime control
their
professional expert issue. But from the 1960s and 1970s onwards,
politicians
started to take on crime control as a political issue. The divergence
from the
historical trajectory which had favored the advice of experts and
professionals
during this period presents a historical problem of explanation.
However, this
change can be attributed to the new experience of crime by the middle
class
professionals that were the penal welfare systems core supporters
before the 1960s
and 1970s.
The changes that
increased the crime rates
also increased the exposure to crime that this class had The mass media
had
adopted crime as a major theme, as a result the salience of crime for
the
middle class professional previously removed from it further increased.
It was
these important changes that lead to a new collective experience of
crime, and
a growing support for ‘tough on crime’ measures.
b)
The
Collective Experience of Crime
The professional
middle classes (liberal
elites) generally supported the correctionalist policies in criminal
justice,
but the influence of these professionals gradually diminished. At the
same
time, a fear of crime became generalized across social strata. The increased exposure, and as a result the
increased fear of crime, that was experienced by the professional
middle class resulted
in a new collective experience of crime which shifted popular support
away from
the penal welfare system. These changes reduced the social distance
between the
middle class and crime, and the increasing crime rates gained a more
personal
meaning.
-
Middle-class
families became more vulnerable to crime as traditional controls
weakened. Both,
husbands and wives worked outside the house, leaving houses largely
empty
during the day. The automobile eliminated the constraints of distance
that had
once insulated the middle class from crimes, making these empty houses
attractive criminal opportunities. Children left alone had the freedom
to
engage in deviant and criminal behavior, and the informal controls that
were
created by the previous generation’s stay at home moms were largely
eliminated.
The informal decriminalization of misdemeanors further resulted in the
appearance of disorder and out of control crime.
-
The
poor came to be seen as undeserving of support and the cause of the
major problems,
and were largely blamed for the increased crime rates. The result of
these
changing perceptions was the redefining of class and race relations,
wherein
the poor and the black were labeled as a criminal element within
society.
-
The
media fueled these developments. Crime had become a major theme in the
mass
media, and news reports of riots, murders, and other prevalence of
other crimes
further increased the fear of crime. The television resulted in further
increasing the salience of crime by bringing it into people’s homes,
further
reducing the distance that once insulated the middle class. Political
speech
became more populist, increasing the rhetoric against crime, and the
depictions
of victims lent a further context to crime.
7. The
New Culture of Crime Control
a)
The
Structure of Contemporary Crime Control
The institutions of
penal welfarism
(prisons) are still present in the current system, but their
significance has changed.
Their use, functions, and significance have changed over time, but they
remain
in various forms. The transformation of the criminal justice
institution has
not been a complete disconnect from the previous system, but a
restructuring of
goals and practices that have arisen as a result of the problems facing
contemporary society. There is presently a much greater use of custody
as
punishing offenders and protecting society has become the central focus
of the
criminal justice field. The victim has moved to the foreground,
resulting in
new practices and policy motives, although the correctionalist
apparatus is
still in place, and rehabilitation efforts are still made, albeit to
lesser
degree than before.
A very striking recent
development has
been the elaboration of the sector of prevention and security. The
emphasis is
on harm-reduction and risk-management, aiming to minimize criminal
opportunities, enhance situational controls, and channel conduct away
from
criminogenic situations. The characteristics of individual offenders
has become
secondary to identifying situations that crime occurs in and
establishing
controls to prevent crime from occurring. This new way of preventing
crime has
created an apparatus of prevention and security through the cooperation
between
the state and civil spheres.
The institutions of
criminal justice are now
less autonomous and more controlled by governments. Governments, in
turn, rely
on popular opinion or their perceptions thereof. Experts in the field
have
become less influential, while the public has become a major influence
on
policies. The central aims in the new structure of the criminal justice
system
are political as opposed to penological, focusing on alleviating public
outrage, restoring credibility, and reassuring the public. Thus, while
official
criminal justice is larger than ever before, it is also now a much
smaller part
of the crime control complex, which now includes community
organizations, the
private security sector, etc.
b)
The
Culture of Crime Control
The structure of crime
control
institutions have changed the most dramatically in the culture that
influences
the attitudes and actions of individuals working in the system. The new
culture
of crime control has come to focus on a number of issues:
1)
The
transformation of penal-welfarism:
The criminal justice
system has become
focused on penal sanctions in response to crime, and punishment has
become more
punitive and expressive, with a greater concern for providing security.
The
welfare regime of the previous century has become conditional, and is
evaluated
with reference to the risks associated with it, such as the recidivism
criminals released on parole. Rehabilitation still exists, but it is
redefined
in terms of criminal behavior only, not the conditions that gave rise
to
criminality. Also, probation is different today as it comes along with
certain
forms of confinement and punishment (e.g. intensive probation at home).
Probation
has become a practice of managing risks and increased controls have
become
instituted. The prison is used very extensively, but as a quarantine
zone to
exclude the dangerous classes. Offenders, also, have no more rights or
just
very few, as the balance has shifted totally to the victim and society
which
have to be protected.
2)
The
new criminology of control:
The new rational
choice theories of crime
now complement the older causation theories. The solutions to crime
that flow
from these perspectives focus on technical aspects, bypassing the realm
of
values and individuals’ integration. The prevailing view that has
emerged is
that crime is normal and only controls can prevent and/or predict
crime. These
theories have become popular with politicians, leading to their
increased
influence on the development of the field, and focus exclusively upon
controlling situations in order to prevent criminal situations.
3)
Towards
an economic style of reasoning:
Criminal justice is no
longer primarily a
moral matter, but an economic one. Now, a cost-benefit model dominates
crime
control, and the field is increasingly discussed in economic terms and
calculations. The emphasis on the economics of crime control has
limited
experimentation of different methods, increased the focus on
outputs(911 calls
responded to, cases closed) rather than outcomes(decreased crime
rates), and
realigned the practice of crime control to meet performance indicators.
Politically,
in contrast, there are currents to punish criminals and protect the
public ‘whatever
the cost’ (e.g. three strikes). The policies and positions of
politicians, such
as the war on crime, which are publicly supported are often expensive
and
ineffective. Therefore there are currently two contrasting trends in
the field
of criminal justice with irreconcilable aims, the economic, focusing on
efficiency and effectiveness, and the political, which focus on public
opinion
and whose policies undermine the economic foundation of the current
criminal
justice system.
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