* A previous version
was presented at a conference on "International Institutions: Global Processes—Domestic
Consequences" in April 1999 at Duke University. I am grateful to the editors
of this volume for their helpful comments.
 Abstract
Contemporary developments
of international law enforcement strategies between the United States and
Mexico are discussed. Emphasis is on the criminal law enforcement duties
surrounding U.S.-Mexico border control, cross-border implications of the
war on drugs, and the relevance thereof for issues of police professionalism
and corruption. Employing a theoretical model rooted in the sociology of
globalization and bureaucracy, it is argued that efficiency standards shape
these international efforts of policing, often irrespective of legality
and justice. Furthermore, research indicates that a relationship of dependency
and inequality marks the U.S.-Mexican police partnership. Implications
of these findings are discussed with respect to issues of corruption and
in relation to the continued efforts on the part of U.S. law enforcement
to forge and control a global hegemony of policing. Whereas the traditional
policing-corruption focus is within a local or national range, this article
moves the center of attention to the international arena. Unresolved critical
issues and future needed research are also noted.
Key Words: international
police cooperation, U.S.-Mexican police relations, Americanization of law
enforcement, police corruption, bureaucratization, globalization, war on
drugs
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, social science
research has devoted increasing attention to patterns of crime and law
enforcement transcending the borders of nations (e.g., Deflem 1997, 2000;
Deflem and Swygart 2001; Deflem and Henry-Turner 2001; Nadelmann 1993;
Sheptycki 1996, 1998). This growing body of scholarship has done much to
advance our understanding of various aspects of the historical and contemporary
dimensions of international police structures and processes. But there
still remains an important task for scholars to uncover the many dimensions
and forms of international policing and to construct appropriate models
that can account for these phenomena. As the world is increasingly subject
to globalization in many domains of society, inquiries on international
aspects of law enforcement are significant in contributing to unravel the
consequences of these forms of policing with respect to a traditional understanding
of legality rooted in the notion of jurisdiction. Clearly, as the world
gains in interdependence and complexity, such conceptions will in the future
be increasingly questioned.
I will offer a theoretically
informed sociological model of international policing that I will put to
the test in the case of aspects of U.S.-Mexican policing. Applying analytical
models of international police to selected cases has the advantage of offering
materials that may lead towards the uncovering of more fundamental and
universal mechanisms across specific times and places. Under conditions
of globalization, policing is likely to be more complex, dynamic, multi-dimensional
and non-linear than its traditional forms have been. In that case, critical
issues related to control, predictability, and assessment can no longer
be adequately grasped in our traditional paradigms (Martin and Beittel
1998). With respect to police corruption, specifically, the focus has traditionally
been on the police institution’s or officer’s accountability vis-a-vis
the citizens or inhabitants of the particular jurisdiction over which the
police has authority (Deflem 1995). But in the case of international policing,
the basis of accountability is less clear, which in itself may affect opportunities
for corruption and other forms of illegitimate police conduct.
Focusing on central dimensions
of contemporary U.S.-Mexican police relations, I specify a sociological
model of the internationalization of social control that relates international
policing to a two-fold development of globalization and bureaucracy. I
will argue, in relation to globalization, that international police duties
are mostly conceived as explicit components of the national function of
police to enforce the ‘laws of the land.’ This dominance of national
concerns places police from Mexico in a secondary and dependent role relative
to U.S. law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, I maintain that international
police practices are driven by organizational developments related to a
process of bureaucratization.
The empirical focus of my
research is on selected efforts from U.S. federal law enforcement agencies
that involve cooperation with Mexican police or transnational work with
implications for Mexico. My analysis relies extensively on primary data
collected from a variety of sources, including internet websites from various
police agencies (see References and Website Sources), congressional testimonies
by police and government officials, and newspaper sources that were retrieved
through the computerized database of Lexis-Nexis (see Lexis-Nexis website).
I will argue that nationally
determined international police work will remain a steady factor in the
future. This pertains particularly to the ‘Americanization’ of,
and U.S. dominance in, police relations with Mexico. Furthermore, the potential
for police to emphasize crime control without sufficient regard for issues
of justice I consider a consequence of the fact that police agencies operate
independently from political and legal supervision. From the viewpoint
of the United States, it is important that what is practiced abroad may
also have intra-national implications. The direction of these domestic
implications, however, is uncertain for it could lead to strengthen law
enforcement in the United States at the expense of constitutional safeguards,
or further polarize the differences between domestic policing and law enforcement
abroad. This paper offers materials that may contribute to answer these
questions.
INTERNATIONAL POLICING
AS GLOBAL BUREAUCRACY
The sociological study of
police practices across the boundaries of national jurisdictions raises
at least two critical questions.
First, how does the globalization
of the police function relate to national police tasks?
Second, what are the causal
and contextual determinants of international policing?
Briefly stated, my theoretical
model holds that national interests and dynamics in the bureaucratic development
of police agencies shape the internationalization of the police function.
The primacy of national interests in international police work relates
to the fact that police institutions are representative of the state monopoly
of force. The bureaucratization of policing is shaped by evolutions in
the professionalization of police in terms of means and objectives.
The Nationality of International
Police
Among the conceptual concerns
in the globalization literature relevant for the present examination are
the following two questions:
First of all, the relationship
between international and national developments is theoretically complex,
entailing the question whether internationalization and nationalization
are opposing trends that involve conflict (Ruggie 1993) or whether they
complement one another in more or less harmonious fashion (Amin 1997).
Second, globalization is a very
broad concept covering a variety of processes, often associated with controversial
normative implications (Kettner 1997).
These two themes are also
central to research on the globalization of police, which has addressed
issues of sovereignty (Fijnaut 1993; Fijnaut and Marx 1995) and has particularly
centered on the international mechanisms of police as they affect, and/or
are influenced by, national police developments (e.g., Herbert 1999; Röhl
and Magen 1996; Zagaris 1996a,b).
In relation to these theoretical
insights, I conceive of globalization as referring to structures and processes
of empirical interdependence between geographically dispersed social units,
especially national states and their institutions, that can have different
kinds of implications depending on socio-historical conditions. I will
defend the viewpoint that international policing efforts are typically
maintained as collaborative networks between national police systems, each
of which independently also engage in unilaterally instigated international
activities. These internal and external dimensions, I argue, exist side
by side as two related manifestations of the state-controlled monopoly
of force. Therefore, international police activities typically do not conflict
with national tasks, because international work is conceived as one dimension
of the primary function of police in the state’s internal means of coercion.
Bureaucratization and
International Policing
Relying on the sociology
of Max Weber (1922), I conceive of public police agencies as bureaucracies
that are sanctioned by states with the task of order maintenance and crime
control. Bureaucracies, I argue with Weber, have a tendency towards independence
from their political centers on the basis of acquired knowledge and expertise
(Deflem 2000). Such institutional independence police institutions can
particularly achieve because and when they rely on a purposive-rational
model to employ the technically most efficient means given certain goals
(professional expertise) and, additionally, develop specialized systems
of knowledge (official information) about certain crimes, which can be
presented as particularly threatening to public safety (e.g., the war on
drugs as a response to the devastation caused by drug addiction, or border
control in response to a massive influx of aliens). While police institutions
are by necessity always an agency of power related to state control, the
behavior of police, within and across nations, is not wholly determined
by the ideological dictates of their governments. Arguing against political
or state-centered perspectives that view police and police as extensions
of government power (e.g., Busch 1995; Huggins 1998), my theoretical model
instead suggests that international police practices cannot be explained
in terms of political (nor economic) conditions, but are influenced by
organizational developments related to a process of bureaucratization.
Relying on the fact that
bureaucracies can define their own field of operations, international police
work is typically justified on the basis of the definitional powers of
police to bring out the centrality of international crimes, such as illegal
migration, smuggling and other border disputes, and the international trade
in illegal drugs. Police agencies can authoritatively define these international
crime problems because of specialized knowledge about and expertise to
control international criminal activities. Also, because international
police activities are often motivated by a very strong concern for efficiency
in crime control, they can fall short in terms of requirements of due process.
In the context of U.S.-Mexican policing, this process particularly involves
heightened pressures on U.S. police agencies to ‘get the job done’ no matter
the normative and legal concerns, and it confronts Mexican police agencies
with the opportunities in their country to participate in, or at least
condone, the drug world in a more or less active sense.
THE STRUCTURES OF U.S.-MEXICAN
POLICING
Obviously, this paper cannot
analyze all agencies, practices, and problems involved with U.S.-Mexican
policing. While necessarily selective, however, I will focus on those dimensions
that have recently been most significant in the context of U.S.-Mexican
policing and that have even managed to influence the political relationships
between the two countries. The emphasis is therefore on aspects of U.S.-Mexico
border control and the enforcement of drug violations and related crimes
over the past decade.
The Players: U.S. and
Mexican Federal Law Enforcement
It may be useful to say a
few words about the main agencies involved with U.S.-Mexican police activities.
Because law enforcement in both the United States and Mexico is the responsibility
of federal as well as local (state and municipal) levels of government,
there are a huge number of police agencies involved with border control
and other international police tasks. The most crucial agencies involved
are certain federal police and administrative institutions (Table 1).
Table 1: Major Agencies
in U.S.-Mexican Police Relations
| Agency
United States:
Office of National Drug
Control Policy
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Drug Enforcement Administration
U.S. Border Control
Mexico:
Mexican Federal Judicial
Police
Office for Crimes Against
Health |
Type
Administration
Investigation
Law Enforcement
Law Enforcement
Law Enforcement
Law Enforcement |
Primary Function
Drugs Policy
Federal Crimes
Drug Crimes
Border Crimes
Federal Crimes
Drug Crimes |
In the United States,
the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) takes in an important
administrative position to guide and control much of the international
activities U.S. law enforcement agencies are engaged in. The ONDCP is set
up within the U.S. Presidency to organize policies, priorities, and objectives
for national drug control programs. The ONDCP establishes the National
Drug Control Strategy to direct U.S. anti-drug efforts and establishes
a program, a budget, and guidelines for cooperation among federal, state,
and local agencies. The Director of ONDCP, the so-called ‘drug czar’ (until
recently Barry McCaffrey), also evaluates and oversees the international
and domestic anti-drug efforts of executive branch agencies. Also, unlike
the authorities of many other countries, the ONDCP collaborates with the
United Nations Drug Control Program under the leadership of Pino Arlacchi.
Among the most important
federal U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) in the U.S. Department of Justice has various international tasks,
among them the organization of international police training programs,
the implementation of police work abroad (through a system of legal attaches),
and the enforcement of federal crimes that are of an inherently international
crimes (drug trafficking, terrorism). The FBI cooperates with foreign police
in criminal investigations with an international character and can (as
can other U.S. federal agencies) assist with, though not actually participate
in, arrests on foreign soil.
The United States Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) is the primary U.S. agency for drug enforcement. The
DEA enforces drug laws at home, at the U.S. border and abroad, and is typically
responsible for representing the United States in international organizations
involved with drug control. The DEA’s Office of International Operations
centralizes all international work. The DEA has a foreign liaisons system
even more extensive than the FBI’s.
In Mexico, the Federal Judicial
Police is the national law enforcement agency which is primarily involved
in international police work (Deflem 2001). The Federal Judicial Police
enforces federal crimes, such as the drug trade, and it has liaison officers
posted with Mexican consulates. During the 1990s, most outstanding about
the force has been its extreme instability, in part because of political
upheavals, in part because of corruption among police and their involvement
in the drug trade, which this article later will discuss. These problematic
conditions have brought about massive layoffs and new professionalism initiatives,
including new training programs. Specialized anti-drug units have also
been created in Mexico (Deflem 2001; Zagaris 1996b). With the changing
pattern of drug trafficking since the late 1980’s (primarily a shift from
Columbia to Mexico as the main importer of drugs into the United States),
the Northern Border Response Force was set up in the Mexican Federal Judicial
Police in 1980. In 1993, a National Institute to Combat Drugs was established
by the Mexican government. However, in 1997 then Mexican President Ernesto
Zedillo found himself forced to abolish the Institute and replace it by
a new office, the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes Against Health,
in an effort to show Mexico’s concern to curb the production and flow of
drugs (see below).
The Strategies: Border
Control and Drug Enforcement
A Selective History
Throughout this paper, it
will be come clear that an analysis of U.S.-Mexican police relationships
cannot but start from a discussion of the police dimensions from the United
States viewpoint, with the consequence that Mexican involvement should
be treated secondarily. This situation of Mexican dependency on U.S. law
enforcement evidently harmonizes with political relations, but also has
a relatively independent police component with a long history (Deflem 1997,
2001; Nadelmann 1993). Historically, the difficult and at times hostile
relations between the United States and Mexico meant that police cooperation
governmental treaties between the two countries were never easily achieved.
Yet there have always been exceptions, especially when specific needs could
be identified in which both Mexico and the United States had a stake (e.g.,
the smuggling of alcohol). Generally, border control emerges as a key concern
in U.S.-Mexican police relationships and, more particularly, relates to
the control of smuggling, migration, and the drug trade. In most all these
case, relationships between the U.S. and Mexico are asymmetrical as the
relatively poor South is confronted with the relatively wealthy North.
With the expanding frontier,
of primary concern for U.S. law enforcement were the protection of the
United States’ shifting borders with the neighboring states, especially
Mexico (Nadelmann 1993). As early as 1845, following America’s annexation
of Texas, agents from the U.S. Customs Service were sent to the territory
to detect smugglers. Thereafter, a more organized group of customs agents,
so-called "mounted inspectors," were employed along the border. They were
later replaced by agents from the U.S. Immigration Service and, after 1924,
a special Immigration Border Patrol. Dependent on the political conditions
within Mexico and hampered by the country’s various periods of turmoil,
police collaboration and bilateral treaties between the USA and Mexico
were never easily achieved. In 1882, a bilateral treaty was signed which
allowed troops of both states to pursue fugitive bands of "savage Indians."
Border controls were also conducted in reaction to smuggling activities.
The U.S. Customs Service was created in 1789 in the Treasury department
to specifically target smuggling, through cooperation with foreign governments
and by stationing its own agents abroad (Deflem 2001).
The Current Context
Developments in recent decades
have altered the border situation from a law enforcement viewpoint, though
present activities build on prior practices. On the one hand, there is
a continuation of practices in matters of smuggling and immigration, whereby
the latter matter has increased in significance. The U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service is mainly responsible for administering and enforcing
the nation’s laws on immigration. Among the INS enforcement agencies are
Investigations and Inspections and Border Patrol. Investigations and Inspection
are primarily responsible for matters of criminal and illegal aliens, unauthorized
labor, and smuggling. U.S. Border Patrol has similar enforcement duties
but is more specifically oriented at police tasks close to the borders
with Canada and Mexico.
U.S. Military forces have
also joined in the enforcement of border and anti-drug crimes. All branches
of the United States military are involved, as anti-drug units are formed
in the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force. Joint task forces are
also set up, for instance, for anti-drug operations along the U.S.-Mexican
border (Defenselink website). The deployment of military units in the United
States has thereby brought about a redefinition of border control as a
military national security issue, rather than a civilian concern (Dunn
1996). In Mexico, a military involvement in law enforcement has also occurred,
but for different reasons. There, the military was held to be less corruptible
than civilian law enforcement. The results of this strategy, however, have
been less than clear, as I will discuss later in this paper.
Besides smuggling and migration,
the American war on drugs has been by far the most significant factor shaping
U.S.-Mexican police relationships. It evidently propelled the activities
of DEA and FBI in their partnership with Mexican law enforcement (which
I will center on in the remainder of this paper), but it is to be noted
that it also influenced the work of many other U.S. police agencies. For
example, the U.S. Customs Service in Southern California stepped up law
enforcement efforts against the flow of drugs from Mexico to the United
States. The U.S. Marshals Service is affected because among its duties
are the enforcement of terrorism and drug trafficking. The U.S. Coast Guard
is also involved in the fight against drugs, specifically the flow of drugs
over seas and waters under U.S. jurisdiction.
The Practices: The Centrality
of the U.S.-Mexico Border
The present practices of
U.S.-Mexican police issues provide for an extremely intricate web of plans
and policies, agencies and strategies, that defies simple classification.
I will attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of the most central aspects
of law enforcement between the U.S. and Mexico starting from the viewpoint
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, discussing other initiatives
secondarily to the coordinating policies of the Office. The ONDCP, indeed,
centralizes the various components of the U.S. drug policy, specifically
in the form of its National Drug Control Strategy, an annual report of
ongoing and newly instituted anti-drug policy and police efforts.
International Dimensions
of the National Drug Control Strategy
The recent editions of the
National Drug Control Strategy, published annually from 1998 to 2001, provide
ample evidence for the centrality of the U.S.-Mexico border to police matters
(ONDCP website). Whereas drugs were once primarily imported from the Far
East, the shift to cocaine has brought about a refocusing of attention
to South America and, more specifically, to Mexico, at least since the
shift of cocaine production and distribution with the relative disintegration
of the illegal drug market in Columbia. Though Columbia is still a focus
of concern for the ONDCP in its strategy to curb the flow of drugs, it
is clear that the once looser approach to Mexico’s involvement has during
the 1990s been abandoned (Deflem 2001).
The ONDCP specifies among
its goals, next to policies aimed at reduction of drug use within U.S.
borders, the shielding of America’s frontiers and the breaking of foreign
and domestic drug sources of supply. The 1999 National Drug Control Strategy
details three concrete policy efforts with international implications:
the reduction of drug supply;
the shielding of the U.S. borders;
and
the fostering of international
drug control cooperation.
In terms of the objective
of international demand reduction, the ONDCP includes the following five
strategies (see ONDCP website):
Build public and political support
in producing and transit countries for cooperation with U.S. in reducing
supply;
Strengthen will in the international
community for comprehensive anti-drug policies comparable to those in the
United States;
Increase understanding in key
countries and regions of their own drug consumption problems through better
epidemiological surveys and public awareness initiatives;
Educate the international community
about U.S. policies, programs, and successes in combating drug abuse;
Build effective multilateral
alliances to combat drug use.
The shielding of the U.S. borders
is central to American drug policy because most illegal drugs are not produced
in the United States. The borders (and ports of entry) are targeted by
a large number of agencies, including DEA, FBI, the Coast Guard, and the
Armed Forces, as well as certain private sector groups such as the Business
Anti-Smuggling Coalition. In total, 23 federal agencies and scores of state
and local governments are involved with border controls. To coordinate
these activities, the Justice and Treasury departments established the
Border Coordination Initiative (BCI) for the region of the Southwest Border
(see Map 1).
Map 1: The Southwest Border
and the Drug Trade
(source: DEA website)
The Border Coordination Initiative
was developed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the
U.S. Customs Service for increased cooperation on the Southwest Border
to enhance the interdiction of drugs, illegal aliens, and contraband. The
Southwest Border is the 2,000 mile-long border between the United States
and Mexico and is considered of primary importance in the flow of drugs
into the United States. Drug reduction efforts in the initiative are targeted
at the supply of drugs, including programs oriented at interdiction operations
—which attempt to control the flow of drugs by air, sea, and over land—
and the destruction of production sites. Table 2 provides an overview of
the many strategies that are set up as part of the Border Coordination
Initiative.
Table 2: The Border Coordination
Initiative: Framework of Strategies
(source: ONDCP website)
Port Management - streamlines
enforcement, traffic flow and community partnership at each Southwest Border
(SWB) Port of Entry (POE);
Investigations - provides
a unified strategy for SWB seizures that capitalizes on investigative enforcement
operations at and between POE’s;
Intelligence - multi-agency
intelligence teams; produce informational and actionable products on narcotics
and alien smuggling, money laundering and other border crime;
Technology - provides
for inter-agency coordination on use, implementation and development of
border enforcement technology;
Communications - development
of interoperable, mutually supportive, wireless communications through
joint user training, compatible systems and shared frequencies;
Aviation/Marine - coordination
of joint air/marine operations;
Integrity - identification
of joint training initiatives and policy development aimed at producing
uniform guidelines amongst SWB law enforcement personnel;
Performance Measurement
- systematic, scheduled and agreed upon evaluations of BCI’s effectiveness.
|
Anti-Drug Agreements
by the Organization of American States
The international drug control
cooperation efforts overseen by the ONDCP involve a comprehensive approach
to target "illegal drug cultivation, production, trafficking, abuse,
diversion of precursor chemicals, and the corrosive effects of the illegal
drug trade, including corruption, violence, environmental degradation,
undermining of democratic institutions, and economic distortion" (ONDCP
website). U.S. policies are tied in with multilateral initiatives, such
as those taken by the United Nations General Assembly and, more important
still, a series of anti-drug efforts agreed upon by the countries of the
American continent. For instance, the Organization of American States increased
multilateral cooperation after the First Summit of the Americas, held in
Miami in 1994. They later endorsed the 1995 Buenos Aires "Communiqué
on Money Laundering" and the "1996 Hemispheric Anti-Drug Strategy." Such
international agreements to coordinate the fight against drugs on the American
Continent have continued in the late 1990s. At the Second Summit of the
Americas in Santiago, Chile in April of 1998, 34 Presidents, including
then U.S. President Bill Clinton, agreed to create a new "Hemispheric Alliance
Against Drugs" (see Organization of American States websites; ONDCP website).
Little concrete information
is available about the actual implications of these international treaties
in terms of their effectiveness in anti-drug operations, but their objectives
provide for a specification of principles to enhance and ease international
cooperation in the fight against drugs. Given the emphasis in the international
agreements on anti-drug objectives without much detailed information on
projected and achieved effectiveness, the latest Alliance also specified
a ‘Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism,’ which functions as a system of performance
measurement in order to monitor the progress of national and international
efforts in the Hemisphere. The results of this initiative will be discussed
at the Third Summit of the Americas will be held in April 2001 in Quebec
City, Canada.
U.S.-Mexican Bilateral
Cooperation
Because of the shifts in
the illegal drug trade from Columbia to Mexico since the early 1990s, the
bilateral anti-drug efforts between the United States and Mexico agreed
upon at a series of conferences have acquired special significance within
the broader initiatives of American states. In fact, the bilateral agreements
between Mexico and the United States in the fight against drugs have become
a top priority for the governments of both countries (see Table 3). Most
critical among the many efforts in this bilateral relationship, the United
States and Mexico in 1998 finalized a comprehensive U.S.-Mexico Binational
Drug Strategy, which builds on the "United States-Mexico Binational Drug
Threat Assessment" and the "Declaration of U.S.-Mexico Alliance Against
Drugs" signed by Presidents Clinton and Zedillo in May 1997 on the occasion
of Clinton’s visit to Mexico. The Binational Drug Strategy involves, amongst
other things, commitments to focus police efforts against organized criminal
organizations, to negotiate conditions of extradition, to provide for training,
to enhance border control, and to exchange information between Mexico and
the U.S.
Table 3: U.S.-Mexican
Binational Drug Demand Reduction Conferences
(source: ONDCP website)
The first conference held in
1998, in El Paso, Texas, and attended by 350 participants, resulted in
proceedings and recommendations for future efforts to strengthen drug demand
reduction in both countries. That same year, the United States/Mexico Bi-National
Drug Strategy was developed under the leadership of the US/Mexico High
Level Contact Group.
Alliance Point One of the Strategy,
to
Reduce the demand for illicit drugs through the intensification of
anti-drug information and educational efforts, particularly those directed
at young people, and through rehabilitative programs, became a blueprint
for actions needed to implement the partnerships forged. In addition, both
governments identified measures (Performance Measures of Effectiveness
- or PMEs) by which to evaluate the effectiveness of those actions.
At the second conference held
in 1999, in Tijuana, Mexico, and attended by 350 participants, conferees
reviewed the PMEs for Alliance Point One (including results obtained from
bi-national demand reduction activities, meetings, and border demand reduction
initiatives), identifying progress made and new actions needed. Both governments
worked together to integrate recommendations obtained into the Alliance
Point One PMEs. Both countries signed a joint declaration in 1999.
A third Bi-National Drug Demand
Reduction Conference was held on May 31- June 2, 2000 in Phoenix, Arizona.
Four hundred and twenty people attended this event which continued to feature
professional development skills seminars, a bi-national research symposium
linking the public health and public safety, extensive training on treatment
methods, prevention strategies, youth coalitions, and dissemination of
materials. The conference strengthened a sustainable mechanisms for future
bi-national collaboration.
Mexico has agreed to host a
fourth conference in 2001.
|
The High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program
The centrality of the US.-Mexico
border is further accentuated when we look at the so-called ‘High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Areas’ (HIDTA). These Areas have been designated by the
Director of the ONDCP pursuant the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to improve
law enforcement coordination against drugs. HIDTAs are regions that are
held to face particularly critical drug trafficking problems and need special
strategies of law enforcement. HIDTA designation allows for the temporary
reassignment of federal personnel. Each Area has an executive committee
consisting of representatives from local/state and federal law enforcement
agencies. By 1999, 28 HIDTA regions were established across the United
States, each comprised of specific designated counties based on the drug
threat in that area (see Table 4).
Table 4: High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Areas By Year, 1990-1999
(source: ONDCP website)
1990: Houston, Los Angeles,
New York/New Jersey, South Florida, and the Southwest Border (California,
Arizona, New Mexico, West Texas, and South Texas);
1994: Washington/Baltimore and
Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands;
1995: Atlanta, Chicago, and
Philadelphia/Camden;
1996: Rocky Mountain (Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming), Gulf Coast (Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi), Lake
County (Indiana), Midwest (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota,
and South Dakota), and Northwest (Washington);
1997: Southeast Michigan and
Northern California;
1998: Appalachia (Kentucky,
Tennessee, and West Virginia), Central Florida, Milwaukee and North Texas;
and
1999: Central Valley (California),
Hawaii, New England (Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Vermont), Ohio, and Oregon
|
At the federal level, the
HIDTA Coordination Committee centralizes policy recommendations to the
Areas, while a HIDTA Assistance Center in Miami, Florida, is in charge
of training, logistic, and financial support. During fiscal year 1998,
the Center was responsible for providing more than 200 training programs
to over 5,000 federal, state and local agents and officers. Resources provided
to the HIDTA Program have grown from $25 million in fiscal year 1990 to
nearly $192 million in 2000. In 2000, the HIDTA program coordinated the
efforts of no less than 949 local, 172 state, and 35 federal law enforcement
agencies as well as 86 other organizations, covering 292 counties in 40
states and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
(ONDCP website). Next to federal U.S. police agencies from the departments
of the Treasury (e.g., Customs Service), Justice (e.g., FBI, DEA), and
Transportation (e.g., Coast Guard), the departments of State and Defense
are also involved in the HIDTAs. The Department of State has a policy-oriented
role in fostering cooperation with Mexico, while the Department of Defense
has a leading role in the detection and monitoring of the aerial and maritime
transit of illegal drugs.
Map 2: High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Areas, 1990
(source: DEA website)
From its inception in 1990,
one HIDTA that clearly stood out among all others has been the Southwest
Border HIDTA, the only Area that is not localized in one city but covers
the entire U.S.-Mexican border. Of all HIDTA’s, the Southwest Border is
clearly the most expensive to maintain, with a budget of nearly 25% ($46
million) of the total budget for all HIDTA programs. The Southwest Border
HIDTA consists of five partnerships —the California Border Alliance Group,
the Arizona Alliance Planning Committee, the New Mexico Partnership, the
West Texas Partnership, and the South Texas partnership, all together covering
41 counties and five federal judicial districts in the states of California,
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The Southwest Border HIDTA provides for:
an operational intelligence
center for the collection and dissemination of information on drug trafficking
organizations;
organization of a Southwest
Border Unit for intelligence support; and
establishment of the Southwest
Border HIDTA Management and Coordination in order to harmonize the activities
of all participating agencies.
The complexity of the five partnerships
of the Southwest Border cannot be underestimated. The California Border
Alliance Group, for instance, had in operation some sixteen different law
enforcement strategies in the year 1998, including a Customs Intelligence
Group, a Marine Task Force, and a San Diego Violent Crime Task Force. Participating
in the California group are some seventeen local police departments from
various municipalities, five state agencies, and 14 federal police agencies
(Table 5).
Table 5: Agencies Participating
in the California Border Alliance Group
(source: ONDCP website)
Federal: Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Internal
Revenue Service, United States Attorney’s Office, United States Border
Patrol, United States Bureau of Land Management, United States Coast Guard,
United States Customs Service, United States Forest Service, United States
Marshals Service, United States Postal Inspection Service, United States
Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense
Joint Task Force Six
State: California
Attorney General’s Office, California Department of Justice-Bureau of Narcotic
Enforcement, California Department of Corrections, California Highway Patrol,
California National Guard
Local: Calipatria
Police Department, Brawley Police Department, Calexico Police Department,
Carlsbad Police Department, Chula Vista Police Department, Coronado Police
Department, El Centro Police Department, El Monte Police Department, Escondido
Police Department, Holtville Police Department, Imperial County District
Attorney’s Office, Imperial County Sheriff’s Office, Imperial County Fire
Department, National City Police Department, Oceanside Police Department,
San Diego Police Department, San Diego District Attorney’s Office, San
Diego County Sheriff’s Department, San Diego County Probation Dept, San
Diego Harbor Police Department, Westmoreland Police Department.
|
The agencies in
the California Border Alliance Group take care of four primary goals:
intelligence,
interdiction,
investigation, and
prosecution.
Separate task forces are established
for interdiction (three forces) and investigation (seven forces). The other
four partnerships of the Southwest Border have likewise complicated structures
marked by multi-agency involvement.
In total there are no less
than nine federal coordinating mechanisms that concern the Southwest Border
region, among them the High Level Contact Group, chaired by the Director
of the ONDCP to coordinate anti-drug efforts; the Interdiction Committee,
which groups a variety of federal agencies; the Attorney General’s Executive
Committee, which specifically targets the fight against drug-related border
crime; and the Bilateral Working Group, which establishes military-to-military
anti-drug cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico.
A brief look at the major
federal agencies involved in the Southwest Border HIDTA will further bring
out the centrality of the region to U.S.-Mexican policing. The FBI has
a relatively minor role, mainly providing support for cooperative law enforcement
efforts with Mexico. The DEA is the Department of Justice’s main representative
at the border, in charge of intelligence and investigative matters. In
1996, DEA efforts along the Southwest border were responsible for more
than 4,000 cases and over 5,000 arrests. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) oversees some of the most visible strategies of border control.
The INS specifically focuses on a strengthening of border controls in places
were the number of crossers is large and existing controls are considered
weak. It also seeks to strengthen security in the major U.S. towns neighboring
the border.
The growth of the presence
of agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Southwest
Border is impressive. In 1995, some 4,500 INS agents were stationed at
the U.S.-Mexican border and an additional 400 were in training (Deflem
2001). By 1997, already more than 6,000 INS agents were at the southern
U.S. border as part of an estimated total of some 12,000 federal agents.
A year later, the Office of National Drug Control Policy announced plans
to increase the total number of federal agents at the U.S.-Mexican border
to 22,000 (Christian Science Monitor 1998). And, indeed, among the most
recent developments has been the deployment of even more agents and added
surveillance technologies. In 1999, the number of Border Patrol agents
at the U.S. border with Mexico had climbed up to more than 7,000, and by
2001, the number was over 9,000 (Houston Chronicle 1999; Washington Post
2001).
As dramatic as the number
of agents is the equipment and technology employed. For instance, INS uses
a biometric identification system called IDENT that registers fingerprints
of alien criminals (i.e., hose who have a record in the United States or
have at sometime been removed from the U.S.). Canine inspection teams,
fences, electronic surveillance, and aircraft complement the technological
apparatus at the disposal of the INS. Among the surveillance tools are
X-ray technologies to inspect the contents of trucks and sensors that measure
seismic activity of people crossing the border.
Mexican International
Policing In Response
The Mexican involvement in
anti-drug and other border-related forms of international policing was
minimal, and affected by Mexico’s political and economic turmoils, until
the Presidency of Ernesto Zedillo. Whatever law enforcement action is taken
in Mexico, it has to be seen in intimate relation with U.S. developments
and pressures from United States law enforcement and government authorities.
In 1996, the Presidents of both countries formally committed to developing
joint anti-drug and other law enforcement cooperation and established the
U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group. It led to the development of the
already mentioned U.S.-Mexico Binational Drug Strategy, initiated after
Clinton’s visit to Mexico in May of 1997. It was just before Clinton’s
visit, in fact, that the Mexican government had decided to abolish the
National Institute to Combat Drugs, created just four years earlier, and
replace it, on April 30, 1997, by a newly formed Special Prosecutor’s Office
for Crimes Against Health. The replacement had been necessitated because
of the rampant corruption that pervaded the National Institute to Combat
Drugs. In December 1996, former army general Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo had
become the third person to head the Institute in as many years. However,
in February 1997, a most severe blow was dealt to the Institute when Rebollo
too was arrested for suspicion of involvement in the drug trade. Few weeks
later, Presidents Clinton and Zedillo signed the agreements that led to
the Binational Drug Strategy that provides for cooperation between Mexico
and the U.S. in matters of money laundering, arms trafficking, chemical
control, and drug demand reduction.
The new Special Prosecutor’s
Office for Crimes Against Health was at its creation headed by Mariano
Herran Salvatti, with headquarters in downtown Mexico City (Los Angeles
Times 1997). Agents who wish to join the Office have to undergo rigorous
testing and screening in a so-called vetting process and, in an attempt
to promote loyalty and professionalism, they receive higher salaries and
better medical and retirement benefits. Additionally, Mexico’s Attorney
General Jorge Madrazo Cuellar in 1997 also instituted a new Organized Crime
Unit, specialized in investigating and prosecuting criminal organizations,
especially those that are involved in drug trafficking and those that are
responsible for corrupting law enforcement personnel and people in other
important public offices. The Unit was formed as part of the Organized
Crime Law, passed in November of 1996, which expanded Mexican police powers
to allow for plea bargaining, the use of informants, a witness protection
program, and court-authorized electronic surveillance.
Further oriented at increasing
professionalism in Mexican law enforcement, President Ernesto Zedillo turned
to the military, putting army generals in top police positions and recruiting
soldiers into the ranks of agents involved in the war on drugs. In Mexico
City, for instance, some 3,000 soldiers were deployed in March 1997 to
direct traffic and walk the beat. The Mexican military involvement in anti-drug
operations is assisted by American military personnel. Relatedly, the U.S.
Department of Defense has established a training and equipment program
for military airmobile, rapid-reaction anti-drug efforts in Mexico. In
1997, some 1,500 Mexican military were expected to be trained by U.S. military
personnel under authority of the Department of Defense (ONDCP website).
Mexican Law Enforcement
and U.S. Certification
A next important phase in
enhancing Mexican police efforts was taken on the occasion of former U.S.
President Clinton’s second trip to Mexico in February 1999, just shortly
before the President decided on certification of foreign countries as partners
in the drug trade. Certification is an annual decision that involves declaring
that a country is cooperating fully with U.S. efforts against illegal drugs.
Certification is announced by the President but Congress has thirty days
time to overturn or let stand the decision. Countries that are decertified
face suspension of most U.S.-sponsored aid programs. In the past years,
there was much opposition from Congressional representatives against certifying
Mexico because of the country’s poor record in the fight against illicit
drugs. But former U.S. President Bill Clinton always decided to grant Mexico
certification during his tenure, and newly elected President George W.
Bush during his first year in office likewise certified Mexico as a full-fledged
partner in the war on drugs (San Diego Union-Tribune 2001b).
Although Mexican authorities
feel that the certification process is unfair —because it is only concerned
with (Mexican) drug supply, not (U.S.) drug demand— and unilateral (Cottam
and Marenin 1999), it seems no coincidence that just before certification
of Mexico was to be decided upon in the past couple of years, Mexican authorities
re-affirmed their role in the fight against the drug trade and committed
to multi-million dollar expenditures on police equipment and new technologies
(Boston Globe 1998; New York Times 1999a). In 1998, for example, then Mexican
President Ernesto Zedillo announced a new, $380 million crime-fighting
plan that included provision to professionalize law enforcement by removing
corrupt officers, coordinating inter-agency efforts, restructure police
training, and the creation of new police academies. A year later, new safeguards
were added to certification by specifying 82 benchmarks for determining
the success of joint U.S.-Mexican policing efforts alongside the 1,900
mile border. The benchmarks include a variety of indicators, such as extraditions,
drug seizures, and demand reduction on the U.S. side (Boston Globe 1999a).
Additionally, the Mexican government has newly established a Federal Preventive
Police, consisting of highly trained and well-paid uniformed agents in
charge of arresting suspects of drug-related crimes.
ISSUES IN U.S.-MEXICAN
POLICING: AMERICANIZATION AND CORRUPTION
The logistics involved with
policing the U.S.-Mexico border are considerable when we consider that
in 1998 alone, 278 million people, 86 million cars, and 4 million trucks
and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico (ONDCP website). But
the border poses more than practical problems. Its centrality for policing,
drugs, and many other policy concerns (among them, labor and environmental
issues) has led observers to view the border region in terms of its own
dynamics, as the fourth partner in NAFTA, next to the U.S., Canada and
Mexico (Brown 1997).
Two issues emerge as critical
from the present investigation:
First, in terms of globalization
and attained level of internationality, there is a clear persistence of
national characteristics and interests in U.S.-Mexican policing efforts,
even when they are planned and conducted in the form of bilateral collaboration
strategies.
Secondly, despite the fact that
U.S.-Mexican law enforcement and border control is heavily discussed at
the political level, the practice of international policing is largely
a matter autonomously designed and executed by specialized police bureaucracies
on the basis of knowledge and expertise.
The ‘Americanization’ of
U.S.-Mexican Policing
International police work
is typically engaged in as an extension of national police duties. In the
case of U.S.-Mexican policing this can be inferred from many aspects of
both the U.S. and the Mexican involvement. From the Mexican viewpoint,
consequences of drug enforcement cannot ignore the extent to which the
drug problem, including corruption and violence, has become an essential
part of Mexican social life and the extent to which Mexican law enforcement
has to respond to this problematic situation, particularly in terms of
the corruption that is held to pervade anti-drug law enforcement. Interestingly,
a report on "U.S.-Mexico Counterdrug Cooperation" by the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, devotes an entire section on anti-corruption measures
in Mexican law enforcement (see ONDCP website). It argues that the abolition
of the National Institute to Combat Drugs and the creation of the Special
Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health and the Organized Crime Unit were
steps explicitly taken to eliminate corruption in Mexican law enforcement.
Therefore, also, these two new agencies are to be staffed only with officers
who have passed through a vetting procedure which examines their background,
in terms of drug use, personal finances, and lifestyle, with the help of
a polygraph test. The vetting procedure, along with enhanced training,
premium pay, and ongoing integrity checks, are seen as measures to ensure
that anti-drug officers are free from corruption and competent to combat
the drug cartels. Additionally, since the bringing in of military personnel
in law enforcement positions, the Mexican Defense Secretariat has also
engaged in efforts to investigate corruption within the ranks of the armed
forces.
The results of these anti-corruption
measures are ambivalent. By the end of 1999, only 282 prospective employees
had passed the polygraph phase of the vetting process for the Office for
Crimes Against Health, although the agency is in need of some 2,000 agents
(ONDCP website). In consequence, Mexican anti-drug efforts have suffered
from a lack of personnel, infrastructure, and resources. Furthermore, by
the late 1990s, at least 34 senior army officers had been identified for
disciplinary action because of their alleged ties to the drug trade (New
York Times 1999a). The use of military personnel in anti-drug units, in
other words, has not been able to prevent corruption, but appears to have
mainly brought about a dispersion of corruption from law enforcement to
the military. Following the death of drug cartel leader Carrillo Fuentes
(who died in 1997 after excessive plastic surgery), a number of investigations
were initiated (New York Times 1998a). Thereupon, several Mexican military
officials have been arrested (by military authorities) and charged with
corruption-related offenses, such as allegations of accepting bribes from
the Carrillo Fuentes Organization (ONDCP website). In August 2000, two
military generals of considerable prestige were jailed on drug charges
(Los Angeles Times 2000).
Furthermore, the violence
accompanying the illegal drug markets has taken on dramatic proportions.
An estimated 200 Mexican police agents were killed in fiscal year 1996
alone. In 1999, a devastating, if unsuccessful strike was launched on the
Mexican fight against the drug cartels when Mariano Salvatti, the head
of the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes Against Health, was shot
at when he and his wife were riding in a car in Mexico City (New York Times
1999b). The extent of corruption and related violent activities associated
with the drug trade and organized crime is so widespread in Mexican public
life that the country has been labeled a "narcodemocracy" (Law Enforcement
News 1997), indicating how ingrained the drug trade and its repercussions
are across all levels of Mexican government and in many aspects of Mexican
social life. Empirical accuracy aside, important is that U.S. drug enforcement
officials continually repeat that corruption pervades Mexican law enforcement
units from top to bottom (Boston Globe 1999b; New York Times 1998a). Corruption
is typically seen as affecting Mexican officials more than U.S. law enforcement
officers, although the latter may at least have a part in the problem in
not being able to prevent the spread of corruption. In 1998, for instance,
it was discovered that top investigators of an elite U.S.-trained Mexican
police unit had ties with drug traffickers (New York Times 1998b).
Further hampering U.S.-Mexican
police collaboration is the lack of effective enforcement which U.S. officials
accuse its Mexican counterparts of (Cottam and Marenin 1999). Specifically
lamented are the refusals of Mexican authorities to hand over suspected
Mexican nationals and to let DEA agents carry guns on Mexican soil (see
"International Narcotics Control Strategy Report," Washington, DC, February
26, 1999, U.S. Department of State website). Although the United States
and Mexico have signed extradition treaties since as early as 1861 —with
the present agreement in effect since 1979— there have been only relatively
few extraditions from Mexico to the United States since. According to a
recent report from the U.S. drug czar’s office ("Main Results of the Mexico-U.S.
Bi-national Cooperation Against Illicit Drugs, 1995-2000, see ONDCP website),
Mexico had extradited only 8 people in the period between 1980 and 1994.
Since 1995, there was a considerable increase, with a total of 61 people
extradited to the United States. Among them were 11 Mexican nationals.
But what the report fails to mention is that it was not until 1999 that
the first extradition was approved of a Mexican national, Jesus Amezcua,
accused of being a leader in the drug trade (Los Angeles Times 1999).
The low number of drug seizures
by Mexican police in Mexico, moreover, has also been a source of critique
(New York Times 1999a). While Mexican officials regret the implication
that Mexico would be a country rampant with violence and corruption, it
is striking that Mexican authorities often do respond to American criticisms,
by setting up new agencies, expanding existing forces, and soliciting help
from U.S. law enforcement. Indicative, for example, are the law enforcement
changes Mexican authorities implement at politically critical times (before
certification, before a Presidential visit). The form and direction of
instituted changes also harmonizes with U.S. requests and conceptions.
The Organized Crime Law of 1996, for example, legalizes methods and principles
of law enforcement that are clearly part and parcel of U.S. law enforcement
traditions (police informants, witness protection, electronic surveillance).
Thus, in the ‘bilateral’
partnership between the United States and Mexico, U.S. forces clearly have
the upper-hand. It is evidently the very fact that both partners formally
recognize their equality that the factual differences between them are
revealed and maintained. The Binational Drug Control Strategy explicitly
states that anti-drug programs are intended to uphold "principles of sovereignty,
mutual respect, territorial integrity, and nonintervention" (ONDCP website).
The differential consequences for law enforcement are all too clear. Relying
on a multitude of factors indicating relative strength (personnel, equipment,
available technology, and technical know-how) United States law enforcement
agencies are the dominant players in every instituted bilateral initiative
with Mexico, even leading to control of the organization of Mexican policing
through training and logistic support.
In terms of dimensions of
globalization, then, I argue that international police work, as in the
case of U.S.-Mexican policing, reaffirms national police institutions as
the key players in the international arena. Most critically, developments
pertaining to the drug trade affect many different countries on a world-wide
scale, but at the same time it is clear that national police systems are
differently influenced by, and variously react to, these global processes.
International police work should therefore be conceived not as police practices
that involve police from more than one nation but as one dimension of the
tasks and operational field of national police agencies in which they engage
in addition to intra-national duties. As such, it is not only useful to
discuss the domestic consequences of global processes, but it is also impossible
to analyze global processes without bringing out the domestic inputs from,
and outcomes for, the various localities that are involved in international
life.
The Higher Amorality of
International Police Work
Besides the fact that the
U.S. war on drugs seems to have had little or no effect on the availability
of drugs and has mostly displaced the problem, the strategy itself may
be more harmful than beneficial and contribute to the organization of illegal
enterprises that violently take control of the market (Gardner 1993). This
may have produced ironic effects, similar to the counterproductive consequences
of U.S. immigration policies (Andreas 1994, 2000; Binder, Polinard and
Wrinkle 1997).
Furthermore, police coordination
problems occur, first of all, between the various American police agencies.
Federal, state, and municipal forces fight over jurisdictional competence,
leading to inter-agency conflicts that hamper law enforcement efficiency
(Carter 1978). At the level of international cooperation, distrust between
American law enforcement officers and police of Mexico and other nations
are particularly troublesome. American accusations of a lack of professionalism
and widespread corruption in the Mexican police have been grounds to give
up on collaborative efforts altogether and instead engage in unilateral
cross-border police operations. DEA officials, in particular, have been
very critical about Mexican police performance and they oftentimes do not
seek to engage in collaboration with foreign police at all. In 1998, for
instance, it was discovered that a U.S. undercover operation had earlier
that year been conducted in Mexico without knowledge of the Mexican authorities
(USA Today 1999).
Unilaterally enacted police
operations are one dimension of the relative autonomy of police agencies
in planning and instigating operations. Additionally, there is an important
emphasis on efficiency of police work, irrespective of legality and justice.
It is also for this reason that border controls may have contributed to
accelerate the level of violence in the border region. Almost not a day
goes by without a report on drug-related violent activities in the border
region. And the INS and other federal U.S. police are once again accused
of an excessive use of force and other violations of human rights (Holmes
1998; Martinez 1994; Nunez 1992; Dunn 1996:85-90). Relatedly, serious concerns
are also expressed over the heavy reliance on technology and the military
involvement in border control operations (Dunn 1996).
The following facts and figures
can bring out some of the more spectacular and tragic implications of the
one-dimensional purposive-rational considerations that determine U.S. police
efforts at the border with Mexico (Houston Chronicle 1999; San Diego Union-Tribune,
1999b; 2001a; Washington Post 2001):
In 1999, there were 7,357 Border
Patrol agents stationed at the U.S.-Mexico border, compared to only 289
agents at the border with Canada. In April 1999, Border Patrol decided
to add another 1,000 agents at the border with Mexico, and by early 200,
the number had gone up to 9,335.
In 1998, a total of 1,555,776
people were apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border. In 2000, some 1.6 million
arrests were made. From January to March of 1999, the Arizona Border Patrol
alone was responsible for 200,000 apprehensions, mostly of illegal immigrants.
In the San Diego area, some 475,000 apprehensions are made annually (based
on 1994 and 1998 numbers).
Between 1994 and 1998, the death
toll of people attempting to cross the border rose 600% to a total of 145
casualties. In the year 2000, immigrant deaths on the U.S. side of the
border had risen from 231 in 1999 to 369, according to the INS. Other estimates
are even higher. The Mexican Foreign Ministry, which records deaths on
both sides of the border, said 499 border crossers died in 2000 and 358
in 1999.
Relative to the autonomously
conducted and efficiency-driven police practices, enacted and planned regulations
of formal law in terms of the drug trade, money laundering, organized crime,
and extradition appear very ineffective (see Spector 1998; Zagaris and
Peralta 1997). Also, compliance with the anti-drug Alliance agreements
signed by the Organization of American States is at present very uncertain.
Even the Office of National Drug Control Policy admits that many participating
nations simply do not have an adequate system to collect adequate statistics
on drug use, production, arrests, and drug trafficking. In addition, the
data that various nations collect are based on different methodologies,
thus preventing useful comparisons and the sharing of information (ONDCP
website).
Likewise, the U.S. certification
procedure appears as a mere political sugarcoating of a law enforcement
dimension that presents a very different reality. Beyond its symbolic importance
(which is not to be underestimated), certification is an annual "diplomatic
rite of spring" that does not have many practical consequences for police
work and U.S.-Mexican cooperation
(San Diego Union-Tribune
1999). Also, the flow of drugs is not affected as an estimated $30 billion
worth of drugs are annually smuggled from Mexico to the U.S. for an estimated
60% of all illicit drugs in the United States (Ibidem). Not only do Mexican
authorities feel that certification is a unilateral process, it may well
also imply that U.S. authorities can claim success and effectiveness in
the war on drugs simply by declaring that Mexico is fully cooperating even
when cooperation is far from ideal (Houston Chronicle 2001; Los Angeles
Times 1999). As Mexican authorities feel that certification is unfair,
because it blames only Mexican involvement in the drug supply while not
addressing the drug demand from the United States, the procedure may actually
be counter-productive and contribute to a lack of cooperation from Mexican
authorities. More than anything else, certification is a political decision
made for political-symbolic purposes related to national interests, foreign
policy and diplomacy. In that sense it can be no coincidence that newly
elected U.S. President George W. Bush just few months after having been
inaugurated into office, in March 2001, certified Mexico as a full-fledged
partner in the war on drugs, despite continuing criticisms from members
of U.S. Congress as well as Mexican government officials (San Diego Union-Tribune
2001b).
My perspective of bringing
out the specific dimensions of U.S.-Mexican law enforcement underscores
the Weberian model of bureaucracy that conceives of law enforcement institutions
as relatively autonomous in setting their own agendas on the basis of acquired
knowledge and expertise. As I have argued elsewhere (Deflem 2000:771),
this does not mean that police institutions can successfully remove themselves
from concerns over legality and rights, but, on the contrary, that they
are subject to evaluations in normative terms precisely because of their
primary reliance on efficiency standards. Internationally oriented policing
is guided by expert conceptions of cross-border crime and its enforcement.
And it is as a consequence of these conceptions of international crime
that police institutions in practice apply a notion of efficiency in their
work with no or little regard for issues of legality, due process and justice.
CONCLUSIONS
Revealing the many differences
in the reality of international policing for Mexican and U.S. law enforcement,
this analysis corroborates the viewpoint that global events have differential
effects on the institutions of different nations. The influence of national
concerns in international law enforcement initiatives is particularly manifested
when considering U.S. involvement relative to Mexican international police
work. Furthermore, analysis shows that the political conditions of foreign
policy and international diplomacy do not explain the dynamics of U.S.-Mexican
police work. Among the most important implications is that cooperation
between Mexican and U.S. police can be hampered (or not) regardless of
political and legal decision-making.
Speculating towards the future,
I suspect that the Americanization of, and U.S. dominance in, police relations
with Mexico (as with many other countries) will remain a constant factor
of international police work. This persistence of nationality puts American
law enforcement at a clear advantage relative to other police institutions
in the world in bilateral and multilateral arrangements. It may additionally
imply that cross-border policing plans unilaterally instituted by U.S.
law enforcement agencies may be preferred, particularly inasmuch and when
police of other nations would show resistance against U.S. dominance. In
this global constellation, Mexican and other national systems of law enforcement
cannot but find themselves in a position of dependency on their U.S. counterparts.
Furthermore, with largely inconsequential methods of political and legal
control, police agencies will remain independent and continue to stress
efficient means to control crime with less regard for legality and rights.
Without effectively implemented principles of democratic oversight in place,
requirements of due process will not be considered primary in any respects
and legal guarantees of protective rights will amount to nothing but legalistic
fluff.
It is too hard to predict
exactly how the suggested developments will affect law enforcement, in
general, and police corruptibility, more specifically, within the borders
of their respective jurisdiction. The reason is that a hardening of law
enforcement can lead to a dispersion —i.e., a spreading of law enforcement
strategies from one (international) area to another (domestic scene)— but
it could also lead to a polarization of differences between styles of domestic
policing and law enforcement abroad and in border regions. At present,
implications of U.S.-Mexican policing in terms of corruption, violence,
and effectiveness in combating the drug trade are without a doubt extremely
problematic.
This article has no doubt
been better at raising questions about U.S.-Mexican police relations than
at providing clear-cut answers about precise questions on specific dimensions
of this complicated issue. Indeed, further research would need to be done
to provide better insights in at least two respects. First, research should
carefully delineate the many aspects involved in U.S.-Mexican police relations
in terms of a variety of criteria, such as scope and objectives. As the
world of international policing is build around the law enforcement organizations
of different nations that may differ greatly in terms of culture, history,
and other aspects of social life, research questions should be tailored
to uncover and account for the influence of these distinct realities. What
may be an appropriate research question about U.S. law enforcement cannot
necessarily be asked in the same way about Mexican police. Collaborative
research among scholars of different nations could be an appropriate way
to address these concerns.
Second, this paper has mainly
focused on the organizational dimensions of U.S.-Mexican policing in terms
of stated objectives, desired goals, and explicit motives in the building
of an infrastructure of international policing. Also because of methodological
limitations, this article could provide only little systematic information
about the concrete implications of international police strategies in terms
of actual operations in the field. Methods aimed at approaching law enforcement
conduct on a more practical basis are needed to further penetrate and unravel
the everyday reality of international police work. As globalization research
in the area of policing is clearly on the rise, the task may not be impossible.
THE MOST CRITICAL UNRESOLVED
ISSUE ASSOCIATED WITH CONTEMPORARY POLICE CORRUPTION IN THE US-MEXICAN
CONTEXT
Since the Spring of 2001,
when this paper was originally written, issues of corruption involved with
U.S.-Mexican police relations have undergone changes because of two developments.
On the one hand, more radical efforts have been made to curb police corruption
and appear to have met with some level of success. Yet, on the other hand,
because of the impact that has been felt among police agencies in many
other parts of the world following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
anti-corruption measures may not necessarily continue to receive due attention
in the near future.
In most recent years, Mexican
authorities have engaged in more concrete efforts to fight corruption among
police. In January 2003, The Houston Chronicle newspaper reported that
the government of Mexican President Vicente Fox stepped up its campaign
to root out the corruption among police that in the past has so often undermined
the fight against drug trafficking (“Mexico Determined to Root Out Corruption
in Drug War,” The Houston Chronicle, January 26, 2003). Most clearly, the
Mexican administration has very openly exposed corrupt police officers
who were found to be aiding the trade in illegal drugs. Also, the Mexican
Attorney General has announced the formation of an agency specifically
charged with fighting corrupt practices in anti-narcotics operations. Special
evaluation and qualification criteria have been introduced to ensure reliability
among anti-drug police.
There are indications that
this renewed attempt among Mexican authorities to fight corruption is more
than merely reminiscent of previous such attempts, which were often far
from successful. One indication of this is that U.S. police representatives
are more optimistic about Mexico’s anti-corruption measures. For instance,
a spokesman for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration recently said
Mexico’s anti-corruption efforts are more serious than ever before. U.S.
officials have also stated that recent attempts by the Mexican government
to fight corruption among the country’s elite police forces have been successful.
The U.S. federal government seems to share this optimistic attitude, as
Mexico was in 2003 exempted from its annual drug certification process.
The Mexican Attorney General’s
office has indeed conducted various investigations of corruption among
police forces and instigated trials. In November 2002, two Mexican generals
were court-martialed on drug trafficking charges and sentenced to lengthy
prison terms. Since then, attention has turned to police and to the specialized
agency of the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Drug Crimes. In January 2003,
for instance, Mexican military troops and police raided federal anti-drug
offices in 11 of Mexico’s 31 states. Following these actions, U.S. officials
have reported that such efforts on the part of Mexican authorities have
persuaded U.S. police agents to cooperate more closely with their Mexican
counterparts. However, some problems remain, mostly because not all officials
engaged in the war on drugs are optimistic about the level of trustworthiness
among their colleagues. Also, analysts point out that whatever is said
and done in the war on drugs, the key problem remains that the war is being
lost.
Another issue that will determine
the shape of corruption issues in U.S.-Mexican police relations relates
to the radical shift to counter-terrorism among police organizations across
the world since September 11. Because of these reorganizations, there is
a considerable danger for police, not only of turning attention unduly
away from the enforcement of other criminal activities, but also of added
pressures being placed on police from terrorist-related organizations and
individuals seeking to corrupt officials. At present it remains uncertain
how these issues will play out in the future, but an increased risk of
corruption cannot be readily dismissed.
RESOURCES FOR
RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL POLICING
The field of international
policing remains a somewhat under-researched domain in the social-scientific
police literature, as most police research continues to focus on local
and intra-national developments. Yet, in wake of a generally increased
attention to globalization, research on policing too has taken on an international
focus to ponder on the interdependencies between and across national states
in matters of law enforcement and crime control. I provide some interesting
resources which, together with the bibliographical references relied upon
in this article, readers may find helpful for their research.
Organizations
Academy of Criminal Justice
Sciences
1500 North Beauregard Street,
Suite 101, Alexandria, VA 22311, USA, phone: (703) 379-2090, 1 (800) 757-ACJS,
fax: 1 (703) 379-8867, email: lmonaco@acjs.org, website: http://www.acjs.org
The Academy of Criminal Justice
Sciences is an international organization established in 1963 to foster
professional and scholarly activities in the field of criminal justice.
ACJS currently has a large number of active members that continue to meet
the organization’s objectives of advancing the knowledge base in the fields
of criminal justice education, research, and policy analysis. The Academy
also has an International Section.
American Society of Criminology
1314 Kinnear Road, Columbus,
Ohio 43212-1156, USA, phone: 1 (614) 292-9207, fax: 1 (614) 292-6767, website:
http://www.asc41.com/
The American Society of Criminology
is an international organization concerned with criminology, embracing
scholarly, scientific, and professional knowledge concerning the etiology,
prevention, control and treatment of crime and delinquency.
American Sociological Association
1307 New York Avenue, NW,
Suite 700, Washington, DC 20005, USA, phone: 1 (202) 383-9005, fax: 1 (202)
638-0882, website: http://www.asanet.org/
The American Sociological
Association is a non-profit membership association dedicated to advancing
sociology as a scientific discipline and profession serving the public
good. With approximately 13,000 members, ASA encompasses sociologists who
are faculty members at colleges and universities, researchers, practitioners,
and students. The ASA houses sections with various specialty interests
that have their own websites. Among them are:
Comparative and Historical
Sociology section website: http://www.sla.purdue.edu/academic/soc/comphist/
Sociology of Law section
website: http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/soc_anthro/soclaw/
Law and Society Association
205 Hampshire House, University
of Massachusetts, 131 County Circle, Amherst, MA 01003-9257, USA, phone:
(413) 545-4617, fax: (413) 545-1640, website: http://www.lawandsociety.org/
The Law and Society Association
is an organization that groups scholars from many fields and countries,
interested in the place of law in social, political, economic, and cultural
life. Members bring training in law, sociology, political science, psychology,
anthropology, economics, and history as well as in other related areas.
Journals
Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies
Indiana University School
of Law-Bloomington, 211 South Indiana Avenue, Bloomington, IN 47405-1001,
USA, phone: (812) 855-8717; fax: (812) 855-0555, website: http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/glsj.html
The Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies is a faculty-edited, peer-reviewed interdisciplinary journal
focusing on the intersections of global and domestic legal regimes, markets,
politics, technologies, and cultures. The journal is a forum for communication
and exchange among the many research agendas that now involve the concept
of globalization.
The International Criminal
Justice Review
Georgia State University,
P.O. Box 4018, Atlanta, GA 30302-4018, U.S.A., phone: 1 (404) 651-3660,
fax: 1 (404) 651-3658, email: icjr@gsu.edu, website:
http://www.gsu.edu/~wwwicj/
The Review is an academic
journal dedicated to presenting system-wide trends and problems on crime
and justice issues throughout the world. Articles may focus on a single
country or compare issues in two or more countries. Both qualitative and
quantitative pieces are encouraged, providing they adhere to standards
of quality scholarship. Manuscripts may emphasize either contemporary or
historical topics.
Police Practice & Research:
An International Journal
Managing Editor: Arvind
Verma, Department of Criminal Justice, Indiana University, Bloomington,
IN 47405, USA, email: averma@indiana.edu
Police Practice and Research
presents current and innovative police research as well as operational
and administrative practices from around the world. Articles and reports
come from practitioners, researchers and others interested in developments
in policing, analysis of public order, and the state of safety as it affects
the quality of life everywhere. Attention is also focused on specific organizational
information about the police in different countries or regions. Periodic
special issues are devoted to a particular country or continent.
Policing: An International
Journal of Police Strategy & Management
MCB University Press Ltd.,
60/62 Toller Lane Bradford, England BD8 9BY, phone: 44 (0)1274 777700,
fax: 44 (0)1274 785200, website: http://www.mcb.co.uk/pijpsm.htm
The journal Policing provides
expert discussion, analysis and strategies for those concerned with achieving
greater effectiveness in policing and law enforcement. With its comprehensive
coverage of cross-cultural and international issues and research, the journal
provides a truly global and comparative perspective on policing.
Policing and Society
James Sheptycki, Department
of Sociology, University of Durham, New Elvet, Durham, DH1 3JT, England,
phone: 44 (0)191 374 2311, fax: 44 (0)191 374 4743, email: james.sheptycki@durham.ac.uk,
website: http://www.gbhap.com/journals/381/381-top.htm
Policing and Society is concerned
with the activity of policing and the factors which affect it. A major
part of this material concerns formal police institutions but space is
also devoted to the relationship between what the police do and the policing
decisions and functions of community groups, private sector organizations
and other state agencies. The journal provides a genuinely international
forum and will have correspondents in most countries where there is a tradition
of research and academic inquiry into all aspects of policing.
International Agencies
Interpol
The International Criminal
Police Organization, General Secretariat, 200, quai Charles de Gaulle,
69006 Lyon, France, fax (33) 4 72 44 71 63, website: http://www.interpol.int/
Interpol is the oldest international
police organization. It aims to ensure and promote the widest possible
mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities, within the limits
of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also seeks to establish and develop
all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and
suppression of ordinary law crimes.
Europol
Raamweg 47, PO Box 90850,
NL-2509 LW The Hague, The Netherlands, phone: (31) 70 302 5000, fax: (31)
70 345 5896, email: info@europol.eu.int, website:
http://www.europol.eu.int/
Europol is the European Union
law enforcement organization that handles criminal intelligence. Its aim
is to improve the effectiveness and cooperation between the competent authorities
of the Member States in preventing and combating serious international
organized crime. The mission of Europol is to make a significant contribution
to the European Union’s law enforcement action against organized crime,
with an emphasis on targeting criminal organizations.
The United Nations Crime
and Justice Information Network
Centre for International
Crime Prevention, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, P.O. Box
500, A-1400 Vienna, Austria, website: http://www.uncjin.org/
The UNCJIN, as mandated by
United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution 1986/11, is an electronic
clearing-house that represents the culmination of several years of incremental
efforts coordinated by the United Nations Centre for International Crime
Prevention, Vienna.
The International Union of
Police Associations
1421 Prince Street, Suite
400, Alexandria, VA 22314, USA, website:
http://www.iupa.org/index2.html
The International Union of
Police Associations is the only chartered union uniquely for law enforcement
and law enforcement support personnel. The Union works to improve legislation
that protects and affects public safety officers, as well as representing
the needs of law enforcement officers and support personnel.
The International Association
of Chiefs of Police
515 North Washington Street,
Alexandria VA 22314, USA, phone: (703) 836 6767, email: information@theiacp.org,
website: http://www.theiacp.org/
The International Association
of Chiefs of Police is the world’s oldest and largest nonprofit membership
organization of police executives, with over 18,000 members in over 100
different countries. IACP’s leadership consists of the operating chief
executives of international, federal, state and local agencies of all sizes.
Resources for Online Research
Deflem, Mathieu. 1998 "International
Criminal Justice on the Internet." Inter-Section, Newsletter
of the International Section of the ACJS (Summer 1998):1-4. An updated
version is available online at: http://www.sla.purdue.edu/people/soc/mdeflem/ZINTCJ.htm
Greek, Cecil, and Deborah
B. Henry. 1997. "Criminal Justice Resources on the Internet." Journal
of Criminal Justice Education 8(1):91-99.
Journal of Criminal Justice
Education. 1995. Special Issue: "Information Literacy: En Route to the
Information Superhighway." Journal of Criminal Justice Education
6(2):213-358.
Walker, Clive. 1998. Crime,
Criminal Justice and the Internet. London: Sweet and Maxwell.
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