Abstract
We present an analysis of
the organization of counter-terrorist police strategies by the International
Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). Historically, Interpol has gradually
developed anti-terrorist activities since the 1970s and radically expanded
its strategies since the events of September 11. Analyzing these developments,
it is shown that counter-terrorist strategies at the international level
of cooperating police agencies are driven by concerns over an efficient
management and exchange of information among police. The target of terrorism
is thereby (re)defined in a language that can be shared among the world’s
police institutions. As such, Interpol attempts to ‘de-politicize’ terrorism
and strip it of its ideological connotations that create political divisions
in the world. However, these efforts in Interpol and many of its member
agencies to target terrorism as a crime may not necessarily harmonize with
the political, diplomatic, and legal activities against terrorism conducted
at the level of the governments of national states.
INTRODUCTION
International terrorism has
abruptly moved to the center of public attention and become an intense
subject matter at many levels of politics, law, and criminal justice. Especially
since the events of September 11, 2001, there can be no rational way to
deny the relevance of the study of terrorism. Much attention has already
gone to (counter-)terrorism in the scholarly community (e.g., Townshend
2002; White 2003; Deflem 2004), including contributions on the law enforcement
response to the threat and reality of terrorism (e.g., Deflem 2002a:228-231;
Donnermeyer 2002; McVey 1997; Stuntz 2002). Given the contemporary climate
on the global scene, especially the recent conflict between the USA and
Iraq, it is clear that the complex conditions of terrorism involve many
significant components. In this chapter, we will focus on the counter-terrorist
police response at the international level since September 11, especially
the relevant changes in the International Criminal Police Organization,
better known as Interpol.
The perspective of our analysis
is rooted in the sociology of social control and the transformations of
social control under conditions of globalization. Based upon prior research
on international policing (Deflem 2000, 2002a), we defend the theoretical
perspective that international police cooperation is enabled through a
historical process of police agencies gradually claiming and gaining a
position of relative independence from the governments of their respective
states. Following Max Weber’s bureaucratization perspective, such conditions
are characterized as formal bureaucratic autonomy and can be witnessed
to have affected police bureaucracies across the western industrial world.
Under these conditions, moreover, police agencies can rely on expert systems
of knowledge of international crime that are shared across national boundaries
to effectively form international cooperation plans on a relatively broad
multilateral scale. However, despite such trends of international cooperation,
nationally variable concerns of participating police remain paradoxically
paramount, most distinctly in specifying shared international police objectives
at the national level.
INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORIST
POLICING: SEPTEMBER 11 AS WORLD EVENT
The September 11 terrorist
attacks in the United States had a ripple effect that could be felt across
the world and that led to major reorganizations of counter-terrorist policing
(and other components of counter-terrorism) in many countries. In the United
States, among the most striking change in policing has been a sudden and
considerable expansion of police powers, justified by the tragedy and devastation
of the attacks. About a month after the tragedy, the PATRIOT Act (the ‘Provide
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act’), a
new federal bill to broaden police powers against terrorism, easily received
congressional approval. The bill places special emphasis on foreign investigative
work and the investigation of aliens engaged in terrorist activities, and
urges a shift in police attention towards the northern border with Canada.
This expansion of U.S. police powers also brought about a refocusing of
resources and a re-alignment of federal, state, and local police agencies.
All levels of law enforcement focus more attention than ever on terrorism.
In the months following September 11, for instance, the FBI assigned some
4,000 of its 27,000 agents to counter-terrorist activities. Also, the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was then reorganized to separate
its administrative tasks from its expanded enforcement duties, which include
international and interior enforcement as well as border patrol.
The most important initiative
at the federal level to secure inter-agency coordination in the fight against
terrorism was the creation of the Office of Homeland Security. The Office
was established on October 8, 2001 by executive order of President Bush
and placed under the directorship of Tom Ridge, the former governor of
Pennsylvania. On November 24, 2002, the Office turned into a separate Department
in the executive branch, when President Bush signed the ‘Homeland Security
Act of 2002’ into law. The Department has brought together, amongst many
other agencies, the U.S. Customs Service, the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Secret Service,
the U.S. Coast Guard, and the successor to the INS, the Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services.
Counter-terrorist policing
reorganizations, similar to those in the United States, have been conducted
in many countries across the world, especially in Europe where police powers
have also been expanded since September 11. The police institutions directed
by the Ministry of Defense in the United Kingdom, for instance, have been
given broader powers of investigation and can now arrest civilians that
are suspected of terrorist involvement. Again paralleling conditions in
the United States, new counter-terrorist agreements and legislation have
also been passed abroad. For example, the European Union has passed new
anti-terrorism measures, partly justified by the fact that EU-nationals
were among the casualties of September 11.
Thus, at the international
level, the September 11 attacks have served as a powerful symbol to step
up enforcement in many nations and to enhance international cooperation.
Considering the mechanisms that drive international cooperation against
terrorism, emphasis is placed on effectiveness and speed in cooperation,
especially for the exchange of intelligence information. Information on
suspects and requests for information is typically transmitted directly
among police (and intelligence) agencies. In the weeks after September
11, for instance, the FBI passed on information about people suspected
to be involved in the attacks to Scotland Yard and requested investigations
to be conducted on British soil. Typically, personal contacts are established
between the representatives of police of various nations to foster swift
communications. Such fostering of international police cooperation on the
basis of personal contacts by police officials often takes place next to,
and independent of, international diplomatic negotiations. For instance,
when Attorney General Ashcroft met with German Minister of the Interior
Otto Schily in October 2001 to discuss counter-terrorist measures, FBI
counter-terrorist experts separately met with German investigators in Hamburg
to discuss the profiles of the members of a Hamburg cell of the al-Qaeda
network. Additionally, international meetings are held to discuss international
cooperation strategies of counter-terrorism. For example, the meeting of
the International Association of Chiefs of Police in Toronto in September
2001, just a few weeks after the attacks in the United States, was refocused
to discuss the policing of terrorism. A similar adjustment of the discussion
agenda took place when the Interpol General Assembly met in Budapest from
September 24 to 28, 2001, the organization’s first session after the September
11 attacks. In the remainder of this paper, we take a closer look at the
role of Interpol in counter-terrorist policing.
INTERPOL AND INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM
Interpol is an organization
that aims to provide and promote mutual assistance between criminal police
authorities within the limits of national laws and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Originally formed in Vienna in 1923, the organization
has steadily grown in membership but never substantially changed in form
or objectives (Deflem 2000, 2002a). Interpol is not a supranational police
agency with investigative powers, but a cooperative network intended to
foster collaboration and to provide assistance in police work among law
enforcement agencies in many nations. To this end, Interpol links a central
headquarters, located in Lyon, France, with specialized bureaus, the so-called
National Central Bureaus (NCB), in the countries of participating police
agencies. At present, Interpol counts 181 participating police agencies,
with police of Afghanistan among the most recent members to join. At the
Lyon headquarters, Interpol employs some 200 full-time staff and 150 seconded
police officers. The objectives of Interpol have historically always been
confined to criminal enforcement duties (so-called ordinary-law crimes).
Since 1951, following certain politically sensitive Interpol cases that
involved police from former Communist countries in Eastern Europe (Deflem
2002a), Interpol has adopted an even more explicit Article 3 to its constitution
to preclude the “Organization to undertake any intervention or activities
of a political, military, religious or racial character” (Interpol website).
Interpol and Terrorism:
A Brief History
With respect to counter-terrorism,
various resolutions were passed by Interpol to combat —at first implicitly,
then explicitly— terrorism and terrorist-related activities (Anderson 1997;
Bossard 1987; Interpol website). In 1970, the Interpol General Assembly
in Brussels specified a resolution to cooperate in matters of criminal
acts conducted against international civil aviation. In 1971, a resolution
was reached that Interpol agencies should take measures to prevent or suppress
specific modern forms of international criminality, specifically, the holding
of hostages with the intention of perpetrating blackmail or other forms
of extortion. The resolution clarified that this provision was valid only
within the context of the Interpol resolution, which passed in Lisbon,
Portugal in June 1951, that Interpol would not concern itself with matters
of a political, racial or religious nature. In 1979, the Interpol General
Assembly, meeting in Nairobi, decided to take appropriate measures against
organized groups which, sometimes claiming to be ideologically motivated,
had committed acts of violence, such as murder, wounding, kidnapping, hostage-taking,
unlawful interference with civil aviation, arson and bombing, and thereby
“seriously jeopardise general public safety”. In 1981, the General Assembly
in Nice passed a resolution to control the worldwide production, distribution,
sale and storage of explosive substances, which were often used in criminal
acts of violence.
Interpol took a more explicit
move towards the policing of terrorism in 1983, when the General Assembly
meeting in Cannes, France resolved that a study would be conducted to define
Interpol’s position regarding criminal acts that resulted in many victims,
are committed by organized groups, and “which are usually covered by the
general term ‘terrorism’.” It was also decided to organize a symposium
on terrorism in 1984. That year, at the General Assembly meeting in Luxembourg,
a resolution passed on ‘Violent Crime Commonly Referred to as Terrorism’
to encourage the member agencies to cooperate and “combat terrorism as
far as their national laws permit.” Referring specifically to the criminal
acts of organized groups engaging in violent criminal activities that are
designed, by spreading terror or fear, to attain “allegedly political objectives,”
and activities that are “commonly covered by the term ‘terrorism’,” a new
Interpol Resolution specified that “(a) [although] by virtue of the principle
of national sovereignty, the political character of any offense can only
be determined by national legislation, (b) it is nonetheless essential
to combat this type of crime which causes considerable damage in Member
States.” An additional Interpol resolution of 1984 acknowledged that it
was not possible to give a more precise definition of political, military,
religious or racial matters, and that each case had to be examined separately.
In 1985, at the General Assembly
meeting in Washington, D.C., a resolution passed that called for the creation
of a specialized group, the ‘Public Safety and Terrorism’ (PST) sub-directorate
to coordinate and enhance cooperation in “combating international terrorism.”
The resolution also called for a practical instruction manual on terrorism,
to organize another symposium on terrorism, and to make international terrorism
an agenda item of all future General Assembly and Executive Committee meetings.
In 1986, a first ‘Guide for Combating International Terrorism’ was approved.
Following certain highly
publicized terrorist incidents during the 1990s (such as the World Trade
Center bombing on February 26, 1993), the Interpol General Assembly stepped
up its counter-terrorist initiatives. In 1998, at the General Assembly
meeting in Cairo, Interpol’s commitment to combat international terrorism
was explicitly confirmed in a ‘Declaration Against Terrorism,’ condemning
terrorism because of the threat it poses “not only with regard to security
and stability, but also to the State of Law, to democracy and to human
rights.” In 1999, at the Interpol General Assembly meeting in Seoul, it
was again affirmed that the fight against international terrorism was “one
of the main aims of Interpol’s action in carrying out its general activities
of police cooperation.”
Recent Developments: Interpol
After September 11
Interpol’s Counter-Terrorism
Resolutions Since 9-11
A few weeks after the terrorist
attacks in the United States, from September 24 to 28, 2001, the Interpol
General Assembly held its 70th meeting in Budapest, Hungary. At the meeting,
the Interpol General Assembly passed Resolution AG-2001-RES-05 on the ‘Terrorist
Attack of 11 September 2001’ to condemn the “murderous attacks perpetrated
against the world’s citizens in the United States of America on 11 September
2001” as “an abhorrent violation of law and of the standards of human decency”
that constitute “cold-blooded mass murder [and] a crime against humanity.”
It was also decided to tackle terrorism and organized crime more effectively
and that the highest priority be given to the issuance of so-called Red
Notices (international Interpol warrants to seek arrest and extradition)
for terrorists sought in connection with the attacks. Later, in October
2001, Interpol held its 16th Annual Symposium on Terrorism, the first of
Interpol’s terrorism meetings to take place after September 11, at which
110 experts from 51 countries discussed new long-term anti-terrorism initiatives,
such as the feasibility of setting up a special aviation database; the
financing of terrorism; and the expansion of anti-money laundering measures.
In October 2002, 450 representatives from 139 of Interpol’s 181 member
agencies attended the 71st General Assembly meeting in Yaoundé,
Cameroon. Acknowledging September 11 as a catalyst in the development of
global approaches to crime, the meeting paid even more distinct attention
to the matter of terrorism. The Assembly attendants agreed to draft a list
of security precautions for the handling of potentially dangerous materials
(such as letters and parcels that might contain anthrax), while bio-terrorism
was specified as deserving special attention.
An online available Interpol
fact sheet on ‘The Fight Against International Terrorism’ summarizes the
key elements of Interpol’s current policy against international terrorism
(Interpol website). It specifies that in the aftermath of a terrorist act,
member agencies are expected to inform the Interpol headquarters of the
particulars concerning an incident and its investigative developments,
such as details about individuals arrested and information concerning organizations
on whose behalf the terrorist act was conducted. The Interpol offices in
Lyon can then issue international notices for fugitive terrorists whose
arrest is sought by a member agency. Since 1998, a formal set of ‘Interpol
Guidelines for Co-operation in Combating International Terrorism’ more
explicitly addresses the relationship of terrorism to Article 3 of Interpol’s
Constitution, forbidding Interpol to undertake matters of a political,
military, religious or racial character. The key aspect is that terrorist
incidents are broken down into their constituent parts, the criminal elements
of which can then be identified and subjected to police investigations
(Anderson 1997:95).
The restriction laid down
by Article 3 is further clarified in an Interpol policy document outlining
the “Legal framework governing action by Interpol in cases of a political,
military, religious or racial character.” Applying to both the General
Secretariat and Interpol’s member agencies, Article 3 is said to allow
Interpol to check that requests from an NCB comply with the Constitution.
Interpol may also receive requests submitted by individuals or an NCB concerning
cases which could potentially violate Article 3. In order to determine
such a violation, a distinction is made between offenses which are by their
very nature considered to be of a political, military, religious or racial
character, on the one hand, and offenses of which the predominant nature
must be more carefully studied to determine its constituent components.
In the latter case (of the so-called predominance theory), Interpol takes
into account whether there are links between the aims of the accused and
their victims, and bases its analysis on three criteria: the place where
the action was carried out; the status of the victims; and the seriousness
of the offense. These principles also inform the distinction Interpol makes
between requests for prevention and those for prosecution: 1) requests
aimed at prosecuting terrorists are processed in strict conformity with
the above rules; but 2) with regard to preventing terrorism, Interpol does
not apply the theory of predominance.
Until recently, Interpol
had a policy in place that specified that the decision to circulate information
via the Interpol headquarters always had to be based on intelligence indicating
that an individual might be involved in a terrorist offense, rather than
that the individual merely was a member of some particular group. Effective
November 18, 2003, however, it was decided that a Red Notice for arrest
and extradition can be issued for suspected members of a terrorist group,
providing strong evidence of such membership. The policy change has been
justified because membership in a terrorist organization is considered
a criminal offense in an increasing number of nations.
Interpol pays special attention
to the financing of terrorist activities, because it is found that the
frequency and seriousness of terrorist attacks are often proportionate
to the amount of financing terrorists receive. Interpol’s emphasis on financing
is aided by the fact that Interpol Secretary General Ronald K. Noble, the
organization’s chief executive (and an NYU Law School Professor), has a
long-standing interest in monetary crimes as President of the Financial
Action Task Force, a 26-nation agency established to fight money laundering.
In 1999, a first specific Interpol resolution on the financing of terrorism
was passed in Seoul and, since then, the financing of terrorism has remained
a special focus of Interpol. When Secretary General Noble addressed the
U.S. House Committee on International Relations in July 2003, he discussed
the increasingly more problematic links between intellectual property crimes
and terrorist financing. Noble went as far as to argue that “intellectual
property crime is becoming the preferred method of funding for a number
of terrorist groups.”
Finally, Interpol also sets
up separate agreements to maintain liaisons with other international organizations.
In November 2001, for example, Interpol signed an agreement with Europol
to foster cooperation in the policing of terrorism and other international
crimes, including those associated with the introduction of the new Euro
currency. In December 2001, Interpol and the U.S. Department of the Treasury
similarly pledged to cooperate more closely and create an international
database of organizations and persons identified as providing financial
assistance to terrorist groups. In March 2002, Interpol reached an agreement
to cooperate closely with the Arab Interior Ministers’ Council to facilitate
the exchange of information with the Arab police community.
Interpol’s Counter-Terrorist
Actions Since September 11
How did the terrorist attacks
of September 11 fall under the authority of Interpol’s objectives? The
clearest answer to this question came from Interpol’s Secretary General,
Ronald Noble, who in his opening speech to the 10th General Assembly in
Budapest emphasized the global, non-political dimensions of the September
11 attacks. Noble not only referred to the fact that citizens from over
80 countries were among the casualties, but also argued that while the
terrorist attacks took place on U.S. soil, “they constituted attacks against
the entire world and its citizens.” Therefore, Noble explained, Interpol
would continue and expand its re-organizations to better suit changing
conditions of international crime. Likewise, the Interpol Resolution agreed
upon in Budapest likewise made reference to the September 11 attacks as
having been directed “against the world’s citizens.” And at a special session
of the Financial Action Task Force in Washington, DC, October 29, 2001,
Noble emphasized that the attacks targeted the World Trade Center, which
“thus represented the world by name,” indicating that the terrorists meant
the attacks to “be felt worldwide... [and] have no geographical limits
and no national boundaries.”
Although Interpol recognized
that the FBI was handling the primary investigation of the acts of 11 September,
many investigative leads spanned the globe and many of Interpol’s member
agencies have been involved with the investigations. Interpol members have
issued Red Notices for a number of terrorist suspects through Interpol’s
international communication network and have published them on its web
site to give them as wide a circulation as possible. Immediately following
September 11, Interpol issued 55 Red Notices for terrorists who had committed
or were connected to these terrorist attacks. Interpol also increased its
circulation of Blue Notices, i.e., requests for information about or the
location of a suspect, of which 19 concerned the hijackers who carried
out the September 11 attacks. On September 25, 2001, for instance, Egyptian
police authorities posted a Red Notice for Aiman Al Zawahry, a leader of
the Al Jihad terrorist group and considered Bin Laden’s right hand man.
Incidentally, the first request by Red Notice for the Saudi-born militant,
Usama bin Laden, was made by police from Libya well before the attacks
on the United States (Brisard and Dasquie 2002).
International Police Arrangements
and Structural Re-Organizations
After September 11, Interpol
reorganized in several key respects, although some of these organizational
changes had already begun before the terrorist attacks. Most concretely,
during a press conference in Madrid on September 14, 2001, Secretary General
Noble announced the creation of ‘11 September Task Force’ at Interpol’s
Headquarters in Lyon, France. The objective of this special task force
is to coordinate international criminal police intelligence received at
Interpol’s Headquarters and relating to the recent terrorist attacks in
the United States. The creation of the task force is meant to ensure that
information received is processed as quickly as possible for immediate
forwarding to the Interpol National Central Bureau in Washington, DC, and,
through it, to the FBI.
Also instituted following
the September 11 attacks was a General Secretariat Command and Co-ordination
Center that is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. A new Financial
and High Tech Crimes Sub-Directorate was created that specialized in money
laundering. Furthermore, five new Assistant Director posts have been created
for various regions of the world, including the Arab World, Europe, the
Americas, Asia/Pacific, and Africa. The Public Safety and Terrorism Sub-Directorate
became a component of the Specialized Crimes Directorate. In April 2002,
Interpol announced the creation of an Interpol Terrorism Watch List, which
provides direct access by police agencies to information on fugitive and
suspected terrorists who are subject to red (arrest), blue (location) and
green (information) notices. On June 22, 2001, Interpol established a system
for member agencies to automatically enter information into and retrieve
information from a database on stolen blank travel documents. And, finally,
at the Cameroon meeting of 2002, the establishment of a new global communications
project was announced as Interpol’s highest priority. This project involves
the launching of a new internet-based Global Communications System, called
‘I-24/7,’ to provide for a rapid and secure exchange of data among Interpol’s
member agencies. Now operational, the I-24/7 system allows for the searching
and cross-checking of data submitted to Interpol by the organization’s
members over a virtual private network system that transmits encrypted
information over the internet. At the 72nd Interpol General Assembly in
Benidorm, Spain, in September 2003, Secretary General Noble said that a
total of 78 NCBs and 10 other non-NCBs (among them, the New York City Police)
had by then been effectively connected to the I-24/7 system. Special efforts
are now underway to also connect Interpol’s other members. In November
2003, bids were requested from equipment and service suppliers to connect
the police of countries in Africa and the Caribbean to the I-24/7 system.
DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM
Related to the theoretical
perspective introduced in this paper that international police developments
are driven by bureaucratization trends in police agencies and that there
is a remaining persistence of nationally variable concerns, two issues
emerge as central from our analysis. One, because of Interpol’s structure
as a cooperative organization, the limitations and characteristics of the
various police systems of different nations continue to be revealed when
they engage in border-transcending international work. And, two, technological
developments and concerns of efficiency are primary considerations in establishing
the organizational structures of counter-terrorism, oftentimes even over-riding
the ideological antagonisms on terrorism as a politically volatile issue.
The Boundaries of Interpol
The fact that Interpol brings
together police of different nations without creating a supranational police
force demonstrates that national concerns affect international cooperation
among police of different nations (Deflem 2002a). By its very nature, then,
Interpol serves in the “limited capacity of a communication network system
to assist local law enforcement in locating terrorists” (Carberry 1999).
Additionally, local developments and unilaterally executed transnational
police operations typically outweigh international police work and cooperation
on a multilateral scale and/or more or less pre-structured basis. As a
result, the famous international criminal law scholar Cherif Bassiouni
(2002) argues that Interpol is simply not effective because “major powers,
like the United States, do not fully trust it” (p. 93). In the days following
the attacks of 9-11, FBI officials were indeed reported to “have been loathe
to share sensitive information with” Interpol, instead preferring unilaterally
conducted operations. Furthermore, Bassiouni argues, the fight against
international terrorism is less likely to be effective when no or only
limited cooperation exists with the intelligence community and instead
remains restricted, as in the case of Interpol, to police agencies.
Recognizing these limitations,
Interpol places most emphasis on a smooth coordination of and direct contacts
between the various participating police agencies. Only a few days after
September 11, Interpol Secretary General Noble flew to New York and Washington
to meet with U.S. police chiefs and plead for international cooperation.
Also, during his speech in Budapest, Noble aptly stressed that the concrete
steps that had to be taken to expand Interpol’s counter-terrorist role
would have to be “beginning in each of our home countries.” He added that
Interpol needed “each country’s commitment to use our systems and to fill
our databases,” but that, regrettably, “many countries consider Interpol
too slow.” Similarly, Willy Deridder, the Executive Director of Interpol,
at the 16th Annual Interpol Symposium on Terrorism emphasized that information
exchange is the key issue in international police work, which is in no
small part influenced by cooperation between law enforcement agencies,
law enforcement and intelligence services, and relations with magistrates,
all issues that Deridder admitted had to be dealt with at the national
level.
Police support at the national
level is not self-evident, particularly not when cases involve politically
sensitive matters. This was clearly shown in the case of a former Chechen
government representative, Akhmed Zakayev, for whom an Interpol warrant
on charges of terrorism was distributed on the request of Russian Authorities.
The Chechen envoy was freed by Danish authorities early December 2002,
because no evidence was found against him. Thereafter, the Chechen citizen
was also released on bail from a London prison. Another interesting
instance of lack of cooperation at the national level by police agencies,
despite their formal participation in Interpol, is the case of former Peruvian
President Alberto Fujimori. An Interpol notice for Fujimori, who
is now living in self-exile in Japan, was placed by Peruvian authorities
in 2001. But Japanese police and justice authorities have not sought extradition
for Fujimori because he has in the meantime become a Japanese citizen.
Another peculiar indication
of the persistence of nationality in international policing is that sources
in Arabic are always listed first on the pages of Interpol website and
all official documents since September 11. Although Arabic was together
with English, French, and Spanish already one of Interpol’s official languages
before 9-11, the prominence now accorded to the language clearly shows
that international police organizations and cooperative arrangements such
as Interpol reflect the various characteristics of national police agencies,
their relative weight on the international scene, and the focus on terrorist
groups from Arab nations (Rubin and Rubin 2002). Thus, police agencies
from the western industrialized world, especially the U.S. and Europe,
are seen to strongly influence the international police agenda on terrorism.
Additionally, the focus on foreign terrorist groups rather than domestic
groups has led to an emphasis in anti-terrorist activities on citizens
of certain countries, often with distinct ethnic characteristics, bringing
about problematic considerations with respect to civil and human rights.
Ironically, among the victims of this ethnic bias in the application of
anti-terrorist laws has been Interpol Secretary General Ronald Noble, who
has experienced to have been singled out at airport checks because he is
African-American. “I know that I've been searched because I look like a
person who could be Arabic, if I'm traveling from an Arab country —or I
could be a drug-trafficker if I'm coming from a drug-trafficking country,”
Noble said in an interview during Interpol’s annual meeting in Benidorm.
An additional consequence
of the persistence of nationality in international police work (Deflem
2002a) is the fact that international terrorism has mostly remained a matter
regulated, policed, and prosecuted at the national level or on a more limited
multilateral scale. This accounts for the development of many international
anti-terrorist initiatives that are independent from Interpol. In Europe,
for instance, counter-terrorist efforts date back to the 1970s when the
TREVI Group (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and International Violence
Group) was founded in the European Community (Benyon 1997; Rauchs and Koenig
2001). The Group was explicitly founded because “Interpol was not considered
suitable for such discussions because of a distrust of its ability to handle
sensitive information” (Gammelgard 2001:238). Since the formation of the
TREVI Group, Europe’s unified nations have created additional cooperative
arrangements against terrorism. In 1993, the TREVI Group was along with
other European judicial, customs, and immigration organizations united
in a new structure specified by the Treaty of European Union. And since
1998, an anti-terrorist unit, the ‘Task Force Terrorism,’ has been set
up in the European Police Office (Europol).
In multilateral anti-terrorist
matters, moreover, the United States has typically played a leading and
dominant role. According to Ethan Nadelmann (1993), U.S. police agencies
influenced Interpol to become a more effective organization and promote
U.S. law enforcement concerns, including improvement of international cooperation
in Interpol and its member agencies in matters of “terrorism and the financial
aspects of drug trafficking” (p. 185). According to Malcolm Anderson (1997),
Interpol’s re-interpretation of the meaning of Article 3 and its consequences
for counter-terrorism in 1984 was the result of “a combination of American
pressure, sensitivity to sections of western public opinion alarmed by
terrorism, and fear that the Organization could be marginalized” (p. 95).
And, indeed, following the reinterpretation, the Interpol communication
network was, in effect, used to search for terrorist suspects. In 1985,
for example, the London NCB issued about 1,000 enquiries about a bombing
by the IRA aimed at killing then British Prime Minister Thatcher and some
of her colleagues when they were in Brighton (Anderson 1997:95).
Relative to Interpol’s increasing
involvement in counter-terrorism, it is important to note that police agencies
at the level of national states have also gradually expanded their powers
to include anti-terrorist objectives. In the United States, for instance,
the FBI’s role in anti-terrorist investigations abroad was until the 1970s
limited because federal laws restricted the scope of the FBI’s jurisdiction.
In 1978, the deaths of a congressman and a U.S. embassy official in Guyana
created an opportunity for the FBI to become involved in international
investigations. In the 1980s, an increasing number of terrorist incidents
and politically motivated killings of U.S. citizens created additional
incentives for the FBI to become involved in international investigations
(Nadelmann 1993:157). In 1983, for example, the FBI sent forensics experts
to Beirut to investigate the April embassy bombing and the October Marines
barracks bombing. Federal laws then also extended U.S. jurisdiction over
violent crimes, such as terrorism, against American citizens abroad. The
international character of terrorism has led to the passing of new laws
by U.S. Congress to protect Americans and their property from assault,
regardless of where it occurs (Marx 1997:24; Nadelmann 1993:157; Smith
1994). In 1984 and 1986, Congress formally passed legislation that granted
U.S. police agencies wider extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist
acts. Between 1985 and 1989, the FBI conduced over fifty investigations
of terrorist actions that occurred outside American borders. From the early
1990s onwards, the counter-terrorist role of the FBI steadily expanded
and, since September 11, the FBI has become the leading counter-terrorist
law enforcement agency in the United States. The case of the FBI’s growing
counter-terrorism program shows that although Interpol’s role in counter-terrorism
is more significant today than it ever was before, the police agencies
of various countries may continue to work on a unilateral or limited cooperative
basis rather than take advantage of participation in the international
organization.
Towards Global Police
Efficiency
A remarkable emphasis is
placed on technology in formulating the proper police response to international
terrorism. The centrality of technology in international counter-terrorist
policing is seen as a necessity in response to the use of new technologies
by contemporary terrorist organizations, which are argued to be highly
sophisticated in terms of scope and methods of operation and are also said
to rely on high-tech means of communication and financing to recruit new
members and organize attacks (Harmon 2000). Furthermore, aided by such
technical developments, a relatively high degree of internationalism and
cross-border activity characterizes many present-day terrorist groups.
But there is also an independent technological drive in (international)
police work based on the means, rather the objectives of policing (Deflem
2002b). Indeed, language barriers, poor inter-agency communications, and
aged equipment among police are seen as hindering police investigations.
Likewise indicating the sharp emphasis on technological issues, separate
concern in counter-terrorism goes to bio-terrorism, the use of computers,
and the financial assets of terrorist groupings. All these factors betray
an emphasis on the technological means at the disposal of terrorist groups
and the likewise technically sophisticated manner in which counter-terrorist
police strategies should respond (Deflem 2002b).
Demonstrating the emphasis
on technology at Interpol are the creation of a specialized anti-terrorist
command and coordination center, a new sub-directorate specialized in sophisticated
financial crimes, new computerized databases, and the newly instituted
I-24/7 communications system. Similarly, the PATRIOT Act in the United
States, much like similar legislative changes that have been introduced
elsewhere in the world, also places a premium on the technologies of counter-terrorism.
Among the surveillance tools mentioned in the PATRIOT Act, for instance,
are secret search and seizure methods, the tapping of telephones, and the
use of detention without charges for seven days (Whitehead and Aden 2002).
Ironically, in view of the
technological focus in counter-terrorism, police and intelligence agencies
have been criticized for not having been efficient in curbing terrorism
or for predicting the September 11 attack. Efficiency as an aim in police
operations does not necessarily equate to effectiveness in results. In
the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, for example, there was
an overload of information, as many citizens have called in about all kinds
of issues they think matter for terrorism, or because they thought they
had leads on the investigations. On the other hand, police officials are
quick to respond that they had warned many times against the possibility
of new terrorist attacks. In 1998, for instance, then FBI Director Louis
Freeh already said that the loosely-organized terrorist networks, such
as the one controlled by Usama bin Laden, pose “the most urgent threat
to the United States.”
At the international level,
Interpol head Ronald Noble admitted that the sharing of information among
the police agencies throughout the world is not always easy, because national
agencies do not want to jeopardize their investigations. Noble also acknowledged
that Interpol’s “communication system... is antiquated, clumsy to use.”
Until recently, the circulation of Red Notices occurred by regular mail.
Even though a received Red Notice could be processed and translated into
Interpol’s four languages within a day, Interpol would then mail photocopies
back to member agencies, using the cheapest and lowest-priority mail service.
It could take weeks, even months before the Red Notices would reach their
destination. Changes were made after September 11 to move to an electronic
communications system. During the first 10 months of 2002, about half of
all (968) Red Notices were transmitted electronically, albeit it to only
42 member agencies. Some NCBs are not aware of the benefits of the electronic
system, while others do not have the necessary technical infrastructure.
Related to the technological
emphasis in the means of counter-terrorist policing is a de-politicization
of terrorism as the target of police activities. The explicit non-political
nature of the objectives of Interpol’s activities may seem problematic
in the case of terrorism because terrorist activities by definition contain
a political element in terms of their motive. Christopher Harmon (2000),
for instance, defines terrorism as the use of illegitimate means, typically
involving the exercise of violence against innocent people, to gain political
power. It has therefore been argued that Interpol cannot be authorized
within the parameter of its own constitution, especially Article 3, to
exchange information regarding political terrorists (Bassiouni 2002). Responding
to such concerns, police cooperation with respect to terrorism has in the
European context been legally and formally secured in Articles K-K.9 (Title
VI) of the Treaty on the European Union concerning cooperation in the fields
of justice and home affairs. One of the articles provides for “police cooperation
for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking
and other serious forms of international crime, including customs cooperation
in connection with a Union-wide system for exchanging information within
a European Police Office (Europol)” (Flaherty and Lally-Green 1996:983-984).
From a legal viewpoint it
might be problematic for Interpol that there is no internationally agreed
upon definition of terrorism. The plurality of terrorism definitions reflects
the disagreement that exists over the politically sensitive issues of the
“purposes of terrorist aims, actors, and activities... [and is] symptomatic
of larger ideological arguments over who the ‘bad guys’ are” (Sabia 2000:228).
In potential terrorism cases, one country may identify an act as terrorism,
while another country might label it “resistance” (Marx 1997:33). Gary
Marx cites an example in which a Pakistani religious party requested that
American rock stars be tried as terrorists, because, they argued, “Michael
Jackson and Madonna are the torch bearers of American society [and] their
cultural and social values... are destroying humanity” (Marx 1997:33).
Differences in definitions of terrorism across nations also shape differences
in their systems of legislation, so that national laws and international
conventions may often differ, making enforcement at an international level
difficult. Thus, although a United Nations General Assembly Resolution
of 1983 unconditionally condemned as criminal “all acts, methods and practices
of terrorism,” the only instrument of enforcement adopted by 1988 was the
more restricted International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings (Gregory 2000:102).
From the viewpoint of international
police cooperation, however, it is important to note that terrorist incidents,
even when they explicitly involve political motives on the part of the
perpetrators and are sensitive matters in an ideological sense, are de-politicized
by police institutions to become the foundation of shared systems of information
on which international cooperation can be based (Deflem 2002a; see Geraghty
2002). When Interpol was placed on high alert to respond to possible terrorist
attacks that might occur during the war in Iraq, General Secretary Noble
was quick to add that Interpol would not take a position on the war itself.
As is the case in Interpol, politically sensitive crimes, such as terrorism,
can also be broken down into several components, only the criminal elements
of which (e.g., homicide, bombings, illegal weapons trade) are taken as
the focus of international police investigations. Thus, while it is legally
problematic that terrorism is defined differently across the nations of
the world, police agencies of various countries can agree to accept their
common task to focus on terrorism, whatever its more precise legal specification
in any country.
From the viewpoint
of a de-politicized understanding of terrorism it becomes understandable
why Interpol manages to attract cooperation from police agencies representing
nations that are ideologically very diverse and not always on friendly
terms in political respects. In January 2002, for example, Interpol decided
to donate communications equipment to the Cuban police to better coordinate
its anti-terrorist operations. According to Interpol Secretary General
Noble, the technology transfer was in part the result of the cooperation
agreement Interpol had signed with the U.S. Treasury Department concerning
matters of the financing of terrorism. Similarly revealing the politics-transcending
nature of international counter-terrorist police work is the fact that
shortly after the war in Iraq, authorities from France and the United States
agreed to cooperate towards the development of biometric techniques to
prevent the forgery of passports as part of their efforts against terrorism,
despite these countries’ profound disagreements over the Iraqi conflict.
On the occasion of the signing of the agreement, U.S. Attorney General
John Ashcroft also visited the Interpol Headquarters in Lyon to attend
an international conference aimed at stepping up the recovery of Iraqi
works of art stolen in the aftermath of the fall of the Saddam regime.
Thus, although ideological sentiments on terrorism are very divided in
the world of politics and diplomacy, international efforts at the level
of police agencies and organizations, such as Interpol and its member agencies,
can be based on a common ground surrounding terrorism through its treatment
as a de-politicized crime.
CONCLUSION
Interpol has undergone significant
changes since September 11 as part of a renewed and vigorous effort to
more efficiently organize international police cooperation against the
terrorist threat. Most clearly, new systems of information exchange among
police across the world have been instituted. Also, formal policy resolutions
have been developed to offer a foundation to these new counter-terrorist
arrangements. Two keys issues emerge that will significantly direct the
shape and future of Interpol’s counter-terrorist activities. One, Interpol
is not a supranational police force with investigative powers but instead
provides a collaborative forum for cooperation among the police of 181
nations. Two, concerns of efficiency and technical sophistication in international
police work are emphasized in Interpol but remain confronted with the ideological
battles over terrorism on the political arena of world diplomacy.
With respect to the collaborative
form of international police cooperation in Interpol, it remains unclear
to what extent the organization can effectively determine the course and
outcome of counter-terrorist police efforts. To be sure, Interpol does
aid in the fight against terrorism and the organization is used by police
of various nations. Nonetheless, relative to the activities undertaken
by the police agencies of certain powerful nations across the world, Interpol’s
efforts are rather minimal. Particularly in matters of terrorism, these
police organizations may be expected to prefer unilateral strategies and
cooperative efforts on a more limited scale. Additional regional cooperation
efforts (e.g., by Europol) further add to the notion that Interpol cannot
readily be expected to make good on its claim to be the world’s leading
police organization. Potential resistance from police in Arab nations,
likewise, may cause rifts in the global fight against terrorism.
As a modern bureaucratic
police organization, Interpol typically institutes efficient procedures
of information exchange and intelligence gathering. In the wake of September
11, Interpol drastically modernized some of its technical apparatus and
further built on the communications facilities it has been developing since
many decades among a growing number of member agencies. Yet a key problem
remains the tension between the emphasis placed in Interpol on efficiency
of international police work and communications, on the one hand, and the
politically sensitive nature of counter-terrorist objectives, on the other.
By criminalizing terrorism, Interpol seeks to develop counter-terrorist
programs that can be participated in by police institutions from countries
across the world irrespective of the ideological justifications of and
sentiments about terrorist activities. The treatment of terrorism in Interpol
as a purely criminal matter reflects the impact of a professionalized police
culture across nations. It remains undetermined, however, how this de-politicized
approach to terrorism as a crime will blend or clash with the political
response to international terrorism as a matter of international diplomacy,
law, and war.
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Notes
1 This analysis is
based on publicly available documents from archives, libraries, and police
agency websites. Additionally relied upon were news sources retrieved through
Lexis-Nexis. News sources are cited only in footnotes. Other sources are
listed in the References section.
2 Unless otherwise
stated, all references in this section and the following are to documents
available on the Interpol website (www.interpol.int).
3 “The Building
of a Network that Is Global and Reliable,” The New York Times, September
23, 2001.
4 “Chechen Envoy
To Ask To Be Removed From Interpol ‘Wanted’ List,” Agence France Presse,
December 5, 2002; “Redgrave Posts Bail for Chechen Who Russia Says Is a
Terrorist,” The New York Times December 7, 2002.
5 “Japan Police
Tight-Lipped Over Interpol Arrest Warrant For Fujimori,” Agence France
Presse, March 9, 2003.
6 “Interpol Needs
Thorough Overhaul to Fight Terrorism,” Agence France Presse, September
26, 2001.
7 Other international
conventions on terrorism that have been agreed upon by the nations of the
world are similarly delineated to specific issues, such as the The Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1971),
the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of the Civil Aviation (1971), and the International Convention against
the Taking of Hostages (1979) (Gammelgard 2001:237).
8 “Iraq War Will
Increase Terror Risk, Analysts Say,” Agence France Presse, March 14, 2003.
9 “Interpol Assists
Cuba in Anti-Terrorist Drive,” Agence France Presse, January 17, 2002;
“Global Plan To Track Terror Funds,” The New York Times, December 19, 2001.
10 “France and U.S.
Seek to Thwart Passport Forgers Postwar Co-Operation,” Financial Times,
May 6, 2003.