For scientific
theory is one thing to which the pragmatic formula applies; it is justified
only by its usefulness in understanding the facts of empirical experience.
—Talcott
Parsons.
It is more than merely
provocative to make the case for the pragmatic objectives of theory by
quoting from the work of a sociologist not uncommonly thought of to have
contributed little beyond conceptual schemata. Besides unraveling the characteristics,
structures and processes of selected institutions in the context of specified
socio-historical conditions, the primary objectives of my work in the area
of the sociology of law and social control involve a determined attempt
to link the insights from general theoretical models with empirical research,
whether in terms of appropriate approaches or fruitful arrivals.
My fondness for theory must
have preceded my interest in sociology, for when I became an undergraduate
student of sociology in Belgium in 1980 I was interested almost exclusively
in issues far outside the discipline. Whatever few sociological interests
I did then maintain, however, were entirely theoretical. The theories I
now develop and apply also date back to my undergraduate student days and
the fortuitous and fortunate exposure to the writings of Emile Durkheim,
Robert Merton, and Talcott Parsons. I thus learned the proper boundaries
of sociology early. The first sociological article I ever read was Merton’s
(1968:73-138) essay on manifest and latent functions, a paper that proved
its point rather well, for it was like no other writing instrumental for
my development as a theoretically inclined sociologist.
The pragmatic objectives
of theory are proclaimed more readily than they are practiced. Admittedly,
some of my writings are ‘purely’ theoretical (Deflem 2003, 1999), and there
must be room for such work, particularly inasmuch as it clarifies the sociological
usefulness of theory to relevant specialty audiences (Deflem 1996, 1989;
Featherstone and Deflem 2003). But I value an exclusive preoccupation with
theory only by those who can perform it competently, which I am not. Instead,
I have in my work mostly sought to show the value of sociological theory
for issues of law and social control, especially by applying theory in
various studies on empirical phenomena. Starting from the premise that
social life is located in time and space, my work concerns aspects of society
that relate to the reproduction of social order in matters of law and social
control. Among the topics I have studied in most detail are constitutional
aspects of abortion policy and the internationalization of the police function.
Reviewing the existing scholarly
literature on abortion policy, it is hard to imagine an area of investigation
more inspired by divergent but always ethical orientations and less informed
by theoretical insight. Most of the existing abortion scholarship indeed
confuses the normativity that social facts resonate with the intellectual
foundations of the study thereof, thus neglecting the value of an analytical
distinction that has been with sociologists since Durkheim. To avoid such
pitfalls, my work relies on the writings of Jürgen Habermas and Talcott
Parsons to analyze the evolution of the constitutional regulation of abortion
in the United States. Because of their breadth and staunchly modernist
aspirations, the works of Habermas and Parsons offer fascinating perspectives
on which to build a meaningful sociological analysis of the dualities of
modern societies. Habermas’ and Parsons’ theories combine to usefully reflect
on the enduring tension produced by the legal recognition of an individualized
right on abortion —a tension that is reflected not least of all the proliferation
of abortion groups and the polarization of abortion opinion— in spite of
and contrary to law’s self-proclaimed function to regulate social behavior
and integrate society (Deflem 1998). In other words, a functionalist orientation
should not lead astray from a historical orientation, both perspectives
(again) inherited from Durkheim.
At least since Weber, a central
focus in the study of law is the tension between legitimacy and legality.
This duality is articulated in the institution of law, minimally in the
continued normative aspirations of law through legislation, on the one
hand, and the establishment of an efficient apparatus of rule enforcement,
on the other. Focusing on the behavior of police institutions, the theoretical
orientation of my work on the historical foundations of international policing
argues against unfounded reductionist perspectives of police power in terms
of state or market (Deflem 2002). It is not only ironic to argue that the
extent to which the bureaucratic autonomy of police institutions is not
recognized among sociologists may count as its single most perceptible
indicator. The neglect of the study of police in sociology and of its relevance
in society is not only a function of the institutionalization of managerial
police studies in criminal justice. It is also intellectually dumbfounding
that police cannot easily be discussed nor perceived in a discipline whose
founders focused centrally on the development of criminal law and surveillance
and the bureaucratization of the state. Weber even equated modern power
with bureaucracy: “domination is in everyday life primarily administration
(Verwaltung)” (Weber 1922:126).
Based on a rejection of the
conflict-theoretical appropriation of Weber, I have developed a theory
of policing that posits the bureaucratic autonomy of police institutions
as a necessary condition for the development of international cooperative
structures. Police institutions form international networks with broad
participation when they are sufficiently divorced from the political dictates
of their respective governments and, additionally, have developed a professional
agenda on the means and objectives of crime control. Gradually in the course
of history these conditions are met more successfully. As Weber already
foresaw, modern bureaucracies ultimately become an “almost unbreakable
formation,” relative to which the political ruler is but “a dilettante”
(Weber 1922:570, 572). This insight is important to recognize among theoretically
oriented sociologists regardless of their research specialty. A respected
colleague once told me, “Surely, police has something to do with the control
of labor.” More than questioning the validity of this statement, my work
is theoretically oriented at getting rid of the ‘surely.’
The bureaucratization theory
of policing has been applied primarily in the historical context of Europe
and the United States from the middle of the 19th century until Word War
II. My current investigations extent the theoretical perspective to analyze
ongoing developments in the policing of terrorism, again with special and
not farfetched attention to the international dimensions that are involved.
The events of September 11 have impacted sociological scholarship (Deflem
2004a, 2004b) and have also removed the need to look for a contemporary
topic supplementing my historical work. The theory of bureaucratization
now serves to guide research on the policing of terrorism and related aspects
of terrorism policy. Based on ongoing research, the theory most distinctly
leads to defend the viewpoint that the present-day constellation of counter-terrorism
policy is fragmented along various institutional dimensions, involving
political, legal, economic, cultural, and, indeed, organizational components.
There is a dubious tendency
in the sociology of law and social control (and, I suspect, in other specialty
areas of our discipline) to have the theoretical intentions of one’s work
be presented as more important than the systematic unraveling of the empirical
dimensions of the social structures and processes one’s sociological attention
is devoted to. There is also an accompanying tendency that one’s work will
be evaluated more in theoretical terms related to the advancement of sociology
rather than on the basis of substantive insights related to society. At
the same time, along with the theory-first drift one can also observe a
trend for certain kinds of work in the sociology of law and social control
(and elsewhere) to leave out considerations of theoretical merit altogether
in favor of a valuation in entirely practical or ethical terms. In both
cases, the divorce of theory and research is arbitrary and unhealthy for
sociological theory and research alike (Merton 1968:139-171). It is an
especially unfortunate and —as my colleagues here show— illegitimate impression
that our specialty would be less involved with theory than others who are
said to engage in core epistemological and theoretical issues. But that
impression exists. Theory is a culture too.
References
Deflem, Mathieu. 2004a, ed.
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives. Oxford, UK:
Elsevier Science.
____. 2004b. “Reading Terrorism
and Terrorists.” Theoretical Criminology, forthcoming.
____. 2003. “The Sociology
of the Sociology of Money: Simmel and the Contemporary Battle of the Classics.”
Journal of Classical Sociology 3(1):67-96.
____. 2002. Policing World
Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation. Oxford/New
York: Oxford University Press. Paperback: May 2004.
____. 1999. “Ferdinand Tönnies
on Crime and Society: An Unexplored Contribution to Criminological Sociology.”
History of the Human Sciences 12(3):87-116.
____. 1998. “The Boundaries
of Abortion Law: Systems Theory from Parsons to Luhmann and Habermas.”
Social Forces 76(3):775-818.
____. 1996, ed. Habermas,
Modernity and Law. London: Sage.
Featherstone, Richard, and
Mathieu Deflem. 2003. “Anomie and Strain: Context and Consequences of Merton’s
Two Theories.” Sociological Inquiry 73(4):471-489.
Merton, Robert K. 1968. “Manifest
and Latent Functions.” In his Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe,
IL: The Free Press.
Weber, Max. (1922) 1980.
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Tübingen:
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
