Abstract
Sociologists have by and
large neglected the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism. The continued
relevance that terrorism may be expected to have in our era should stimulate
the development of new sociological ideas. I propose a sociological perspective
of the policing of terrorism that is conceptually informed by a neo-Weberian
bureaucratization theory of police. The theory holds that anti-terrorist
efforts at the level of police rest on a formal-rational conception of
the means and objectives of counter-terrorism, although ideological and
political sentiments on terrorism are very intense and divisive within
and across national states. Social control and counter-terrorism are complex
realities, comprised of a multitude of dimensions which are not necessarily
in tune with one another. High-profile terrorist incidents, such as the
events of 9/11, lead to attempts by national governments and international
governing bodies to re-direct police efforts against terrorism in function
of political objectives. Yet, because the bureaucratization of modern police
institutions is at an unprecedented high level, the theory predicts, police
agencies will resist these (re-)politicization attempts to continue counter-terrorism
activities that rest on an efficiency-driven treatment and depoliticized
understanding of terrorism.
Introduction
The history of terrorism
and counter-terrorism as topics of sociological reflection is straightforward.
Until recently, very few scholarly studies of terrorism and related issues
had been conducted in the sociological community. Most terrorism-related
research was conducted in other social sciences, especially political science,
international studies, and law. Political scientists have focused on the
relationship between terrorism and political rights and on policies against
terrorism in relation to foreign policy (Heymann 2003; Jenkins 2003; Laqueur
2003; Stern 1999). Terrorism has intellectually also connected with the
interests of international studies scholars, who have investigated terrorism
and counter-terrorism in terms of the manifold interconnections between
nations and other localities (Brown 2002; Sterba 2003). Scholars of law,
finally, have approached problems of terrorism and counter-terrorism in
the specialty areas of international law (Geraghty 2002) and criminal law
(Carter 2003). There is no doubt that insights on terrorism in these social-science
disciplines are highly relevant, but a distinctive tradition of a sociology
of terrorism is sadly missing, despite the occasional exceptions (Gibbs
1989; Juergensmeyer 2000). Fortunately, since the events of September 11,
many new terrorism-related works have appeared, also in sociology (Beck
2002; Deflem 2004, forthcoming; Denzin and Lincoln 2003; Etzioni 2002;
Sociological Theory 2004; Webb 2002).
Terrorism scholarship also
comprises the study of counter-terrorism, defined as the whole of policies
and practices responding to terrorism. Counter-terrorism, however, has
been relatively much less addressed than terrorism, mirroring a differential
concern related to power and authority which sociologists have often noted
(Goffman 1961). The existing literature focuses on counter-terrorism mostly
as one aspect of a broader focus in terms of national legislation (Heymann
2001; Posner 2002) and international policy (Cole 2003; Peers 2003). But
much less discussed have been the practical arrangements and strategies
to fight terrorism at the level of police and other bureaucratic institutions,
which have usually been treated residually or approached from a management
viewpoint (Alexander 2002; Pounder 2002). Whatever its causes, the relative
neglect of research on the institutional dimensions of counter-terrorism
has de facto led to an important omission in scholarship. This paper will
redress this neglect by relying on insights from the sociology of social
control to develop a novel theory of counter-terrorism that is particularly
applicable to the policing of terrorism.
Social Control and the
Policing of Terrorism
Theoretical and substantive
contributions in the sociology of social control offer the basic analytical
tools for a study of the police dimensions of counter-terrorism. Social
control is understood to refer to the social institutions and mechanisms
that define and respond to crime and/or deviance. Situated in the social
control tradition, especially the perspectives rooted in the work of Michel
Foucault (1975) and Max Weber (1922), the sociology of police focuses on
one of the most important manifestations of social control in modern societies.
Among the most interesting topics from the perspective of this paper is
the transformation of the police function in modern industrialized societies
towards the enforcement of criminal objectives that are relatively independent
from the political goals of national states and the growing internationalization
of the police function on the basis thereof (Deflem 2002a, 2002b).
Most existing studies on
the policing of terrorism have not been conducted by sociologists. Political
scientists and legal scholars pay attention to the activities of police
institutions in counter-terrorism, yet they typically conceive of police
in connection to formal policy and law (Donohue and Kayyem 2002). Many
works on the policing of terrorism, also, are very policy-oriented or of
a highly normative nature related to discussions on civil rights (Cohen
2002; Cole 2003). Other studies in the police literature discuss practical
matters from the viewpoint of the position of the police professional (Henry
2002; Veness 2001). Still other works focus on selected aspects and, while
not always analytically strong, are very informative on a variety of issues,
such as anti-terrorist policing in individual countries (Singh 1998), the
counter-terrorist programs of specific police institutions (Lavranos 2003),
and the police implications of terrorism at the local and international
level, especially since 9/11 (Das and Kratcoski 2003; McVey 1997). Many
of these studies are informative but lacking in theoretical focus.
The little sociological (and
socio-legal) work that exists on the police aspects of counter-terrorism
has treated counter-terrorist policing as one element in a broader study
or focused on specific police institutions (Deflem 2004; Deflem and Maybin
2005; De Guzman 2002; Kratcoski, Edelbacher, and Das 2002; Smith 2002).
Counter-terrorist policing has also been studied in terms of its relation
with other important aspects of terrorism such as criminal developments
(Shelley and Picarelli 2002) and issues of international cooperation (Deflem
2002c ; Den Boer and Monar 2002).
Sociological investigations
of the policing of terrorism should not lose sight of the fact that counter-terrorist
activities always comprise a multitude of political, legal, military, economic,
and cultural efforts (Martin 2003; Murphy 2003). The best counter-terrorist
police literature takes these complex dynamics into account. Thus, it is
important that research has brought out that counter-terrorist policing
always involves a rethinking of the connection/disconnection between police
and military institutions, for as terrorism is conceived as war-like behavior
and is responded to by military actions, it brings up the problem of a
potential militarization of the police (Kraska 2001; Sievert 2003). Relatedly,
given the connections between terrorism and politics, there is in counter-terrorism
a delicate relation between police and intelligence activities. Police
and intelligence work do not neatly harmonize as policing activities are
oriented at suspects of criminal cases, while intelligence involves the
routinized collection of information without the necessity of a criminal
event. Additionally, the law enforcement community is itself a multi-dimensional
complex, with various levels of policing and jurisdictional authorities
that cross-cut agencies at the local, state, federal, and international
level. Cooperation, in other words, is a key concern in counter-terrorist
policing.
Terrorism, Policing, and
Bureaucratization
The bureaucratization theory
of policing has been developed in the context of comparative-historical
work on the internationalization of the police function (Deflem 2002a).
Relying on the sociology of Max Weber (1922), I conceive of public police
agencies as bureaucracies that are formally sanctioned by states with the
task of order maintenance and crime control. Bureaucracies have a tendency
towards independence from their political centers on the basis of acquired
expertise and knowledge. Although public police bureaucracies always remain
related to the governments of national states (on which their legitimacy
is based), police institutions achieve institutional autonomy in the means
and objectives of their activities because they rely on a purposive-rational
logic to employ the technically most efficient means and develop professional
systems of knowledge. The theory does not deny that public police agencies
are related to state control, but holds that the behavior of police institutions
is not wholly determined by reference to their relation to the political
center of states and, thus, that police work is not necessarily driven
by the ideological dictates of governments. Contrary to political or state-centered
perspectives that view police as mere extensions of government power (Huggins
1987), the bureaucratization theory suggests that police practices are
fundamentally shaped by organizational developments related to a more general
rationalization process (Walker 1977). Bureaucratization is conceived in
Weberian-terms as an increasing influence of formal-rational principles
of action that affect police institutions to not only determine the most
efficient means of policing, but ultimately also the proper and more specific
goals given a general mandate. In this respect, it is most crucial that
public police institutions gradually abandoned the directives of their
governments to police political opponents and instead began to focus on
distinctly criminal enforcement tasks framed on the basis of professional
conceptions of the nature and extent of crime.
The bureaucratization theory
of police also predicts variation in the form which police strategies will
typically take, especially under conditions of globalization. Thus, the
theory of police bureaucratization accounts for the development of policing
at the (intra)national and international level, a dual focus that may be
expected to be particularly valuable in research on the police aspects
of counter-terrorism because of the conception of terrorism as having both
domestic and foreign components. Historically, modern police development
has gone in the direction of the creation of a specialized bureaucratic
apparatus in functional and organizational respects. Under conditions of
increased interconnections across national states and otherwise confined
localities (globalization), this rationalization has unique implications.
Police efforts transcending
the borders of national states are typically conducted with limited international
appeal (unilateral or bilateral), especially among agencies close in social
distance (Black 1998), and are initiated for ad hoc purposes rather than
permanently structured. If international cooperation structures are set
up, they are maintained as collaborative networks that facilitate communication
and information exchange among the police of various nations without the
creation of a new international force. In consequence of this national
or, more broadly, regional persistence, police institutions ensure that
international activities are conceived as extensions of the primary function
of police to enforce the ‘laws of the land.’ Regional persistence in extra-jurisdictional
police work applies not only to (intra)national versus international police
work, but also to functions and practices at other concentrically expanding
levels of jurisdiction (local, state, federal, and international).
The theory of police bureaucratization
accounts for change as well as continuity in the development of police
institutions. In prior work, I have applied the theory to investigate the
impact of certain periods of momentous societal change that affect the
course and outcome of the bureaucratization of police (Deflem 2002a, 2005).
Drawing on comparative-historical examples in the context of U.S. and European
police systems, for instance, several periods of societal upheaval affected
the police bureaucratization process, such as during the rise of the anarchist
movements in the 19th century, periods of international warfare, and the
spread of communism following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Such momentous
disturbances not only lead to attempts to redirect police work to again
play a role in furthering the political goals of national states (politicization),
but they ironically take place at the same time when police institutions
are solidifying their professional expertise and knowledge, also enabling
them to resist any attempts at (re-)politicization.
In sum, the bureaucratization
theory predicts a high degree of institutional autonomy of police to determine
the means and objectives of its counter-terrorist activities on the basis
of professional expertise and knowledge. However, this perspective does
not maintain that police is unrelated to politics. Instead, the bureaucratization
theory does not fall victim to a simple determinism that would defend the
viewpoint that the behavior of police institutions is ultimately residual
to the behavior of the governments of national states. Such an overdeterministic
perspective is fraught with insurmountable conceptual contradictions to
argue that “all policing is political” while also employing a notion of
“politicized policing” (Huggins 1987:150). As argued elsewhere (Deflem
2002a:31), such a statement is meaningless on conceptual grounds alone.
Because of its Weberian orientation to investigate bureaucratization influences
under specified historical conditions, the theory of police bureaucratization
is conceptually equipped to take into account the societal contexts of
police behavior and the influence of social processes and structures, whether
political, legal, economic, or cultural, on police bureaucracies. Then
it can be discovered empirically that modern police institutions which
are marked by a high degree of institutional autonomy indeed demonstrate
that “real authority... rests necessarily and unavoidably in the hands
of the bureaucracy” (Weber 1918:320). However, this autonomy has variable
implications, depending on social conditions, especially affected by attempts
at a politicization of policing during moments of intense societal upheaval.
Policing the “War on Terror”:
A Sociological Model
Historical incidents of politicization
attempts on policing, such as during the ‘red scare’ in the 1920s and the
build-up towards World War II, offer interesting parallels to the momentous
events of September 11, 2001 (Deflem 2002a, 2002c). It is appropriate to
assume that the function and organization of police, in the United States
as well as elsewhere in the world, will have changed in significant ways
in response to the terrorist events of 9/11. Among the most important contextual
determinants of counter-terrorist policing are political pressures. Expanded
and intensified means of formal policy controlling the conduct of police
institutions in matters of terrorism may be expected to most concretely
articulate such political efforts. But it should also be expected that
police institutions will attempt to resist political influences to continue
to direct their activities in a manner that is congruent with achieved
standards of expertise and knowledge. Moreover, in terms of the international
orientation of counter-terrorist police work, which has special significance
in this context because international terrorism is of central concern to
police institutions, it can be predicted that national and regional persistence
marks counter-terrorist police work. An application of the bureaucratization
theory to an analysis of the police dimensions of counter-terrorism, then,
implies investigation of the following four themes.
1) The Historical Context:
Policing Terrorism Before and After September 11
Terrorism
has instigated police activities for many years. Generally, terrorism was
from the late 1960s onwards much more of concern to police in Europe, Israel,
and the Middle East than in the United States. The relative localization
of terrorism harmonizes with the fact that most terrorist groups are politically
directed at seizing political power in a particular national state. Yet,
with the growing internationalization of terrorist groups during the 1980s,
terrorist events began to have global effects. Plane hijackings and bombings
(e.g., the Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland) steadily stimulated
anti-terrorist police powers. The 1990s brought a renewed attention to
terrorism because of several high-profile terrorist incidents, such as
the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing
in 1995, and the attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
in 1998 and on the USS Cole in 2000. Still, nobody could foresee the impact
that would be brought about by the terrorist incidents of September 11,
2001 in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania. The September 11 attacks
had ripple effects that could be felt across the world and that led to
major reorganizations of counter-terrorist police in many countries.
In the United States, among
the most striking changes in policing post-9/11 was a rapid expansion of
police powers. In the months following September 11, for instance, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assigned some 4,000 of its 11,500
special agents to counter-terrorist activities. This expansion of U.S.
police powers also brought about a refocusing of police powers and a re-alignment
of federal, state and local police agencies, as all levels of police now
more than ever focus on terrorism. Among the ironic consequences of these
adjustments in policing has been that other crimes besides terrorism now
receive much less scrutiny from police and, therefore, may be on the rise.
Counter-terrorist policing
reorganizations similar to those in the United States have also taken place
in many countries across the world, especially in Europe where police powers
have also been expanded since September 11. The police agencies directed
by the Ministry of Defense in the United Kingdom, for instance, have been
given broader powers of investigation and can now arrest civilians that
are suspected of terrorist involvement. Again paralleling conditions in
the United States, new anti-terrorist agreements and legislation have also
been passed abroad. For example, the European Union has passed new anti-terrorism
measures, partly justified also by reference to the fact that EU-nationals
were among the casualties of September 11. At the international level,
then, the September 11 attacks have served as a powerful symbol to step
up enforcement in many nations and enhance cooperation, bringing about
institutional shifts on a global scale.
2) The Political Context:
Political Controls of Counter-Terrorist Policing
The theory
of police bureaucratization takes into account relevant societal contexts,
among which political influences, including government policies and related
legislative initiatives, are most critical. In the decades before September
11, formal government policies and accompanying legislation against terrorism
at the national and international levels of government developed only slowly
and in piecemeal fashion, focusing on specific manifestations commonly
associated with terrorist acts. Internationally, the regulation of terrorism
dates back to at least 1937 when a League of Nations conference adopted
a convention on the ‘Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism’. But only
one country, India, ratified the agreement. From then on, international
laws on terrorism have mostly developed piecemeal, focusing on one or two
very specific elements that are often associated with terrorism (e.g.,
plane hijackings, bombings), but not terrorism as such (Bassiouni 2002).
Examples of such international conventions are the U.N. Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons
of 1973 and the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages,
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1979. These conventions were agreed
upon by different international bodies with more or less wide appeal, ranging
from the United Nations to the Council of Europe, the Organization of American
States, and extradition treaties between two countries. During the 1980s
and 1990s, more such conventions were signed, such as the U.N. International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 1999, and
following the events of 9/11, international regulatory bodies have accordingly
re-affirmed their commitment to fight terrorism, while additional anti-terrorist
legislations have passed in various countries. Despite these various legislative
efforts, however, the international fight against terrorism is clearly
not governed by a simple common agenda. Instead, international terrorism
presents a global field in which many of the nations of the world are at
odds.
In the United States, formal
policies against terrorism also developed slowly during the 1970s and 1980s,
especially in various departments of the executive branch (Wilson 1994).
In the State Department, for instance, a counter-terrorist office was set
up in 1976. Other developments were even more piecemeal than at the international
level, mostly because terrorism was considered a predominantly foreign
problem. The Reagan administration was the first to attempt a broader and
more permanent anti-terrorism policy, though terrorism would mostly remain
a matter distant from home. The 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism
and the 1986 Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act, which made terrorist acts against
Americans abroad a federal crime, both focused on terrorism outside U.S.
soil. The former Bush administration typically treated terrorism as a matter
of international diplomacy, for instance following the plane explosion
over Lockerbie in 1988. Following certain high-profile incidents, such
as the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City
bombing of 1995, the Clinton administration again stepped up anti-terrorist
legislative efforts, most distinctly in passing the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996.
The U.S. political response
to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, however, was far beyond what could have
been predicted on the basis of developments during the 1990s (Deflem 2002c).
To be sure, the military intervention in Afghanistan mirrored the strikes
launched against Al-Qaeda during the Clinton administration. But the military
effort was now more intensive and resolute, backed by new policies to justify
the militarization of criminal justice used against foreign terrorists
and new legislation to more effectively enforce existing terrorist laws.
About a month after 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act (the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act), a new federal bill to broaden police powers against terrorism,
easily received congressional approval, although civil libertarians have
widely criticized the act because of the potential abuse of authority and
erosion of civil liberties (Carter 2003). On November 13, 2001, President
Bush signed an order to allow military trials of foreigners accused of
terrorism. To secure a better system of inter-agency coordination, the
most important initiative at the executive level was the new Office of
Homeland Security, created by President Bush by executive order on October
8, 2001. Placed under the leadership of Tom Ridge, the former governor
of Pennsylvania, the Office turned into a full-fledged Department in the
executive branch, when President Bush on November 24, 2002 signed the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 into law.
The PATRIOT Act is the most
distinct way in which counter-terrorist police work has been legally regulated
and thus indirectly put under political scrutiny, opening up the possibility
that the legal system is used as an instrument to further political goals.
The Act gives broad powers to police in an effort to prevent future terrorist
attacks but thereby also compelling police agencies to fight terrorism
more effectively should any future threat occur. The special focus on international
terrorism is remarkable and confirms the political influences, as the international
forms of terrorism harmonize with the political conception of terrorism
by the present U.S. administration. Relatedly, the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) has been among the most concrete political efforts
to take control of the many agencies involved in the ‘war on terror.’ Organized
with the express purpose of coordinating all federal and, indirectly, local
law enforcement efforts against terrorism, the Department brings together
various policing agencies that were previously part of separate departments.
DHS consists of four major directorates: Border and Transportation Security;
Emergency Preparedness and Response; Science and Technology; and Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. The Border and Transportation Security
directorate is most central to policing and incorporates such agencies
as the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Office of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, and the Transportation Security Administration.
The political treatment of
terrorism as an issue of national security, closely associated with war
and involving military interventions, has also brought about a re-coupling
of military and police duties and has in this sense attempted to bring
police institutions in line with government policy in domestic and international
matters. It is in this respect remarkable how close the current re-organizations
of policing in the United States (and elsewhere in the world) approximate
the politicization attempts and war-time re-organizations that police institutions
underwent in past times (Deflem 2002a). As with periods of extreme political
upheaval and war, the impact of September 11 on policing implied an expansion
of police duties in function of terrorism (e.g., the move of FBI personnel
from drug enforcement). Organizationally, police forces have been given
new and exceptional police means, such as special equipment, personnel,
and budget. And, finally, police institutions also re-aligned with military
forces (Byers 2002). Attorney General Ashcroft spoke of a ‘wartime re-organization’
of the Justice Department (Deflem 2002c). Accordingly, FBI special agents
have been working closely with military units (special forces) and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in overseas operations, while paramilitary
anti-terrorist assault teams are also deployed among civilian police forces
(Sievert 2003). As was the case with international conflicts in the past
(especially World War II), such re-alignments and reorganizations of policing
may lead to structural adjustments that will last until long after the
more immediate repercussions of 9/11 have faded. In other words, police
reorganizations since September 11 demonstrate the validity of the claim
defended by political scientists that national crises typically bring about
a centralization of power in the executive branch of the government (Baker
2002). Typically, indeed, during periods of warfare, police institutions
are drawn closer to the political centers of their respective states to
follow the patterns of cooperation or conflict as determined by the (international)
political scene. However, unlike the late 1900s and the earlier half of
the 20th century, modern police institutions have in the present day attained
a level of bureaucratic autonomy that is unprecedented in scale, with a
multitude of implications in many areas of policing for a period of more
than a century. These considerations can now be spelled out in more detail
to form the core of the here proposed theoretical model in view of estimating
the impact of 9/11 on the organization of counter-terrorist policing.
3) The Institutional Context:
Bureaucratic Autonomy in Counter-Terrorist Policing
While
there are definite empirical indications of an ‘imperial presidency’ in
the wake of September 11 (Blackburn 2002), it is surely not wise to just
assume that this strengthened central political command has effectively
been influential across various levels of government and its many bureaucracies.
Scholars of policy have often observed that there can be a “wide gulf between
the professionals and the White House” (Wilson 1994:187). For instance,
it is not because extreme political efforts have been made to coordinate
various security agencies in one department (DHS) that it can be assumed
that this coordination attempt effectively guides cooperation among those
agencies and would affect and dictate their day-to-day activities and organization.
On theoretical grounds alone, the degree to which the bureaucratic autonomy
of police institutions has been accomplished during long periods of relative
stability cannot be assumed to be without consequences for policing today,
even during times of extreme upheaval in matters as complex as terrorism.
Therefore, on the basis of the bureaucratization theory of policing it
is argued that the transformative powers of September 11 implied only in
delineated ways a return to a politically directed policing. In most important
respects, bureaucratic persistence and resistance against political attempts
to redirect police institutions will have prevented anti-terrorist police
efforts from being politicized to instead remain subject primarily to professional
expertise and knowledge in terms of means as well as objectives. In matters
of counter-terrorist police strategies, I argue, accomplished developments
in the institutional autonomy of police bureaucracies and the accompanying
evolution of a widespread police culture for well over a century now will
resist politicization attempts to foster a mode of counter-terrorist policing
that continues to rest on police professionalism rather than political
purpose.
Importantly, the bureaucratization
theory does not imply that politics is not relevant or that governments
do not attempt to exert influence on police. Certain aspects in the broad
constellation of the ‘war on terror’ are entirely political, most concretely
the policies that guide foreign diplomacy and military operations. Other
political interventions, also, are clearly directed at overseeing and controlling
relevant police work. But by avoiding a naive deterministic conception
of policing, the theory of police bureaucratization maintains clear conceptual
distinctions to be able to carefully analyze the causal paths of influence
among various institutions to bring out the relevance of both politicization
and bureaucratization processes.
The bureaucratization theory
of policing predicts that police institutions have a high degree of autonomy
in determining the means and objectives of its counter-terrorist programs,
despite the fact that there are new political pressures put on these agencies
to harmonize their practices with government policy. In this respect, it
is to be noted that terrorism has been among the tasks of police institutions
since well before September 11. In the United States, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation is the lead agency on terrorism, a responsibility that
has historical roots dating back to the Presidential directives that authorized
the Bureau in the 1930s to investigate activities relating to espionage,
sabotage, subversive activities, and violations of American neutrality
laws (Deflem 2002a). From the 1970s onwards, the FBI steadily expanded
its anti-terrorist programs, both at home and abroad (Nadelmann 1993).
The 1990s saw an upswing in the FBI’s mission, especially after the Oklahoma
City bombing and the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.
A similar emphasis on terrorism
has also affected police institutions of many other countries and has been
influential for international police structures and processes. In Europe,
in particular, where the 1970s witnessed various terrorist incidents, terrorism
was a prime motive in the unification movement among European police, ever
since the creation in 1975 of the so-called TREVI group (‘Terrorism, Radicalism,
Extremism, and International Violence’) established to coordinate police
work on terrorism (Lavranos 2003). Such historical predecessors of counter-terrorist
policing must be taken into account to usefully situate the impact of 9/11
in the context of realized and ongoing developments of police bureaucratization
in matters of counter-terrorism. Bureaucratization tendencies are significant
in terms of the means and objectives of police work.
With respect to the means
of antiterrorist policing, technological developments and concerns of efficiency
are observed to be the primary considerations in establishing police arrangements
against terrorism. The centrality of technology in counter-terrorist policing
mirrors other areas of police work and is driven by an increasing role
played by technologies in both criminal activity as well as police work.
Counter-terrorist police work employs sophisticated technological methods
in response to the use of modern technologies by terrorist groups and individuals,
including sophisticated weaponry and technically advanced means of communication,
financing, and the execution of attacks. Therefore, also, police work is
especially concerned with bio-terrorism, the use of computers, and the
financial assets of terrorist groupings. These factors betray an emphasis
on the technological means at the disposal of terrorist groups and the
likewise technically sophisticated manner in which counter-terrorist police
strategies should respond (Deflem 2002b; Ventura, Miller, and Deflem forthcoming).
An emphasis on principles of efficiency in anti-terrorist policing is apparent
from the police concern with inter-agency communications, linguistic issues,
and the use of special investigative techniques such as wire-tapping.
From an organizational viewpoint,
efficiency considerations are apparent in the functional division of police
work in terms of various investigative matters and management issues. Bureaucratization
effects can also be predicted to take place with respect to the ongoing
militarization or ‘war-time’ reorganization of policing. For while a militarization
of police might imply a politicization of police, at least in certain respects,
war-like developments might also ironically lead to strengthen the role
of police. Organizationally, police institutions might emerge stronger
than before if and when their new powers, acquired during a period of national
emergency, will not be relinquished when relative tranquility has again
set in. The case of the exponential expansion of the FBI during and after
World War II is telling in this respect (Deflem 2002a). Functionally, also,
the widening objectives of policing can potentially be applied to police
duties that are not related to terrorism but share certain some formal
characteristics therewith (e.g., public demonstrations and riots). Also
to be investigated are the mechanisms of cooperation between military and
police services. From a civil liberties viewpoint, the use of special paramilitary
anti-terrorist assault teams in civilian police forces raises serious questions,
but the consequences of the merging of military and police duties are far
from clear. The increasing acceptance among military circles that the threat
of terrorism and post-war reconstructive efforts show the need for police
missions to accompany military actions might actually imply a ‘police-cization’
of the military (Dunlap 1999).
The bureaucratic emphasis
on technologies in counter-terrorism is also apparent in the relevant policies
and legislations that have been passed. Laws and conventions on terrorism
have not only developed piecemeal but typically also focus on technical
aspects of terrorism, such as its financing and its instruments (bombings,
hijackings). Public proclamations of policy, likewise, often emphasize
an efficiency in means that harmonizes with the bureaucratic developments
of police institutions. For instance, a few days after 9/11, President
George Bush sought to step up police efforts against terrorist groups,
saying that “we ought to give the FBI the tools necessary to track down
terrorists” (cited in Deflem 2002c). In the context of the United States,
also, the PATRIOT Act betrays a striking emphasis on an efficiency of means
in combating terrorism (rather than a concern to define terrorism). The
Act focuses on efficient methods to track down terrorists, on means to
ensure effectiveness in cooperation, and on the technological challenges
posed for police and intelligence agencies by advances in communications
technology. Among the special surveillance tools mentioned in the Act are
secret searches and seizures, the tapping of telephones, and the use of
detention without charges for seven days.
The emphasis on technology
and efficiency in counter-terrorist policing reveals the relevance of formal
rationalization processes which have been observed in and beyond many modern
bureaucratic institutions (Weber 1922). The fact that such formal-rational
logic not only drives bureaucratic work but also affects legislation and
other formal policies is indicative of the fact that bureaucratic resistance
can effectively assert itself in the political and legislative realm. As
such, it is not only useful to know which political and legal bodies at
the national and international level have passed laws and regulations on
counter-terrorist policing, but also that these formal policies in substance
and orientation follow the principles police institutions have developed
and applied in their relevant activities, sometimes even before any formal
policies were drafted (Deflem 2002a). In this context, also, it is not
only important to consider that many political leaders across the world
have vowed to conduct a ‘war on terror,’ but also to carefully investigate
the foundational principles and actual mechanisms of counter-terrorism
at all levels, including police. The politicization of counter-terrorism,
as much as its bureaucratization, cannot be speculation, but requires evidence
and scientific analysis.
A final aspect of the efficiency
in means emphasized in counter-terrorist policing relates to the practices
and arrangements of international cooperation and information exchange
among police of different nations. Available evidence shows that the fostering
of international cooperation primarily takes place by establishing direct
means of communication among police. Such police-to-police communications
take place in an extra-legal context and occur at international police
meetings, visits to foreign police agencies, and through established systems
of international police practices and organizations. From the U.S. viewpoint,
international policing activities are conducted by stationing agents abroad,
especially through the FBI’s system of legal attachés stationed
in foreign countries, and by participation in international police organizations.
Among the international organizations, the role of the International Criminal
Police Organization (Interpol) is in this respect most interesting because
the organization has the widest international appeal, has a long history
dating back to the organization’s founding in 1923, and has been focusing
on terrorism issues since the 1970s (Deflem and Maybin 2005). Interpol
has established various systems for communications and information exchange
among its presently 181 members and a central headquarters in Lyons, France.
The very structure of Interpol, in other words, is a manifestation of the
police emphasis on a formal rationalitization in means. Demonstrating the
emphasis on technology in Interpol’s counter-terrorism mission is the technologically
driven infrastructure, including a specialized anti-terrorist command and
coordination center, expanded computerized databases, and a new global
communications system since September 11.
With respect to the objectives
of counter-terrorist policing, the bureaucratization of police work involves
most clearly a de-politicization of the target of police activities to
focus on the distinctly criminal aspects of terrorist activities. From
the police point of view, domestic and international crimes —even when
they involve explicit political or otherwise moral motives on the part
of the perpetrator— form the basis of systems of knowledge that are beyond
political and ideological considerations and that therefore can also be
shared among police of different nations to foster international cooperation
efforts. At least two strategies are used by police to accomplish an effective
criminalization of terrorism. First, terrorism is from the police viewpoint
defined in vague and general terms. The FBI, for instance, defines terrorism
as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (in Kapitan
and Schulte 2002). While the definition contains references to the motives
and goals of terrorism, it is only the quality of the means (‘unlawful
use’) that can justify a police response. Strikingly, those means are in
no way specified and therefore precisely useful to police. Questions on
the morality of terrorism are abandoned in favor of a generalized focus
that becomes a basis to police criminal conduct, whether it be terrorist
or not. An Interpol resolution after September 11 condemned the terrorist
attacks as “an abhorrent violation of law and of the standards of human
decency” (in Deflem and Maybin 2005). The criminalization by police has
total aspirations. The net of social control is wide, its mesh thin (Cohen
1985). Legal and moral considerations aside, a vague conception of terrorism
becomes a powerful and highly consequential basis for police work.
A second strategy in the
criminalization of terrorism is to disentangle terrorist activities into
its various constituent parts, only the criminal elements of which become
the target of police work. In the context of the United States, the PATRIOT
Act does not define terrorism but refers to Section 213 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act on terrorist organizations. That Act, however, does
not offer a definition of terrorism but provides a list of certain criminal
activities, such as hijackings, assassinations, and bombings, that are
commonly associated with terrorism, but which would otherwise also be criminal.
The separation of criminal elements from terrorism also explains the piecemeal
fashion in which international conventions related to terrorism have been
formulated (e.g., on financing) and the relative ineffectiveness of broader
conventions. For example, although a United Nations General Assembly Resolution
of 1983 unconditionally condemned “all acts, methods and practices of terrorism,”
the only instrument of enforcement adopted by 1988 was the more restricted
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Travalio
2000). Similarly, the resolutions on terrorism adopted by Interpol acknowledge
that terrorists themselves refer in their actions explicitly to ideological,
political, or religious motivations, but those elements Interpol disregards
in case there are also criminal elements that predominate in the totality
of the act. Thus, while ideological sentiments, political responses, and
formal laws on terrorism can be very diverse in the world, the target of
terrorism at the level of police bureaucracy is defined in a language that
can be shared among police institutions across the world. As a political,
legal, or moral issue, terrorism is not likely to be able to function as
a basis for domestic or international police work. Yet, from the police
viewpoint, terrorism is a crime and to be responded to accordingly. For
police, the ‘war on terror’ is no war at all.
4) The Globalization Context:
Regional Persistence in the Policing of Terrorism
Both
domestic as well as international forms of terrorism are subject to the
activities of police institutions, opening up the relevance of both intra-national
and inter-national counter-terrorist police strategies. But historically
globalization tendencies can be observed to impact nations and other localities
and their institutions in a differential manner (Robertson 1992). Therefore,
while the bureaucratization of the police function has taken on global
proportions, however unevenly, the trend towards a common police culture
that has gradually driven international police cooperation on a wider international
level has not prevented that national and, more broadly, regional police
objectives remain of paramount concern in planning and executing counter-terrorist
police activities. Based on a theoretical model developed on the internationalization
of the police function (Deflem 2002a) and extended to extra-jurisdictional
activities and multi-agency cooperation, the persistence of regionalism
in the case of counter-terrorist policing takes on at least three forms.
First, police agencies will
prefer to work unilaterally to conceive and fulfill their respective mission.
This applies both to federal or national police organizations whose jurisdiction
extends to countries as well as to local (municipal or state) agencies
whose jurisdictional spaces are less extensive. This principle has various
manifestations in counter-terrorist policing, mostly relating to domestic
versus international terrorism issues and the differential concerns across
the globe over the nature of international terrorism. In the context of
the United States, terrorism will be perceived differently by police in
parts of the country where domestic terrorist groups are more prevalent
than in larger metropolitan centers and border regions or points of entry
with large ports or airports where international terrorism will be of more
concern. The municipal police of a small mid-western town, for instance,
will be more likely to focus on domestic terrorist groups, whereas the
FBI Field Office of a large city in the East Coast may concentrate on the
possibility of another attack from abroad. At this level of regional persistence,
differential conceptions of terrorism are important inasmuch as agencies
have to work together. The FBI, in particular, has since the 1980s set
up multi-agency structures, the so-called Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF),
that are comprised of Bureau special agents as well as officers from local
and state police agencies.
Abroad, counter-terrorist
work by the FBI also betrays a preference for unilateral work, which is
made possible through the Bureau’s system of legal attachés (legats).
Overseen by the International Operations at FBI Headquarters in Washington,
D.C., the FBI presently has legat offices in 52 countries. The considerable
international presence of U.S. agents contributes to an ‘Americanization’
of law enforcement and counter-terrorism inasmuch as terrorism issues of
concern to the United States will, all other conditions being equal, receive
more attention than regional terrorism issues elsewhere in the world (Nadelman
1993). The PATRIOT Act also places special emphasis on foreign investigative
work and the investigation of aliens engaged in terrorist activities. Yet,
resentment and distrust on the part of the world’s police agencies, whose
agenda’s are similarly of regional importance, may bring about difficulties
in cooperation, ironically further supporting the view that unilateral
work is needed.
Second, counter-terrorist
forms of police cooperation will typically be limited in function or scope,
initiated either for a specific purpose without the formation of a permanently
available structure, or on an only limited international scale, involving
as few as possible partners and preferably those of closer social distance.
Thus bilateral cooperation will be preferred over multilateral initiatives,
and cooperation among agencies that are socially close will be preferred
over cooperation between agencies that are socially remote. These principles
help explain that the predominant form of cooperation within the United
States as being predominantly de-centralized in municipalities. This regional
persistence is not only a function of the fact that the U.S. does not have
a true national police, but that federal agencies too are organizationally
decentralized across the territory of the country. These various points
of decentralized field offices and outposts function as the locales where
multi-agency partnerships, such as the JTTF’s organized by the FBI, are
established.
Abroad, too, the counter-terrorist
cooperation activities among police institutions are determined by the
same forces of social distance. Thus, international cooperation with U.S.
participation typically takes place on a bilateral level, for instance
through the FBI legat system, rather than by participation in a multilateral
structure. The international activities of the U.S. representative of Interpol,
the U.S. National Central Bureau in Washington, DC, are truly dwarfed by
the enormous global U.S. counter-terrorism activities done by the FBI and
other institutions with foreign presence. In effect, for a foreign police
agency wishing to contact the FBI it will be futile to route a request
via Interpol or even, for a police from the European Union, via the European
Police Office liaison office in Washington, DC, because the FBI relies
almost exclusively on its legat system for bilateral cooperation.
Third, even when multilateral
cooperation initiatives are established among police, regional persistence
is nonetheless shown because such cooperation will be collaborative in
nature, bringing police agencies together without the formation of a supranational
force. The prototypical case in this respect is Interpol, for the organization
is not a not an international police force but a collaborative network
of police from various nations (Deflem and Maybin 2005). The collaborative
structure of Interpol also brings about that the variable characteristics
of the participating police institutions will be reflected in the organization.
Thus, it is no surprise to observe that U.S. law enforcement agencies have
gradually begun to play a leading role in multilateral anti-terrorist efforts
(Nadelmann 1993). U.S. police agencies influenced Interpol to become a
more effective organization and promote U.S. law enforcement concerns on
terrorism (and drug trafficking). The perspectives on international terrorism
held by police agencies from the United States and other parts of the western
industrialized world, especially Europe, are seen to influence Interpol’s
counter-terrorist programs, as can be seen from the attention paid by the
organization to fundamentalist Islamic groups. On the other hand, because
of Interpol’s collaborative structure with wide international participation,
the organization may not be very effective, because major police powers
from the United States and elsewhere will not only need the organization,
but also not trust many of its members. Therefore, also, more limited regional
police cooperation efforts emerge, such as among police in Arab nations
and in Europe. At the European level, recent developments in the European
unification process. European police institutions have a long-standing
interest in counter-terrorism, dating back to the TREVI group, and presently
centralized in the European Police Office (Europol), the new police organization
under the jurisdiction of the European Union (Lavranos 2003).
Conclusion
Terrorism and counter-terrorism
are relatively neglected themes in the sociological discipline. The events
of September 11 have caught sociologists by surprise in more ways than
one. The enduring relevance of terrorism in the present era requires that
sociologists take terrorism-related matters seriously. Sociologists interested
in the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism cannot just jump on a populist
bandwagon of self-proclaimed terrorism experts or rely on emotion rather
than intellect. Instead, we should build on our proven disciplinary insights
to offer a distinct contribution from which other social scientists can
learn as much as sociologists can learn from them.
Based on insights from the
sociology of social control and globalization, this paper developed a sociological
model of the policing of terrorism control under conditions of societal
rationalization. Extending from the bureaucratization theory of policing,
the forwarded model suggests that counter-terrorism is a complex constellation
in which police institutions that have gained a high degree of institutional
independence and professional autonomy are now once again confronted with
renewed attempts by the political centers of national states to gain control
over policing activities. From the viewpoint of the bureaucratization theory
of social control, the key question of 9/11 concerns the course and outcome
of the clash between attempts to politicize police institutions, on the
one hand, and the bureaucratic resistance those institutions can offer,
on the other. Theoretical insights and empirical research of current developments
suggest that a re-politicization of counter-terrorist policing may not
be easily accomplished and that, instead, police institutions will continue
to claim and gain effective expertise in the control of terrorism.
The relevance of police bureaucratization
in matters of terrorism is considerable. From a theoretical viewpoint,
the anticipated impact of bureaucratic autonomy should lead to strengthen
the notion that the policing of terrorism presents a critical research
domain for sociology. Related to the extra-jurisdictional aspects of counter-terrorist
police work, the here proposed model also offers support to the insight
that the behavior of institutions in modern society cannot be confined
to local developments, but must be situated in a wider field of patterns
and dynamics.
Furthermore, to the extent
that ongoing research will find a persistent bureaucratization of counter-terrorism
policing, a critical potential would be revealed for police agencies to
emphasize efficiency in anti-terrorist police work at the expense of concerns
of legality and justice. Counter-terrorist police strategies may then fall
short in terms of requirements of due process and human rights, inasmuch
as police practices are driven by technological considerations of efficiency
that lack democratic oversight and legal control. The criminalization of
terrorism by police, also, might lead to resentment among other constituencies
of society, be it political decision-makers or grass-roots popular movements,
as they experience the resonance of terrorism in ways that are moral rather
than professional. Factors associated with the regional persistence of
counter-terrorism policing, finally, may likewise produce tensions, as
different conceptions of persons and groups pursued as terrorists (as criminals,
enemies, and freedom-fighters) will not always harmonize with the perspectives
used by police institutions. Bringing out the dynamics and interrelations
of the various institutions associated with terrorism and counter-terrorism
from a broad societal viewpoint should be at the center of sociological
studies.
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